Sensory Exp erience and Representational Properties David Papineau King’s College London

1. Sensory Experience and Representational Properties David Papineau King’s College London The Aristotelian Society 7 October 2013

2. The Plan Introduction Representationalism Representations and Propositions Doing without Propositions The Content of Hallucinations Broadness Non-Relationism Reports of Sensory Experience Transparency Intrinsic Intentionality

3. Introduction My focus is on conscious sensory properties. Sensory experience represent all right, but conscious sensory properties are not representational properties. Rather they are intrinsic and non-relational.

4. Representationalism Representationalists (specify kinds of mental states within which they) equate conscious sensory properties with representational properties. They face a range of contrast cases which putatively (a) have the same representational properties but different conscious ones and (b) have the same conscious properties but different representational ones.

5. Representations and Propositions Representationalists generally think of mental representation as a relation between a subject and a proposition. But propositions are abstract objects. How can my here-and-now conscious feelings be constituted by my relation to an abstract object?

6. Doing without Propositions Perhaps we can view references to propositions as dispensable devices used to characterise representational facts, in the way that references to abstract numbers are dispensable devices used to characterise concrete physical processes.

7. The Content of Hallucinations Hallucinations don’t have (even unreified) truth conditions. This drives representationalists to equate conscious sensory properties with ‘gappy’ property-presenting contents. How can my here-and-now conscious feelings be constituted by my relation to an abstract property outside space and time?

8. Broadness General considerations argue that the representational properties of even sensory experiences are broad. This opens representationalism to a range of counter-examples, to whichthe standard representationalist responses are not convincing.

9. Non-Relationism Conscious sensory properties are vehicle properties rather than representational properties. This non-relationism (a) explains the conscious commonality of matching veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experiences (b) avoids building conscious properties out of relations to abstract entities (c) has no difficulty with ‘broad’ counter-examples where representation outstrips phenomenology (d) has no difficulty with the converse counter-examples where phenomenology outstrips representation.

10. Reports of Sensory Experience When we talk about sensory experiences, we identify them via their representational properties. So, insofar as such talk also refers to conscious sensory properties, it refers to them via (representational) descriptions that they only satisfy contingently.

11. Transparency "Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree . . .“ (Harman) All that this shows is that introspection doesn’t change conscious sensory properties—which is consistent with any theory of those properties. Our conscious sensory properties are metaphysically independent of the properties of objects they happen to represent.

12. Intrinsic Intentionality Aren’t conscious sensory properties ‘intrinsically intentional’? Well, they are naturally thought of as representational. And some of them are particularly apt for representing certain things. I don’t resist calling these features ‘intrinsic intentionality’. But they do not amount to real representation.

13. The End