Outline of Paper

1. The 2011 Welsh ReferendumRichard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University)Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University)Paper presented to Annual Conference of the Political Studies AssociationLondon, April 2011

2. Outline of Paper • Introduction • Background to the Referendum • The Campaign • The Result • Turnout • Yes .v. No • Conclusions & Implications

3. But first, a word from our sponsors… • The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (ESRC Grant RES-000-22-4496) • Survey-based study of voting in the referendum • Conducted via Internet with YouGov • Two-Wave panel study, with first wave conducted as ‘rolling’ study through period of the campaign • N of panel study = 2569 • Further support from the McDougall Trust for interview-based study of local and national campaigning (ongoing)

4. Wales 2011: the Background, 1 • Previous devolution referendums: 1979, 1997 • 1998 GOWA: Flawed Devolution Model • ‘Secondary’ legislative powers: responsibility without power? • ‘Body Corporate’ and other problematic aspects • 2004: Richard Commission Report • 2006 GOWA: • LCOs • Provision for Referendum on full transfer of primary legislative powers

5. Wales 2011: the Background, 2 • 2007: One Wales coalition agreement • 2008-09: All Wales Convention • BUT continuing caution… • ‘Shadow of 1979’: unwillingness to believe the survey evidence! • Labour parliamentary opposition • Final agreement on referendum: March 3rd 2011

6. The Campaign: General Context • Greatly constrained by referendum not being on a ‘fundamental constitutional issue’ • Difficult for campaigns to craft appealing messages to voters • Difficult to frame intelligible and legally accurate referendum question (Lord’s Prayer!) • Problems with PPERA: • No official campaigns • Constraints on spending (2011<1997!)

8. The Yes Campaign • Support from all four party leaderships in NAW • Also widespread support from civil society • The ‘Establishment’ campaign • Paradox of Yes position: Main strength also main weakness – constrained precisely because it was so all-inclusive • Had to ‘wait for Labour’ • Limited in what it could campaign against (not LCOs, not UK govt) • Main stake-holders had other priorities (particularly 2011 election)

9. The Yes Campaign

10. The No campaign • Little mainstream support, meaning… • Little ability to raise resources: spending <£5k? • No prominent politicians active. Resulting inexperience obvious in: • Breakdown in message discipline by end (increasingly arguing for abolition) • Seem to have believed own propaganda (own polls) • Failure to produce promised campaign material • Local campaigns very weak • ‘Grassroots campaign’ largely without roots • Some of the spokesmen very weak • Welsh-speaking voices just plain embarrassing

11. The No Campaign

12. Referendum Voting Intention 2007-11

13. Why was the No side so weak? • Polls as self-fulfilling prophecy? • Party cues very strong. Labour (eventually) more united on devolution than ever • Habermas and Hain • Force of better argument. • Status quo so obviously flawed (cf. ‘scrutiny’) • Slippery slope-ism busted flush • Hain (2005) was right: flaws would lead to irresistible pressure for further devolution • Wales has changed • Death of ‘Assimilationist Unionism’ and growth of ‘Devolutionist Unionism’

14. Wales 2011: the Result, 1 Yes: 517,132 (63.5%) No: 297,380 (36.5%) Turnout = 35.6%

15. Wales, 2011: the Result, 2 Perhaps least important aspect of result is that it vindicated work of the Institute of Welsh Politics! Key arguments post-1999: • Devolution increasingly ‘settled will’ in Wales too • Support evened out over country • Appetite for more very apparent But overshadowed by focus on close 1997 result and legacy of the ‘shadow of 1979’

16. Turnout, 1 35.6% hardly good. Low by most historic UK and international standards. But readily explicable: • No fundamental constitutional question at stake • Lack of official campaigns, and only one campaign functioning at local level • Lack of interest in UK media • Timing (winter + forthcoming election) • General reduction in turnout in UK and elsewhere • 3 UK GEs before 1997 av. turnout = 74.8% • 3 UK GEs before 2011 av. turnout = 62%

17. Turnout, 2 (aggregate data) • 17 % difference between highest and lowest figures across Wales • Turnout closely correlated with turnout in 1997 referendum and substantially so with 2010 GE • turnout strongly related to those factors that shape turnout in general and in particular devolution referendums • At aggregate level, turnout correlates with: • % Welsh-speakers in area • Rurality • % employed in professional/managerial roles

18. Turnout, 3 (individual-level data) • Turnout only moderately predicted by most social characteristics: HH income, social class, national identity • Slightly stronger correlation with welsh language; very strong with age • Strong association with some political characteristics: Interest in politics, perceived duty to vote, perceived importance of referendum • But weak relationship with constitutional preference, or perceived performance of devolved institutions

19. Yes .v. No: Homogenisation • Yes side won in 21 of 22 Welsh local authorities • Overall ‘swing’ from 1997 for Yes: 13.2% • Av. swing in 1997 No areas = 16.8% • Av. Swing in 1997 Yes areas = 10.4% • 8 highest ‘swings’ to Yes all in areas that voted No in 1997 • 4 largest Yes ‘swings’ all in North Wales • Gap between highest and lowest Yes % = 26.6%, compared to 34.5% in 1997

20. Yes .v. No (aggregate data) • Yes % closely correlated (r = .90) with % Yes in 1997 – but differences all  greater homogeneity • % Welsh identity and Welsh language in LA strongly related to % Yes vote; so also % Plaid vote • % middle class and % Conservative vote 2010 negatively related to % LA Yes vote

21. Yes .v. No (individual-level data) • Yes vote lower amongst oldest age cohorts, middle-class voters • Correlation between Yes vote and both Welsh language and Welsh national identity • Yes vote uncorrelated with Interest in politics or perceived duty to vote • Very strong relationship between Yes voting and perceived importance of referendum, constitutional preference, and perceived performance of devolved institutions

22. Conclusions, 1 What we can learn from Wales: Don’t hold constitutionally frivolous referendums under flawed Referendum legislation in the middle of winter… Further work to be done on modelling vote: • Impact of Party Cues • National Identities & Sentiments • Performance Politics

23. Conclusions, 2: Implications • Deeply-flawed referendum, but likely to have substantial consequences… • Demonstrates ‘settled will’, therefore legitimacy not provided by 1997 result now bestowed • Substantial pressure developing for devolution of further areas, changes to financial settlement, possible Welsh jurisdiction etc. • Coupled to reduction of MPs ensures that NAW will be main forum for Welsh democratic debate • Welsh relationship with UK state from now inter-governmental in character • Welsh MPs from now on very marginal figures in Wales and Westminster

24. And to find out more… Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Wales Says Yes: the 2011 Welsh Referendum (University of Wales Press, 2012)