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2. . . . . . . Federal Coordination Group. Provincial Emergency Operations Centre. Provincial Ministers. Premier . Provincial ADM. . Provincial DM. Federal Regional Offices/Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . Municipal Emergency Operations Centre. . . . Whole of Government Framework. Operational Tacti
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2. 2 Whole of Government Framework
3. 3 Canada Command’s AOR includes Canada, the continental United States (specifically the 48 contiguous states and Alaska), Mexico, and the approaches to the same. Area of Responsibility Our area of operations is described on this slide. However, our area of operations may be significantly larger if you consider the maritime approaches to North America.
Note that our AOR does not include the Caribbean.
Our area of operations is described on this slide. However, our area of operations may be significantly larger if you consider the maritime approaches to North America.
Note that our AOR does not include the Caribbean.
4. 4 Canada Command Structure As I will mention in more detail, we are pursuing co-location between our regional JTF HQs, Public Safety Canada regional offices (shown here) and the provinces. (Build slide to show JTF overlay)
Being aware of events and incidents anywhere in Canada or on the continent (i.e. 24/7 situational awareness) is essential if we are to provide a coordinated, timely and effective whole of government approach.
For Canada Command, a regionally focused structure - including Pacific, West, Central, East, Atlantic and the North - ensures that we have continuous situational awareness.
The Commanders and staff of the regional Joint Task Force Headquarters are the points of contact for the civilian emergency management community and they interact on a day-to-day basis across Canada.
More broadly on the continent, we also work with our US counterpart, US Northern Command, to coordinate awareness.As I will mention in more detail, we are pursuing co-location between our regional JTF HQs, Public Safety Canada regional offices (shown here) and the provinces. (Build slide to show JTF overlay)
Being aware of events and incidents anywhere in Canada or on the continent (i.e. 24/7 situational awareness) is essential if we are to provide a coordinated, timely and effective whole of government approach.
For Canada Command, a regionally focused structure - including Pacific, West, Central, East, Atlantic and the North - ensures that we have continuous situational awareness.
The Commanders and staff of the regional Joint Task Force Headquarters are the points of contact for the civilian emergency management community and they interact on a day-to-day basis across Canada.
More broadly on the continent, we also work with our US counterpart, US Northern Command, to coordinate awareness.
5. 5 Maritime Mandatesin Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
National Defence
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Canadian Coast Guard
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada Border Services Agency
Transport Canada
Environment Canada
6. 6 MSOC Status CHALLENGES
Infrastructure Decision
Lack of infrastructure decisions significantly impacting cost and schedule
Interdepartmental Vision
MSOC vision (as captured in the approved SOR) is no longer clear… leading to an updated SOR
Legal basis for interdepartmental information sharing
2004 vision will not be realized under the current legislative structure
Schedule Risk
New proposed schedule is highly dependent on critical physical infrastructure and legal decisions
Concept of Operations - ratification
Personnel
Requirement to meet IOC personnel establishment
Return of unused funding
Establishment of MOUs
Project Budget
Anticipated definition budget shortfall
Cost of physical infrastructure
Reprofiling project fundsCHALLENGES
Infrastructure Decision
Lack of infrastructure decisions significantly impacting cost and schedule
Interdepartmental Vision
MSOC vision (as captured in the approved SOR) is no longer clear… leading to an updated SOR
Legal basis for interdepartmental information sharing
2004 vision will not be realized under the current legislative structure
Schedule Risk
New proposed schedule is highly dependent on critical physical infrastructure and legal decisions
Concept of Operations - ratification
Personnel
Requirement to meet IOC personnel establishment
Return of unused funding
Establishment of MOUs
Project Budget
Anticipated definition budget shortfall
Cost of physical infrastructure
Reprofiling project funds
7. 7 V2010 Background Olympic Games 12-28 Feb 2010
5,000 Athletes & Officials
80 Countries+
15 Sports Venues
Estimated 3 billion viewers
Paralympics 12-21 Mar 2010
1,700 Athletes & Officials
40 Countries+
5 Sports Venues
8. 8 RCMP Requested Tasks to CF General
Operational planning
(plan with RCMP)
Training planning
Operational research
Use of CF facilities
Maritime Operations
Surveillance
Interdiction support
Land Operations
Surveillance
Mobility support – joint patrols
Mobile force protection
Force Protection of Accomodation Vessels Air Operations
Surveillance
Air defence
Air support
Special Operations
Technical Operations
Geomatics, hydrographic services
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Capability gap analysis has occurred with CF collaboration
Result has been a preliminary delineation of areas for CF support
This formal list is the first such request that the RCMP has issued to any partner agencies.
What this document does is set the conditions for more detailed collaborative planning
Caveat that this relates to Olympic domain security issues only and does not address other public safety or non-venue security issuesCapability gap analysis has occurred with CF collaboration
Result has been a preliminary delineation of areas for CF support
This formal list is the first such request that the RCMP has issued to any partner agencies.
What this document does is set the conditions for more detailed collaborative planning
Caveat that this relates to Olympic domain security issues only and does not address other public safety or non-venue security issues
9. 9 JTFG Organization
10. 10 MCC MISSION MCC will provide surveillance, interdiction capabilities and force protection to support the RCMP for V2010 Winter Olympics through the effective employment of assigned assets.
11. 11 Expanded AOR to cover all of BC-new all domain awareness requirements
Expanded AOI with Transformation
Arctic AOR. JTFN has the northern land regions but because of our traditional role and resource limitations JTFP retains MDA for this area. We have limited sensor coverage but it is not heavily trafficed at present there is potential for it to become more prominent in the future. Expanded AOR to cover all of BC-new all domain awareness requirements
Expanded AOI with Transformation
Arctic AOR. JTFN has the northern land regions but because of our traditional role and resource limitations JTFP retains MDA for this area. We have limited sensor coverage but it is not heavily trafficed at present there is potential for it to become more prominent in the future.
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14. 14 Vancouver Waterfront
15. 15 MCC TG Structure The MCC has been further refined as the CONOP develops. The MCCHQ will co-locate with the OMOC and some staff will be integrated into the RCMP let Operations Centre.
In keeping with our primary task of conducting surveillance of the approaches to the Games AO including Howe Sound and Burrard Inlet, the major and minor warships will form a TG with individual elements assuming responsibility for specific areas.
The capable surveillance vessels will maintain a COP with the MCC and JTFP’s MSOC as a matter of course. MCC HQ will also maintain comms links with both the ACCHQ and the TF Vancouver component of the Land element for joint domain SA. The Red links highlight a major unknown that is yet to be negotiated between CANR and CANADA COM. Air surveillance/security will remain under NORAD control. This places the airspace within CANR’s juristiciton and the CFACC has been tasked to develop the joint link architecture for the AO. (Switch to next slide). There is also some question over surveillance gap coverage that has yet to be resolved. Ships assigned to the MCC may have to establish and maintain link with CANR/WADS as a matter of course, while operating in the AO. There may also be an need to adjust ships’ patrol areas to provide coverage in a direct/associated support role.
The Port Security Unit will base out of DISCOVERY with 10 RHIBs. This unit will be responsible for general force protection and be prepared to deploy the RHIBs on direction of the RCMP, should normal patrols be required to surge in response to a given event. (SCALABILITY). This will be covered further later in the brief.
The port Inspection Dive team, led by FDU and augmented by the Primary Reserve, will support RCMP underwater security operations in Vancouver harbour, False Creek and potentially the Fraser River. The divers intend to utilize one large diving tender,a smaller jet boat and Diving Support Vehicle(s) as support platforms for their operations. DISCOVERY has the room to support from the shore based perspective, but may not be able to provide berthing services. The exact base of operations is yet to be determined.
Finally, the support element will comprise of logistic and technical personnel in support of the MCC HQ, OMOC and PSU.
You can see by the two boxes in the upper left that the MCC will be responsible to the Commander JTFG and the both the MCCHQ and the capable surveillance assets will continue to feed into the COP maintained by JTFP back in Esquimalt.
The MCC has been further refined as the CONOP develops. The MCCHQ will co-locate with the OMOC and some staff will be integrated into the RCMP let Operations Centre.
In keeping with our primary task of conducting surveillance of the approaches to the Games AO including Howe Sound and Burrard Inlet, the major and minor warships will form a TG with individual elements assuming responsibility for specific areas.
The capable surveillance vessels will maintain a COP with the MCC and JTFP’s MSOC as a matter of course. MCC HQ will also maintain comms links with both the ACCHQ and the TF Vancouver component of the Land element for joint domain SA. The Red links highlight a major unknown that is yet to be negotiated between CANR and CANADA COM. Air surveillance/security will remain under NORAD control. This places the airspace within CANR’s juristiciton and the CFACC has been tasked to develop the joint link architecture for the AO. (Switch to next slide). There is also some question over surveillance gap coverage that has yet to be resolved. Ships assigned to the MCC may have to establish and maintain link with CANR/WADS as a matter of course, while operating in the AO. There may also be an need to adjust ships’ patrol areas to provide coverage in a direct/associated support role.
The Port Security Unit will base out of DISCOVERY with 10 RHIBs. This unit will be responsible for general force protection and be prepared to deploy the RHIBs on direction of the RCMP, should normal patrols be required to surge in response to a given event. (SCALABILITY). This will be covered further later in the brief.
The port Inspection Dive team, led by FDU and augmented by the Primary Reserve, will support RCMP underwater security operations in Vancouver harbour, False Creek and potentially the Fraser River. The divers intend to utilize one large diving tender,a smaller jet boat and Diving Support Vehicle(s) as support platforms for their operations. DISCOVERY has the room to support from the shore based perspective, but may not be able to provide berthing services. The exact base of operations is yet to be determined.
Finally, the support element will comprise of logistic and technical personnel in support of the MCC HQ, OMOC and PSU.
You can see by the two boxes in the upper left that the MCC will be responsible to the Commander JTFG and the both the MCCHQ and the capable surveillance assets will continue to feed into the COP maintained by JTFP back in Esquimalt.
16. Maritime Cross-Border C3
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18. 18 JTFG Exercises & Training
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