INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE II: Federalism and Bicameralism

1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE II: Federalism and Bicameralism Readings: Lijphart 185-215 and Russell

2. Guiding Questions • What is federalism? • Confederation? • Unitary System? • When do states adopt federal institutions? • What is bicameralism? • Do second chambers matter?

3. Dispersing Authority • Democracies vary in the extent to which they centralize political authority. • Critical for understanding the political logic of a system • Tradeoffs between empowering the center vs. empowering the regions. • Critical: regional autonomy can be used as a basis for further autonomy or independence. • Examples: • 1) Spanish government and Catalan/Basque nationalists. • 2) British government and Scottish/Welsh nationalists • Three different ways to disperse authority.

4. Federal, Confederal, and Unitary Systems • Unitary systems: • Political authority is vested within the central government. • Most European systems fall into this category • Confederation: • Political authority is vested within the subunits and central government is relatively weak. • Modern examples are rare • Switzerland sometimes referred to as a confederation • But this is debatable • Federalism: • Intermediate position between unitary systems and confederation. • Austria, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina • European Union often seen as a “special case” of federalism

5. Definition of Federalism • 1) State is divided between a central government and regional or sub national governments. • Typically, federalism is centered around a territorial component. • 2) Institutional powers are allocated between these levels of government. • Each unit is the “final arbiter” on certain issues. • 3) The levels possess at least some degree of autonomy from one another. • Neither level can unilaterally dissolve the other. • Example of a more consensual rather than a majoritarian political structure.

6. Why Federalism? • Federalism typically attempts to reconcile social differences with a common national identity. • Often found in plural societies • Example: Belgium (linguistic communities), Switzerland (linguistic and religious divides). • Federalism often associated with large, diverse countries. • Examples: US (large vs. small state interests), Canada (Quebecois nationalism), etc. • Some exceptions • Germany • Neither large nor diverse • History of federalism is key • Modern German federalism aims to create uniform living standards across the Länder.

7. Federalism and Bicameralism • Bicameralism: legislative systems with two chambers. • Dividing legislative authority across two chambers typically seen as consensual rather than a majoritarian trait. • Federal systems are typically bicameral. • First chamber (lower chamber) represents the national population. • Second chamber (upper chamber) represents the subunits. • In parliamentary systems, a confidence relationship exists between the government and the first chamber. • With few exceptions, this relationship does not extend to the second chamber. • Italy is an exception.

8. Functions of the Second Chamber • Russell 2001 • 1) To represent an alternative set of interests than the first chamber. • Representation and redundancy aid policy refinement and protection of minority rights. • 2) To provide greater independence from political party influence in legislative scrutiny. • Congruence theoretically hinders legislative independence from central parties. • 3) Some act as a “veto player” within the parliamentary process. • Symmetry requires agreement by both chambers to pass legislation. • 4) Spread the legislative burden. • Limited agenda time makes an a second chamber a useful time saving device.

9. Measuring Second Chamber Influence REPRESENTATION REDUNDANCY • Second chambers generally represent a different set of interests than the first chamber. • Originally a class based distinction. • Often seek to protect the rights of states or minority groups within the system. • Linguistic communities in Belgium • Länder in Germany • Different selection mechanisms offer alternative viewpoints and less partisan viewpoint. • Typically indirectly elected or appointed. • Smaller composition allows for greater interpersonal relationships between legislators. • Many second chambers intentionally endowed the with certain policy areas of expertise. • Law Lords/Bishops in the UK • Human rights in France

10. Measuring Second Chamber Influence SYMMETRY CONGRUENCE • Ability to override the second chamber varies depending on the system. • Some chambers possess absolute veto authority. • This means that the agreement of the chamber is necessary for the passage of legislation. • Most second chambers possess suspensory veto authority • This means they can delay rather than defeat legislation. • The likelihood that the composition of the first and second chambers are similar. • In systems where the chambers are congruent, representation function may be compromised. • Similar chambers merely “duplicate” the work of the other. • Where chambers are incongruent, representation may be enhanced. • But, the second chamber may become a “second opposition.”

11. Symmetric and Incongruent: German Bundesrat • STRONG BICAMERALISM • Symmetric and Incongruent • SYMMETRIC • Absolute/strong veto authority on all legislation touching on the prerogatives of the states. • Legislation passed by two-thirds in the Bundesrat can only be overridden by a two-thirds vote in the Bundestag. • There are 69 votes in the Bundesrat. • Majority is 35. • Votes must be cast en bloc in accordance with state government instructions. • Abstentions count as a no vote; land coalitions which cannot agree on a common position abstain.

12. Symmetric and Incongruent: German Bundesrat • INCONGRUENT • Divided government occurs frequently • Seats are apportioned on the basis of population • Each Land receives between 3 and 6 votes. • Members are not directly elected • Appointed by Land governments • Land elections occur at four to five year intervals • Elections typically a referendum on current national government • Merkel government does not have a majority in the Bundesrat • Holds 25 votes and likely to lose more in upcoming elections.

13. Asymmetric and Incongruent: UK House of Lords • MEDIUM BICAMERALISM • Asymmetric and Incongruent • Plays a major role in refining legislation. • Provides representation for the Church of England. • Included the highest appeals court until Supreme Court created in 2009. • Debates tend to be less politically charged than in the House of Commons. • All bills must be passed by both chambers of parliament unless the government invokes the Parliament Acts.

14. Asymmetric and Incongruent: UK House of Lords • ASYMMETRIC: Veto authority removed by passage of the Parliament Acts • House of Lords maintained a strong/absolute veto over all legislation until 1911. • Absolute/strong vetoes: Defeat legislation outright. • Difficult to justify vetoing the legislation of an elected government. • Parliament Acts of 1911 • Gave the Lords a suspensory veto of two years • Suspensory veto: Delays but does not directly defeat legislation. • Parliament Acts of 1949 • Reduced this suspensory veto to one year. • Parliament Acts do not apply to bills that: • 1) Are initiated in the House of Lords • 2) Extend the life of the current Parliament • 3) Are considered “statutory instruments/delegated legislation” • Process takes a lot of time. • Only used four times since 1949

15. Asymmetric and Incongruent: UK House of Lords • INCONGRUENT: No party has a majority in the House of Lords. • Many peers do not affiliate with any party. • 25 Bishops • Serve until 75. • 92 Hereditary peers • Holdovers from the House of Lords Act of 1999 which removed automatic right for hereditary peers to sit and vote in the Lords. • Elected by hereditary peers previously entitled to a seat under the old laws. • 23 Law Lords • Holdovers from previous system • New Law Lords sit the Supreme Court and will not take a peerage until they retire. • 686 Life peers • Appointed by PM or Commission. • Number is not fixed • Hereditary and life peers serve for life. • Cannot be removed save for bankruptcy.

16. Asymmetric and Incongruent: UK House of Lords • Salisbury Doctrine historically shaped debate within the chamber. • Lords will typically not defeat legislation listed in a governing party’s manifesto. • Although this doctrine has weakened following the removal of hereditary peers. • Governments are defeated much more frequently in the Lords than in the Commons. • The confidence relationship does not extend into the Lords. • Defeat on a major piece of legislation does not imply a loss of confidence. • But it does mean that the government has to either: concede to the Lords, spend time overriding the Lords, or drop the bill. • Despite lack of strong/absolute veto authority the Lords still shapes outcomes • Expertise and suspensory veto authority give weight to the second chamber.

17. Asymmetric and Congruent: Irish Seanad • WEAK BICAMERALISM • Asymmetric and Congruent • ASYMMETRIC • Seanad can delay legislation for six months. • Has only defeated the government a handful of times since its creation.

18. Asymmetric and Congruent: Irish Seanad • CONGRUENT: Composition tends to mirror that of the Dáil. • Elections take place after elections for the Dáil. • Vocational boards: 43 • 5 boards consisting of TD’s, Senators and local councilors. • Nomination and election controlled by parties. • University seats: 6 • Directly elected by graduates of National University of Ireland and Trinity College Dublin • Typically independent • Taoiseach nominees: 11 • Typically members of his/her own party to ensure a government majority. • Most senators seek to return to the Dáil, thus central parties have a great deal of influence over their votes. • Senators wanting to be nominated to contest a Dáil do not want to anger their party,. • Independent senators have used their positions to advocate issues that major parties will not touch. • Example: Sen. Norris on civil unions.

19. Conclusions: Second Chamber Reform • Several systems are debating second chamber reform. • Balancing legislative authority is a key factor in these debates. • Germany: rebalance the authority of the Bundestag with that of the Bundesrat • United Kingdom: hereditary peers removed but questions over how peers should be elected. • Ireland: questions over the relevance of the chamber have led to calls to boost its influence over European legislation or abolish the chamber altogether • Old issue of debate taking place in a different constitutional setting. • The idea of abolition is a non-starter in most systems • Referendum due in Ireland on this issue. • Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland abolished their second chambers. • But these were special cases of bicameralism • Increasing veto authority is not an option. • Governments do not want to risk more defeats. • Greater reliance on second chambers increases their bargaining authority regardless of veto strength. • Expertise in the second chamber also a valuable commodity for governments. • But whether or not this would be protected if chambers were directly elected is debatable.

20. Next Unit • Institutional Structure: Majoritarian vs. Consensus Politics • Reading: Lijphart 9-21, 31-47, 243-309 • PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO: • 1) Effects on economic policy. • 2) Effects on social policy. • 3) Patterns of change within systems.