1 / 29

Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Period in Thailand (1991~2006)

Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Period in Thailand (1991~2006). 。. Shu-Chen Li Ph.D. student Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies National Chi Nan University, Taiwan. Structure. 1. Introduction 2. Related Studies 3. Thai Military’s Way to Power

makya
Download Presentation

Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Period in Thailand (1991~2006)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Period in Thailand (1991~2006) 。 Shu-Chen Li Ph.D. student Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies National Chi Nan University, Taiwan

  2. Structure 1.Introduction 2. Related Studies 3. Thai Military’s Way to Power 4. Development of Civil-Military Relations in Thailand (1991~2006) 5. Conclusion

  3. Introduction 1. 1992 Black May was the beginning of Thai military’s fading out of the Thai political stage. 2. Thaksin Shinawatra rose as the strongman and the CEO in Thai after the Asian financial crisis. 3.Thaksin regime based on majority seats in congress instead of the political maneuver by the military.

  4. Introduction 4. Military launched the 2006 coup, was undoubtedly sabotages to democracy, but not challenged or criticized by leaders from parties and bureaucracy system; not even by the intellectuals. Why ? 5. This Study intends to explore from the military-sociology point of view the context of the civil-military relations during the 1991 and 2006 coups, with focus placed on the dynamics of the relationship between the military and the society.

  5. Concept definition Civil-military relations in this study means the relationship between the organization and members of armed forces’ and social organizations. The term of “civil” in civil-military relations not only narrowly applies to civil service or civilian government, but also vastly applies to citizens and civilian society.

  6. Discussing civil-military relations aspects 1. Civilian control and military efficacy Peter D. Feaver, Suzanne C. Nielsen, Warren E. Matthews 2. Military influence Paul Chambers, Richard K Betts, Federico Ferrara 3. Civil-Military Relations friction or conflict Peter D. Feaver, Deborah Avant, Hong, Lu-xun 4. Coup Suzanne C. Nielsen, Giles Ji Ungpakorn, Chen, Hong-yu, Chen, Pei-xiu 5. Economic development 6. Political party 7. Monarchy

  7. 1st Interval 10 years 2ndInterval 13 years 3rd Inverval ? year 1932 1938 1947 1958 1971 1991 1st Phase 5times/6 years 2ndPhase 10 times/11 years 3rd Phase 8 times/20 years Intermittent Period of Coup in Thailand 3rd Interval 15 years 2006 Source: Chen, Pei-xiu, Military and Politics: Military Coup and Political Changes in Thailand (Taiwan: Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 2009), 5 .

  8. Development of Civil-Military Relations in Thailand(1991~2006) 1. Military-civilian interaction (1) Civilian control (2) The Constitution of 1997 (3) Bureaucratic system 2. Civilian society’s response to politics (1) Peoples Alliance for Democracy’s action (2) The riot in the three southern provinces (3) The Nation’scomments 3. Military intervention in politics (1) Military might hide its dominant character, but it had never disengaged or disappeared (2) Military could always return in force easily

  9. Military-Civilian interaction Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy Four types (in Southeast Asiancountries) 1. Military rule Government operation is dominated by military; 2. Concordance Military and civilian elites are all parts of the same ruling group; 3. Polyarchic Military and civilian elites represent interests of different groups; 4. Constitutional Military is governed by laws; it is a civilian control pattern.

  10. Prime minister ofThailand (1992~2006)

  11. Banharn and Chavalit’s administration Banharn, aka Mr. ATM, had profound experience in politics; Chavalit retired as army commander in March 1990, and assumed the office of the vice premier And national defense minister, he won the 1995 general election. Both of Banharn and Chavalit’s administration maintained good relationship with military.

  12. § Chuan’sadministration§ 1. The Democrat Party has always been regarded as a pro-military party, because of the close relationship between Democrat Party and Prem Tinsulanonda. 2. The political support for Chuan came from the royal family and military. In 1997, Chuan served another premier term without election seemed to be the arrangement made by Prem and the approval from the royal court.

  13. General Prem Tinsulanonda§ 1. General Prem, the former premier(1980~1988). During his decades of military career, he earned himself great respect among the military. He was deeply trusted by the King. He had been a member of the Privy Council since his retirement as the premier in 1988, and became the chairman of the Privy Council in 1998. 2. The relationship between military group and the royal family was even further promoted by General Prem. He always served as a mediator among military factions. Chai-anan proposed that the silenced and ignored military during the 1990s can be attributed to Prem’s arbitration.

  14. § Chuan’sadministration§

  15. General Wimol’s military reform He declared that : 1. military shall refrain from intervention in politics, accept media supervision; 2. agreed to 1993 to 1994 national defense budget cut; 3. agreed to reduce 50,000 men in armed forces; 4. agreed to strengthen short term education and training; 5. agreed to maintain the minimal military procurement.

  16. Thaksin’s administration

  17. Thaksin’s administration

  18. Thaksin’s administration Sonthi didn’t have a good relationship with Thaksin, Thaksin’s plans to move his classmates to the security unit in Bangkok were frequently objected by Sonthi. When Bangkok was filled with smoke of political conflict, Thaksin once asked Sonthi whether Sonthi would launch a coup to overturn Thaksin or not? Sonthi gave a positive answer.

  19. Thaksin’s administration Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn argue that: Thaksin’s attempt has brought catastrophic results to civilian control in Thailand.

  20. New Constitution of 1997 1. a minister must abandon his seat as senator; 2. non-confidence motion against the premier can only proposed once per year, and the passing quota has been increased from 1/5 to 2/5; 3. A party that wins votes less than 5% in the general election will not be included in party distribution list; 4. all qualified voters are asked to fulfill their obligation of voting;

  21. New Constitution of 1997 5. All electoral districts are unified into one single district, where 400 seats will be elected. National azonal partisan seats shall be 100; 6. Parliament meeting session has been extended from 90 days to 120 days. A member whose days of absence exceed 1/4 of meeting days shall have his seat cancelled immediately.

  22. Military intervention in politics 1. 2006 coup illustrated that military might hide its dominant character, but it had never disengaged or disappeared, and Military could always return in force easily. 2. Military always used loyalty to the King as its righteous cause and legitimized its intervention in politics. Military is never far away from politics and still maintains its great interest through connections in Thai political system. 3. In some Thai people’s eyes, Military’s intervention is a good way to resolve the social disorder.

  23. Conclusion 1. Military intervention in politics, has been the primary method for the political development, political reform in a changing society, and inheritance of power in the Third World. 2. Huntington proposed that the military organization is formed according to functional and social needs. Thai military’s roles allow military to maintain its importance of political role.

  24. Conclusion 3. Friction or conflict of a certain degree in the relationship between civilians and military under democratic system is a normal phenomenon. However, these disputes and conflicts should be legally abiding and resolved within the system through a democratic measure. 4. In the democratic transition period, civil-military relations in Thailand is “ domination and influence”.

  25. Conclusion 5. When 2006 Coup, leaders of parties and bureaucratic system, even the intellectuals, made no criticism or accusation about the coup, we could say that it had been a “consensus shared by the military and civilian elites”. 6. Is it necessary that Thai military must disengage from politics now? “when” and “how” are the more important questions.

  26. Thank You ขอบคุณค่ะ Shu-Chen Li s98108901@ncnu.edu.tw Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies National Chi Nan University, Taiwan

  27. Thesis subject statistics of Armed Forces and Society Quarterly (2000.01~2011.01)

  28. Bureaucratic system 1. The Thai bureaucratic system referred in this study means as what Max Weber has defined, it means the professional technical officials who are charged with the tasks of policy implementation and administrative affairs. 2. Civilianofficials are the basic force that supports the operation of the national machine. They are not promoted or demoted because of change of government, and bureaucratic system and military regime often maintain a mutual benefiting relationship.

  29. Civilian society’s response to politics 1. Peoples Alliance for Democracy’s action People’s Alliance Democracy was the first that won the support from the middle and upper classes in Bangkok, and expanded to all social classes that were dissatisfied with Thaksin. 2.The riot in the three southern provinces 3. 2005 human right reportclaimed that “17 broadcasting media were shut down because they criticized the government.” 4. Mass media’s comment: The Nation

More Related