Granite TAHG Summer 2013, Unit 4

1. Granite TAHG Summer 2013, Unit 4 Post-Vietnam U.S. Military Conflicts

2. Day 2: 1975-1991 From the End of the Vietnam War to the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.

3. Topics • The Cold War and Containment • The Late Cold War, 1975-1989 • The Weinburger Doctrine and the First Gulf War • The Emergence of Neoconservatism

4. The Cold War – Basic Definition • A global, militarized, bipolar confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that remained short of a general European or global war, • But was exported to the Third World after the mid-1960s, distorting the process of decolonization • It was marked by alternating “thaws” and periods of increased tension between the mid-late 1940s and • The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989-90

5. Overview of the Cold War, 1945-1989 • Although the world became and remained bipolar from 1945 to 1990, the period of maximum danger ended around 1963, when • The confrontation reached an equilibrium in which an intentional nuclear exchange between the US and USSR was unlikely • After that, the nuclear issue revolved not managing both tensions, and arsenals of strategic weapons and delivery systems • Unfortunately, the US and USSR then exported their struggle to the “Third World” via proxy wars, with devastating results • During the “high” Cold War of 1945-1965 US foreign relations and domestic policy were interconnected, i.e. • The requirements of the Cold War determined both our relations with the rest of the world and our own internal governance

6. George Kennan’s Concept of Containment(The U.S.’s Basic Strategy during the Cold War) • Capitalism and Democracy are the best possible economic and political frameworks for an advanced industrial society • The “collectivist” Soviet system will collapse of its own contradictions in the long run • In the short term, “the West” must contain the USSR • Containment must be balanced between • A military effort (defense of an essential perimeter) • A diplomatic effort (alliances, cultural contacts) • An economic effort (commerce, foreign aid) • No one aspect of Containment should become dominant • After 1950, however, the military effort dominated

7. The Late Cold War: 1975-1985 • The U.S. military turns away from counterinsurgency • Nixon/Ford diplomatic triangulation between the U.S.S.R. and China reduces tensions, leading to • Several agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons • During the economic crisis of 1973-1980, the U.S. still relies on its nuclear deterrent in Europe • The U.S. and U.S.S.R. continue to sponsor proxies in the former colonial world (Angola • Under Reagan, military budgets rise, leading to a new operational posture in NATO and a new arms race

8. The Late Cold War: 1986-1991 • “Airland Battle” doctrine, and a new series of “theater” nuclear weapons allows the U.S. to upgrade NATO • Triggering a new arms race between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. • The Soviets deploy a scary new range of weapons systems • At the cost of severe strains on their domestic economy • The U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan in December 1979 (a second self-inflicted blow leading to the collapse in 1989) • The “Weinburger Doctrine” (more later) governs the use of American military force abroad • The Gulf War of 1990-91 – the last Conventional War?

9. The “Weinburger Doctrine” • National Press Club speech of 28 Nov 1984 • Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Admin • He was primarily concerned to strengthen U.S. military capabilities against the U.S.S.R. during the late Cold War • Instinctively adverse to “Third World Adventures” • Essentially a Realist’s’ take on the first five Just War tests • Weinburger’s “tests” serve as the template for the First Gulf War of 1990-1991 • But were rejected by Neoconservatives in the Bush Administration

10. Per Weinburger: U.S. Forces Should Not Enter Combat • Unless vital to defend a “critical U.S. interest” • Without the “clear intention of winning” • Without “clearly defined military and political objectives” • Without constantly reassessing and adjusting the relationship between objectives and resources • Without a “reasonable assurance” of support from Congress and the American people • Unless as a last resort

11. The First Gulf War, 1990-1991 • All elements of the Weinburger Doctrine were in place, including a broad “coalition” • The U.N. authorizes the U.S. to liberate Kuwait • Our opponent could not have been more unready to fight a high-intensive maneuver war • Story: “It’s a good thing the NVA wasn’t here” • President Bush “learns from history” – Truman and the 1950 push into North Korea • The Shia uprising and the protection of Kurds in Northern Iraq (no fly zone, humanitarian aid, etc.)

12. Contingency Operations, 1980-2001 • 1980: Desert One (Iranian hostage rescue attempt) • 1982-4: Beirut peacekeeping (241 U.S. KIA) • 1983: Grenada regime change • 1989: Panama regime change • 1991-2001: Restore Hope support for Iraqi Kurds • 1992-1993: Somalia peacekeeping (58 U.S. KIA) • 1994: Haiti regime change and peacekeeping • 1995 to date: Bosnia peacekeeping • 1999 to date: Kosovo peacekeeping

13. The End of the Cold War • The Soviet failure in Afghanistan takes military support for Eastern European Communist regimes “off the table”, and they collapse • The U.S.S.R. liquidates itself: multiple Soviet “republics” become sovereign nations • The end of bipolarity and the U.S. – U.S.S.R. balance of power/terror • Enormous hubris among the foreign policy glitterati, leading to Nemesis after “9/11”

14. Advanced Weapons Systems that Matured in the 1990s • Ongoing development of “smart” air delivered weapons exploiting GPS technology • Cruise missiles, air and submarine launched • Very long range stealth aircraft: B-2, F-117 • Drone aircraft – initially for surveillance, later for weapons delivery • Widely exploited by Clinton Administration to punish leadership in Iraq, Sudan, Serbia

15. The Emergence of a Neoconservative Foreign Policy • Built on an earlier (smaller) group for former New Dealers who rejected the 1960s “War on Poverty” • Neocons were viewed as a “reality-challenged fringe element” during the bipolar Cold War • A reaction to the “opportunity” provided by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the end of bipolarity • Containment is weak and despicable; threats should be eliminated, not managed or contained • Neoconservative individuals in the Bush White House were essential to the initiation of the Iraq War

16. How Neoconservatives “Read” the End of the Cold War • The Cold War ended in an absolute victory for the U.S. and its “core values” of liberal democracy and and free market institutions • The U.S.S.R. was “vanquished by bold American leadership,” not it’s own errors/contradictions • This created • A “unipolar” world in which balance of power diplomacy is unnecessary • An “end to history:” classical liberalism has triumphed, and any opposition to its values is rooted in “evil”

17. The Neoconservative Consensus • The U.S. must export its values and institutions • The U.S. may act unilaterally outside international law to oppose evil and eliminate “threats” • Diplomacy and international institutions (the UN) uselessly constrain U.S. options • Most threats originate in the Middle East • Military interventions must be rapidly successful so as to avoid “nation building” • This is to be achieved by advanced weapon systems and special operations forces

18. What the Neocons Failed to Understand • “Détente” with the U.S.S.R. served multiple purposes in U.S. foreign and domestic policy • The Reagan Era military buildup (without tax increases) created serious economic imbalances in the U.S. • The Russo-Afghan War, and Soviet liberalization which “got out of hand” doomed the U.S.S.R., not pressure from Reagan or Thatcher • Liberal Western ideas and institutions may be sponsored outside the U.S., but can not be forcibly exported • Interventions tend to become protracted occupations