Rebekah Eyers Sociolegal Research Centre Griffith Law School

1. qld’s most vulnerable farm animals- Can we stop them slipping through the animal welfare regulatory net? Rebekah Eyers Sociolegal Research Centre Griffith Law School Renewing Regulation Colloqium, 2 July 2010

2. Presentation Outline (2) Part 1- Qld regulatory system for the welfare of farmed animals in saleyards • Regulatory problem • Principles of ‘Smart Regulation’ strategy - to prescribe plan to address this prob • Reg framework surrounding the problem – why difficult to regulate? • Case study – Reg actor groups coercive capacities and different views on the reg problem, and best solutions to address it • Case study – Converging views (all actor groups) on preferred reg mechanisms to address problem, and of barriers to using these mechanisms Part 2 – Applying Insights from ‘Smart Regulation’ Apply ‘Smart Regulation’ insights into: • How reg actors can act as surrogate regulators • How characteristics of Aus Ag Ind regulation apply to regulating livestock sector • Tools to complement info mechanisms • Towards solutions to this reg problem

3. Australian agricultural industry sector- Regulatory culture and context (3) ‘Traditionally, regulation of agriculture has been informal, based upon the provision of information and persuasion by government authorities, whose fundamental role has not been to police agricultural producers, but to assist them to do the right thing’ (Grabosky et al, 1998)

4. Regulatory Problem (4) ‘Australia is a world leader in animal welfare’ (AAWS, Animal Welfare Strategy, Fed Govt, 1998) The Problem - Despite legislation, codes and policy - Qld’s animal welfare regulatory net is failing to stop animals who are in a compromised physical condition (often of low economic value) from being transported long distances to be sold in saleyards or delivered to slaughterhouses. My Argument – ‘Smart Regulation’ advises us to utilise a broad range of reg tools/reg actor groups to solve reg problems, and to be informed by the unique reg culture/context of the reg system. To do this, I first need to gain insightsfrom the reg actors “on the ground” about their perspectives on: • the source of the reg problem • the reg instruments that might be supported by range of reg actor groups • the barriers that reg actors foresee for the use of certain reg instruments

5. Emaciated

6. Cripple leg

7. Chronic Mastitis

8. Loaded onto trailer with a broken leg

9. Horn snapped off down to the root

10. ‘Downer’ cow

11. Weak calf – 1 week old

12. “doggers”, “suspects”, “downers”, “buyer’s risk”, “burgers”, “pet food animals” “unfits”, “Faultys”

13. Legal framework - parts relevant to regulating “unfit” animals (6) • Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) and ‘Voluntary’ Codes of Practice for the Welfare of each species of farmed animal. Ind regulator, Qld DEEDI administers Act. Code compliance is ‘voluntary’ - but is a defence (exemption) from cruelty/duty of care omission convictions under Act. Use of exemptions is limited, accused must meet certain conditions. Few complaints made, even fewer convictions. (Cruelty max-$75,000 or 2 yrs; DOC max-$22,500 or 1 yr)

14. Legal framework - parts relevant to regulating “unfit” animals cont... (7) Relevant parts of section17 and 18 of the Act provide that: Act objective – ‘To promote the responsible care and use of animals and to protect animals from cruelty’ Section 17 Breach of duty of care prohibited Section 18 Animal cruelty prohibited Relevant parts of the Codes of Practice provide that: Codes of Practice, Introduction - ‘The code aims to minimise stress in all livestock by encouraging efficient and considerate treatment and handling’ 2.1.5 Management personnel – ‘The saleyard manager should ensure that high standards are maintained in relation to obtaining prompt veterinary attention for diseased, sick or injured animals...’ 4.4 Unloading of injured animals – ‘...If in the judgement of a veterinarian or stock inspector an injury is minor and is not causing undue pain and or distress, affected animals should be promptly segregated and treated. Animals requiring emergency slaughter should be shot or stunned and bled without moving them further than necessary to effect euthenasia’

15. Reg culture/context of ausagind- why so difficult to regulate? (8) Aus Ag sector reg characteristics (Gunningham et al, 1998) • Political culture – self regulation + govt subsidies • Increasingly intensive/globally competitive production methods • Traditional industry, averse to regulatory/procedural change • Causes of reg problem are diffuse and educating and monitoring of reg targets is expensive Farm animal, ‘Livestock’ production sector • Welfare = For market access only • Welfare not exact science (ind pays for reg impact and scientific studies) • Diffuse causes – expensive monitoring/enforcement • Offences are ‘out of public eye’ • Lack $ incentive –improve treatment of low value animals • Pet food – stable market demand • Prohibiting cruelty – not enough to secure ongoing compliance (like enviro regulation, a ‘stewardship’ ethic is needed)

16. Reg culture/context of ausagind- why so difficult to regulate? (9) Telling an individual, surrounded by his peers/culture, how to use their own property (farmed animals), which is, the individual’s livelihood. • Existing research - Enviro regulation (See Cahn, 1995; and Babcock, 2009) • Existing research – Aus Ag ind regulation (See Grabosky et al 1998) • Existing research - Key factors that make reg inspectors from ind background more prone to ‘capture’ include: • Revolving door - Inspectors recruited from ind are less prosecutorial (offered ind jobs) • Individual inspectors meet with ind + inspect 1 geographical territory • Inspectors see more of ind they regulate than they do of general public • Agency reg few companies or co from single ind use less formal means of gaining compliance • Inspectors in frequent contact with same co’s use less formal sanctions (Braithwaite et al, 1986)

17. Reg culture/context qld saleyards- Why so difficult to regulate (10)

18. Case study iv’s – 3 reg actor groups- perception of source of reg problem (11)

19. Case study iv’s –- perception of best reg solutions (12)

20. Availability of reg tools– this reg system (13) • Increases C and C (direct regulation) • QA systems • Financial incentives/disincentives • Info mechanisms Note – Enviroreg research on regulating the behaviour of individuals’ use of natural resources reinforces appropriateness of using these 2 instruments (see Johnson, 2009): • C and C mechanisms = least appropriate • Info dissemination and disclosure mechanisms and financial incentives = most appropriate

21. Advantages of using info mechanisms to influence individuals to be more compliant (14) First step - introduce information tools • Low cost • Improve attitudes/behaviour/management systems • Perceived as equitable/less interventionist • Harness self interest of reg targets and provide ongoing incentives • Educate NGO’s + 3rd parties to participate effectively (reg process) • Help legitimize sacrifices reg targets must make (+ make coercive strategy palatable) • Help close gap between public/private interests • Good foundation for use of other reg instruments • Induce voluntarism– if info instruments represent convergence of producer/public int • In mandatory disclosure form – acts as 3rd party montiroring mechanism

22. Case study iv’s - perception of barriers to success of preferred reg tools (info mechanisms) (15)

23. Applying ‘Smart Regulation’ - To address reg problems (16) ‘Smart Regulation’ • What is it? • Cautions for using ‘Smart Reg’ • What it says about the Aus Ag Ind • Applying its 3 step design process to Qld farm animal welfare reg system

24. Potential Coercive capacity (sanctions/strategies) of 2nd and 3rd party actors – are they limited? (17)Animal pigs, indqa, transporters Banks, ins, retail

25. Applying ‘smart regulation’ - To ID reg responses (18)(up dynamic reg inst till reg goal reached)

26. Applying the ‘Smart Reg’ prescriptionreg design process to qlds.y. a.w. Regime (19) Step 1- Processes ID regulatory objective ID characteristics of problem confronted ID available policy options/issues of consultation and participation Step 2 – Design principles Prefer policy mix with broad range instr/reg actors Prefer less interventionist measure if possible Ascend responses up a dynamic reg instrument pyrmd until reg goal achieved ( also gives early warning of probs/acts as trigger) Empower participants who are in best position to act as surrogate regulators Expand boundaries for ‘win win’ solutions and encourage reg targets to go beyond compliance with existing legal reqirements Step 3 – Sequence instrument combinations To avoid counterproductive results and maximise no of circumstances this combination can be useful for

27. Ag ind and envreg research findings provide a ‘toolbox’ of reg tools/strategy to - apply to my reg system(20) • Stewardship ethic • Supply chain pressure instrument (E.g. QA) • Legally mandated targets • Vol agreements between ind and regulator • Risk reduction initiatives • Incentive to join accreditation programs • Persuasive info mechanisms showing harm of non compliance • Positive and neg instruments mixed – to compensate for lack of market incentive to comply • Beyond C and C solutions – to encourage ind resourcefulness for how to solve themselves • Tools to address whole range of people adversely affected by non-compliance

28. Ag ind and envreg research findings provide a ‘toolbox’ of reg tools/strategy to compliment info mechanisms – in my reg system (21) • Incentives to back up ‘peer to peer education’ • Tripartism – get all groups of reg actors involved in monitoring/auditing • Reg info disseminated to all groups of reg actors • Financial incentive instruments – to compensate for sacrifices made by reg targets • Mix voluntary and price based instruments – to compensate for lack of dependability of info instr • Where public and reg target interests don’t converge – use instruments to both coerce and induce • Oversight mechanisms – to counter ind manipulation of disclosure instruments and provide accountability to info mechanisms