Source: British Archaeology, 114, Sept/Oct 2010

2. Stage 1 Iceni and Trinovantes destroy Colchester Stage 2 9th Legion routed Stage 2-3 Paulinus marches to London Stage 5 The battle in the west Stage 4 Paulinus leaves London: rebels follow The 2nd Legion does not aid Paulinus Source: British Archaeology, 114, Sept/Oct 2010

3. Tacitus' key passage in The Annals of Imperial Rome: “So Suetonius gathered the 14th legion and detachments of the 20th, together with the nearest available auxiliaries – in all around 10,000 armed men – and prepared to join battle without delay. He chose a position in a narrow defile [faucibus] with a wood [silva] behind him. He established there could be no enemy except at his front, where there was an open plain [aperta planities] with no fear of ambush. Then he drew up his regular troops in close array [frequens ordinibus], with the light-armed auxiliaries at the flanks and the cavalry massed on the wings. By contrast, unprecedented numbers of British troops and followers paraded wildly everywhere. Their confidence was such that they brought their wives to witness the victory, installing them in wagons at the extreme border of the field [campus]." Criteria words or phrases are: Defile, open plain, 10,000 armed men, close array, wagons. Sources: Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb 1876; Michael Grant 1956; Boudica: Iron Age Warrior Queen, by R Hingley & C Unwin (Hambledon & London 2005); Mike Pitts, Editor, British Archaeology.

4. Faucibus (nom: faux) 1. the upper part of the throat, pharynx, gullet 2. [figuratively] the throat, jaws 3. a narrow way, narrow inlet, gorge, strait, entrance, defile, pass Source: latinlexicon.org

5. Topographic criteria for battle sites • 1) a defile of approximately 1km width set within an elevated feature. The defile’s sides must rise at least 30m above the bottom and have a steep slope (generally over 8°), and must extend at least 1.5km in both directions to discourage mass flanking movements by the Britons. These sides could be a mix of high and broken ground • 2) an adjacent, lower elevation, plain (less than 4° of slope) or extensive flat area with gentle slopes, at least 1km across to accommodate the British horde and wagons • 3) a gentle, positive slope (less than 5°) between the Britons and Romans • 4) a river or stream, sufficient to water 10,000 men and 1,000 horses and capable of protection by the Roman force • 5) the site must not be easily flanked, for example by an adjacent road or valley • 6) the site should not so intimidate the Britons that they would not offer battle but instead besiege the Romans – it must be inviting to the Britons and appear to them to be a trap for the Romans • 7) the Roman army must be able to march radially from London by road to reach the site's vicinity.

6. 263 possible battle sites from terrain analysis

7. Napoleon said, “An army marches on its stomach” I would add, “An army walks on water” Julius Caesar, "I follow the same policy toward the enemy as do many doctors when dealing with physical ailments, namely, that of conquering the foe by hunger rather than by steel.” Frontinus, Strategemata (VII, 1)

8. US Army estimates of daily water needs for a range of environmental conditions and energy expenditures. WBGT = wet bulb globe temperature. An estimate of the effect of temperature, humidity, wind speed, and sunlight. Developed by US Marine Corps.

9. The size of Paulinus' army and its water requirement Minimum total water required from the rivers each day is 0.00447 cumec.

10. The size of Boudica's army and its water requirement Total water required from the rivers each day is 0.03417 cumec. However, if the horde was following Paulinus along a single river then that river must supply at the very least 0.04 cumec. Even then it would be drained during the day and only replenished during the night.

11. Roman Marching Camps Examples from Chew Green in Northumberland Fort Deer Street Fort annex Marching Camp boundaries Source: Google Earth

12. Measurements were taken for 374 marching camps:- - Size - Number and proximity of rivers – a defence measure? - Amount of water in the rivers – a logistics measure - The curvature of the location – a drainage measure - The openness of the camp site – a measure of how much the site is overlooked by higher ground - The ruggedness of the camp location – suitability for tents - The wetness – a measure of ground water saturation? - The slope of the camp – a general suitability measure - The topographic index of the camp – a measure of topographic type, for example, a plain or a mid-hill slope. - The specific type of land form the camp site occupies, for example, a river flood plain or hill top. - The elevation above nearby rivers – a measure of flood avoidance - Distances to roads

13. Total water required for 307 camps plotted against the excess of water provided by rivers in August 307 marching camps (camps requiring less than 0.0003 cumec removed) Excess water provided % (log scale) An 100% excess is twice as much as the camp required and is thought to be the minimum a camp surveyor would seek in a river Nearly all rivers supply an excess of at least 10% (only 1.63% of camps have an excess less than 10%) Total water required (Cubic metres/second – log scale)

14. Roman marching camp locations around Silchester for Paulinus' army Black areas are highly favourable camps sites along roads South of Farley Hill, next to Blackwater, is first camp site area since Virginia Water - 22 km march away Silchester Coloured 'worms' are locations along rivers where Romans could camp. Red is most favourable, blue least. Note: the army size is 15,000 humans – soldiers, servants, civilians etc.

15. Locations where Paulinus could march his army Green 'worms' = most favourable camp sites along rivers with sufficient water Red blocks = favourable camp sites along roads that intersect rivers with sufficient water

16. Locations where Boudica could march her army Farley Hill Solid colours: Red = very strained rebel camps where roads intersect rivers; Blue = least strained camps where roads intersect rivers Pale 'worms': Mauve = very strained camps along rivers; Pink-yellow = least strained camps along rivers

17. 110 predicted battle sites from a combined study of terrain analysis, water needs and marching camps Red dots are the 110 sites which may overlie some terrain analysed sites. The black dots are terrain analysed deselected sites, i.e. those no longer suitable because they lack adequate water for the Romans.

18. Reasons against the 'cavalry dash' to London • Nicholas Fuentes' points against: • the cautious, prudent and experienced character of Paulinus; • the disastrous consequences of Paulinus not re-establishing contact with his infantry; • the damaging effect on the morale of the infantry as he rode away to London; • that as the Governor for two years he would not need to travel to London to assess its defences; • few refugees could keep up with the pace of a cavalry unit as it returned rapidly up Watling Street. Kaye additional points against: • army commanders very rarely leave their headquarters and/or army; • dispruption of lines of communication between UK-wide forces; • previously demonstrated poor martial rigour and insubordination of legionaries; • poor 'command and control' by army officers; • if information of London is required, send a younger officer; • Tacitus does not explicitly state that the legions were with Paulinus in London, because that was to be expected – there is no literary support for the dash; • civilians tend to march away from conflict, not towards it.

20. The 110 battle sites – weighted and ranked Top 10 Sites 1 Ogbourne St. George, Wilts 2 Norton Ferris, Wilts 3 Wigginton, Oxon 4 Upper Slaughter, Glos 5 East Meon, Hants 6 Lower Swell, Glos 7 Lower Assendon, Oxon 8 Milland, West Sussex 9 Brunton, Wilts 10 Bowyer's Common, Hants North Cotswolds cluster No 1 – Ogbourne St. George Kennet Valley

21. North Cotswolds cluster. Ogbourne St George, Wilts. Site number 1 Source: British Archaeology, 114, Sept/Oct 2010

22. Battle site No. 1 – Ogbourne St George, Wiltshire “for he was naturally inclined to delay and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success. So he kept issuing orders to fill up the ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line, thinking that it was soon enough to begin to conquer when they had made provision against defeat.” Tacitus of Paulinus