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Behavioral Corporate Finance. Malcolm Baker Harvard Business School October 22, 2009. 1998: The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. 1999: Successful investing is anticipating the anticipations of others.
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Behavioral Corporate Finance Malcolm Baker Harvard Business School October 22, 2009
1998: The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent
1999: Successful investing is anticipating the anticipations of others
2008: If you owe a bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem, but if you owe a million, it has
Rational Fundamental Value
There is no other proposition in economics which has more solid evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
Is this the way we make decisions? • Basis for individual investors’ intuition • Basis for well-capitalized investors’ strategies
Is this the way we make decisions? • Basis for individual investors’ intuition
The expert pool player makes shots as if he were a competent physicist and mathematician
How many people does P&G employ?
H1N1 flu outbreak: You have two options
Gamble: 50% chance $110; 50% chance -$100
Retirement Plan Participation
College GPA if your HS GPA was 2.2, 3.0, 3.8?
Four examples • Categorization • Anchoring (expectations) and reference points (utility) • Inertia • Extrapolation
Is this the way we make decisions? • Basis for individual investors’ intuition • Basis for well-capitalized investors’ strategies
Competitive arbitrage forces prices to fundamental value; irrational traders die out
Why isn’t competition more effective? • Model risk • Noise trader risk • Unwinding or endogenous risk… comes from leverage • Funding risk and horizon… comes from e.g. impatient limited partners
Is this the way we make decisions? • Basis for individual investors’ intuition • Basis for well-capitalized investors’ strategies
Behavioral finance Investor errors • Categorization • Anchoring and reference points • Inertia • Extrapolation + Limits to arbitrage = Mispricing
Capital structure, maturity structure, dividend/payout policy… are irrelevant in perfect markets
Perfect Markets • The difference is no one ever thought markets were absolutely perfect • Taxes • Bankruptcy costs • Agency costs • Asymmetric information • But market efficiency and manager rationalityare largely ignored
Behavioral Corporate Finance • Different sources of capital have different costs • For exogenous reasons, i.e. in inefficient capital markets with irrational traders • Firms respond in two ways • Market timing, catering • Real consequences for investment • Exogenously changing constraints
Behavioral Corporate Finance, V. 1.0 • Corporate financing decisions appear to be timed well • Ritter (1991) and many more • Equity issues, stock-financed mergers, repurchases • Flows through to investment • Consistent with opportunism and real consequences of inefficient markets
Managerial Smarts? • Information advantage • Meulbroek (1992) and several more on insider trading • Earnings management • Fewer constraints • Particularly in expanding supply • Accommodating investor demand • Rules of thumb, investment banking
Behavioral Corporate Finance, V. 1.1 • Still the question of supply versus demand • Risk, growth opportunities • Use exogenous shocks to investor demand • Does the supply of capital, separate from fundamentals, affect investment?
Some Examples • Instruments for the supply of capital • Flows into high-yield funds investment by below investment grade firms • Chernenko and Sunderam (2009) • Many more examples like this emerging • Crisis parallel: securitization, screening real estate, PE
Behavioral Corporate Finance, V. 2.0 • Mounting evidence for supply effects • Independent of fundamentals • Still, it would be nice to tie this more closely to investor behavior • As opposed to e.g. institutional rigidities
Back to Behavioral Finance Investor errors • Categorization • Anchoring and reference points • Inertia • Extrapolation + Limits to arbitrage = Mispricing
Categorization and Dividend Policy • Test the hypothesis that investors categorize firms according to whether they pay a dividend • Remember March versus April • Four measures of a ‘dividend premium’ • Examine the corporate response
Dividend Premium and Initiations Dividend Premium Propensity to Initiate Dividend Initiations
Reference Points and M&A Pricing • Investors are reluctant to sell at a loss • Remember H1N1 experiment and loss aversion • Shefrin and Statman (1984) and Odean (1998) study individual investors • This means it’s hard to do a deal when a firm is selling well off its recent highs
A Discontinuity in Offer Prices Offer Price = 52-week High Price Density (Offer Price – 52-week High Price) Pt-30
A Discontinuity in Offer Prices Density (Offer Price – 52-week High Price) Pt-30
Past High Prices and Average Offer Premia Offer Price Pt-30 52-week High Price Pt-30