“States of Concern”

1. “States of Concern” War, Revolution, and Development

2. I. Are some states worse than others? • Possible threats to international order • “Rogue states” -- States that ignore international norms and international law • “Revisionist states” -- States that seek to upset the status quo • “Failed states” -- States characterized by anarchy, poverty, and civil war • “Least developed states” -- States that suffer from severe poverty • “Outposts of Tyranny” -- States that have failed to democratize

3. B. Alleged Characteristics of “Rogue States” • Ignore international law • Build “weapons of mass destruction” • Sponsor terrorism • Violate the human rights of their own people

4. C. The US View: Compare 1998, 2002, 2005 speeches • 1998: “Rogue States” -- Iran, Iraq, Libya (85% of mentions) • Other mentions: Sudan, North Korea, Serbia, Cuba • 2002: “Axis of Evil” -- Iran, Iraq, North Korea • “Beyond the Axis of Evil” Speech (2002): Libya, Syria, Cuba • 2005: “Outposts of Tyranny“ – Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Belarus, Zimbabwe, Myanmar

5. 1. Who ignores international law? • What is the only country which managed to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention all at the same time? • North Korea, but… • Iran is trying

6. 1. Who ignores international law? • What is the only state opposing inspections under the Biological Weapons Convention? • United States

7. 1. Who ignores international law? • Which two states have not ratified “the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in history,” the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child? • Somalia and • United States

8. 2. Who has WMD? Suspected Arsenals: 9 Nuke, 5 Biological, 10 Chemical

9. 3. Who sponsors terrorism? • Which state sponsored the following act? • After it finds out that an environmental group is planning to conduct a peaceful but illegal protest, a government secretly plants a bomb on the group’s ship while it is docked in a neutral, peaceful country. The blast sinks the ship, killing the group’s photographer. • France (attack on Greenpeace)

10. 3. Who sponsors terrorism? • Which state sponsored the following group? • An Islamic fundamentalist group fighting a civil war has the nasty habit of tying down prisoners, pouring gunpowder on their eyeballs and setting it alight. However, when it isn’t killing other groups in the civil war, it targets the military forces of a hated enemy. Its state sponsor gives it tons of weapons, including portable missiles for shooting down aircraft. It continues this aid even after the group targets a civilian airliner. • United States (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)

11. 3. Who sponsors terrorism? • Israel (Lebanese Phalange in the 1980s) • Pakistan (Kashmiri insurgents) • India (Tamil insurgents, Hindu fundamentalists) • Iran (Hezbollah) • Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea • DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Congo Republic, etc. • Let’s just say Africa… • Wait a minute: Central America too • …and Asia, North America, South America, Australia (!), and Europe… • Problem: Just about everyone has provided some aid to “terrorists” / “freedom fighters”

12. 4. Which states violate human rights? • Autocracies: Repress dissent, rig elections, imprison or murder opponents (more on “outposts of tyranny” later) • Notable democracies: • Israel, US, India: Detention without trial, prisoner abuse • Europe: Migrants, ethnic minorities, religious freedom • Japan: Racial discrimination, secret executions

13. 5. Conclusions • Many states ignore international law, including prominent democracies such as the US • Even more states sponsor terror in some form • Similarly, most states violate human rights • Only WMD narrows the field substantially – and this field also includes prominent democracies • Conclusion: “Rogue state” is not a useful concept for predicting differences between states

14. II. Are some states more aggressive?

15. War initiators since 1980 • Three times: USA (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) • Twice: Iraq (Iran, Kuwait), Israel (Lebanon 1980 and 1982) • Once: • Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands) • China (1987 attack on Vietnam) • Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on definition) • Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC) • Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)

17. A. Power Great powers fight more – but also cooperate more (foreign aid, support for IGOs, etc)

18. B. Regime: Democracy makes a difference • War initiation. Democracies: • May be slightly less likely to wage war in general • Are less likely to initiate war • Warfighting. Democracies at war: • Win battles and wars more frequently • Suffer fewer casualties • Undermine enemy morale by taking prisoners • Are not notably better at extracting resources to fight wars

19. 3. Does Democratization  Peace? a. Raw evidence suggests democratization is dangerous

20. b. Democratization may be more dangerous in multi-ethnic societies

21. c. Counter-evidence: The 1989-1995 Transitions in Europe • Interpretation: Stalled transitions are dangerous but quick ones are not

22. d. Increased democracy decreases war risk – but is this always “democratization?”

23. e. Possible explanation: Regime change is the real danger

24. After controlling for regime change….

25. C. Conclusions • Watch out for powerful countries • Regime type does little to predict likelihood of war, but does reduce likelihood of aggression • Democratization is to be welcomed – if regime change is unavoidable • Limitations: Intangibles like “nationalism” are difficult to measure and evaluate

26. III. Failed States: Sovereignty without authority

27. III. Failed States: Sovereignty without authority • Routes to state failure • Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s ability to provide even minimal protection or enforce law. • Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is created which lacks de-personalized institutions or capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force (de-colonization in Congo) • Poverty trap: State is so poor than virtually no surplus exists to support political institutions (like catastrophe, but long-standing)

28. B. Predicting catastrophic failure • Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

29. Corruption Perceptions Index

30. B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic failure • Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption) • Predicting catastrophe • Disease – Compare Prevalence to Resources

31. HIV Cases

32. TB Cases

33. Malaria Deaths

34. Cholera Deaths

35. Polio Cases

36. Per-Capita Health Spending

37. B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic failure • Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption) • Predicting catastrophe • Disease – Compare Prevalence to Resources • Natural disasters – Tend to recur in same places

38. Affected by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)

39. Killed by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)

41. C. Predicting de-institutionalization • Recent decolonization/independence -- “New” states at risk

42. 2. State “birth” type and institutional strength • Hypothesis: States born in revolution, secession, or nonviolent struggle for independence should be stronger than those granted independence without struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan) • IV = Better birth experience (requiring organization and solution of collective action problems) • Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s (2004) index of state failure as DVs reveal…

43. d. The puzzle of state birth • Good births increase later GDP and decrease odds of state failure but… • Relationship disappears when war participation is also included as a (control) IV. Why? • Theory: War produces state strength. • Interstate war increases later growth! • Civil war decreases later growth • Another finding: States with imposed borders different from pre-colonization ones have lower growth, higher rates of failure

44. D. Predicting civil war • Causes of civil war – Weak States and Opportunism • Weak States: Low GDP and…

45. D. Predicting civil war • Geographic Factors • Land Area: Bigger countries more prone to secessionism • Terrain: Mountains increase war risk (less evidence for jungles or forests) • Resources: Oil increases risk (less evidence for metals and diamonds) • Neighborhood: Contagion effects

46. 2. Economic Factors • Per-capita GDP: Both level and growth rate reduce war risk, but “vertical” inequality has no effect (few studies of “horizontal” inequality) • Primary commodity exports: Countries dependent on raw material exports are war-prone • Social welfare: Low infant mortality and high secondary school enrollment reduce war risk • Agriculture: Soil degradation increases war risk

47. 3. Political Factors • History: Recent wars increase risk (effect lasts for more than 10 years) • Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous

48. Anocracy and State Failure

49. 3. Political Factors • History: Recent wars increase risk (effect lasts for more than 10 years) • Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous (and strong democracy is better than autocracy) • Regime change: Political instability increases war risk

50. 4. Demographics • Population: More people = higher risk (but evidence on population density is mixed) • Diversity: Results are mixed, but some studies find ethnic heterogeneity increases risk (no real evidence for linguistic, religious, or social diversity)