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IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA

IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA. TERRORISM : A PROXY WAR. OBJECTIVES: intimidate the state and the civil population; to demonstrate the inability of the State to protect its civilian population; generate pressure on the State from its population to settle with the terrorists; and

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IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA

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  1. IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA

  2. TERRORISM : A PROXY WAR OBJECTIVES: • intimidate the state and the civil population; • to demonstrate the inability of the State to protect its civilian population; • generate pressure on the State from its population to settle with the terrorists; and • create feelings of battle fatigue in the State as well as its population.

  3. TERRORISM IN INDIA OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM: • REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM • SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS • ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

  4. IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON HUMAN LIVES: Toll on the casualties suffered more than the casualties in the four conventional wars fought by India.

  5. IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE POLITICAL SCENE • India has lost two leaders to terrorist attacks, in each case creating a leadership crisis • Undermining of democratic values and democratic institutions.

  6. IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE ECONOMY: • Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on the Indian exchequer estimated to be more than Rs.45,000 crores • Increase in budget on agencies involved in fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since 1980s • Compounded by the loss to property and impact on business environment

  7. IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE SOCIAL FABRIC The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had terrible reprisal on the Sikh community The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered communal onslaught on the Muslim population of the city

  8. HAVE WE COPED? 19 years to bring the insurgency-cum-terrorism in Nagaland under control, 20 years to restore normalcy in Mizoram, 14 years to put an end to terrorism in Punjab.  J&K complicated

  9. POST-MODERN TERRORISM

  10. ARE WE READY? “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!” [The Queen] “It was much pleasanter at home, when one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and being ordered about by mice and rabbits.” [Alice] Excerpt from Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll

  11. REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

  12. SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS

  13. RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

  14. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND STRUCTURES

  15. PREVIEW • SOFT STATE • STRATEGY. DO WE HAVE ANY OR DO WE NEED ONE? • STRUCTURES • ISSUES

  16. NATIONAL APPROACH OF TOLERANCE

  17. MULTI DIMENSIONAL TERROR THREATS

  18. PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003 Pre 26/11 26/11 Post 26/11

  19. INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM APPROACH • INADEQUATE RESPONSE • SYSTEMIC FAILURE • LACK OF COHERENT STRATEGY • SOFT STATE

  20. SYSTEMIC FAILURE • LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS • MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORTING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITY @ • MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FORCES & • AMORPHOUS MARITIME & COASTAL SECURITY • NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF BATTLE

  21. SYSTEMIC FAILURE • AIR SPACE AND AVIATION SECURITY • CYBER SECURITY • NARCO TERRORISM • MEDIA ANARCHY • GLOBALISED TERROR NETWORKS • ANTI TERROR LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT

  22. SOFT STATE

  23. SOFT STATE

  24. NATIONAL STRATEGY DO WE NEED ONE? NEXT TIME, DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF THREATS !

  25. UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY • ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM • PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS • DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM • DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS

  26. UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (CONTEST) THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS “ TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK AND ITS INTERESTS OVERSEAS FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, SO THAT PEOPLE CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES FREELY AND WITH CONFIDENCE”

  27. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK • PURSUE: TO STOP TERRORIST ATTACKS • PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE BECOMING TERRORISTS OR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM • PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN OUR PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK • PREPARE: WHERE AN ATTACK CANNOT BE STOPPED, TO MITIGATE ITS IMPACT

  28. US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN • PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE • PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODS • PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES • STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

  29. COMPONENTS OF US STRATEGY • COUNTER TERRORISM • BORDER SECURITY • PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY INCL FOR NATURAL DISASTER • IMMIGRATION. • CYBER SECURITY

  30. SALIENT STRUCTURES • NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHS • UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT 2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT) • FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA 1978/2008) • JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES • MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS • CYBER COMMAND

  31. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

  32. PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY • Prevent ( EQUALITY; HEARTS AND MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA OF INDIA) • Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND AT HOME AND ABROAD) • Secure ( TARGET HARDENING) • Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP) • Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE) • Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM, DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)

  33. COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY ( SMART POWER) • HARD POWER • PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE, STRUCTURES AND TOUGH DECISIONS) • SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY • ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT • ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS • SOFT POWER • PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION, MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT) • INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION • KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE • TECHNOLOGY • WPNS AND ARMAMENT • SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER

  34. STRUCTURES

  35. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE  • UAPA 2008 • NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA). • NTRO • NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC) • THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC) • NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID). • CRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK (CCTNS). • OPERATIONS DIVISION • STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY • OTHER MEASURES

  36. CRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURES • DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY OF LAWS. • NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA HAS EST IT UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) • COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST LINK AND LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY. • CYBER SECURITY • CBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECT

  37. ISSUES

  38. RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES • MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY • ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT OF DNI. CAN A DIPLOMAT DO JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs? • NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY BODIES LIKE CEC AND CAG ETC. NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND NOT TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO RETIRE (SR)’ OFFRS. • UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES WITH MIL ADVISERS.

  39. RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES • COASTAL COMMANDS • CYBER COMMAND • DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR CRPF: DELINK FROM IPS • IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF UNITS EARMK , TRAINED & EQUIPPED FOR URBAN TERRORISM TO SP LOCAL POLICE.

  40. CONCLUSION • BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG DRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACY SUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR. THE ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE. IT IS MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE NEGLECTED.” • INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCED • ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID, “FOR GOD’S SAKE, DON’T KEEP RUNNING TO MUMMY.”

  41. COASTAL SECURITY

  42. Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of India Post 26/11 • Assigning responsibility for coastal security and maritime security. • Designation of Coastal Command. • Strengthening of marine police stations. • Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for the Coast Guard. • Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy. • Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing vessels • Chain of coastal radars. • Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

  43. Responsibilities for Various Maritime Stakeholders • IN –Overall Maritime Security including Coastal Security & Offshore Security. • CG – Coastal Security in Territorial Waters including areas to be patrolled by Marine police. • Director General Coast Guard – Cdr Coastal Command. • FOC-in-C – C-in-C Coastal Defence.

  44. High Seas - Navy EEZ (200 NM) Security – Coast Guard No specific responsibility assigned to the IN Offshore Security – Navy/CG Responsibilities of Various Agencies Prior 26/11 Territorial Waters (12 NM) Marine Police

  45. Overall Maritime Security - Navy Offshore Security - Navy Coastal Security – Territorial Waters Responsibilities of Various Agencies Post 26/11 Coast Guard

  46. Limitations of New Security Apparatus • Overlapping Responsibilities. • Responsibilities without transfer of authority. • Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only co-ordination. No command & control function. • Replication of responsibility dilutes the accountability. • Distinction between coastal security & coastal defence.

  47. Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd) • Undue focus on shallow waters. • Does not leverage expanse of sea. • Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter. • IN back to brown water navy!

  48. Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd) • Unregulated nature of Indian fishing. • Absence of legal regulatory mechanism. • Fishing Community – a political vote bank. • Compulsions of fisheries being state subject.

  49. Co-ordination • Numerous maritime agencies like major & minor ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB and Marine Police under various ministries. • Each agency has specific charter but bearing on security. • Co-ordination between centre & state agencies.

  50. Recommendations • Clear demarcation of responsiblity, accountability & jurisdiction for various agencies.

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