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IMPROVING GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY AND FOSTERING INDUSTRY GROWTH

IMPROVING GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY AND FOSTERING INDUSTRY GROWTH . GA Accident Statistics and Future Mitigation Work. Meeting Safety Challenges through Pilot Training Reform. SAFE Pilot Training Reform Symposium. Corey Stephens Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention.

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IMPROVING GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY AND FOSTERING INDUSTRY GROWTH

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  1. IMPROVING GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY AND FOSTERING INDUSTRY GROWTH

  2. GA Accident Statistics and Future Mitigation Work Meeting Safety Challenges through Pilot Training Reform SAFE Pilot Training Reform Symposium Corey StephensOffice of Accident Investigation and Prevention May 4th, 2011

  3. GA Metrics FY not CY, but can be converted N-registered aircraft only • Overall GA Fatal Accidents per 100,000 hrs • Everything not 121 or commuter • Alaska Fatal and Serious Injury Accidents per 100,000 hrs • Everything not 121, includes commuter • Experimental Aircraft Fatal Accidents • Interim until we can establish a rate-based metric and goal

  4. Currently Equates to 252 Fatal Accidents

  5. General Aviation Fatal Accidents 2001-2010 by Top 10 CICTT Occurrence Category Note: Homebuilt category incorporates all homebuilt aircraft and is not limited to experimental and LSA.

  6. How to Act on this Information We have identified types of accidents Now we determine why the accidents are occurring

  7. GA Joint Steering Committee • Evolve GA JSC to a CAST like Model • Voluntary commitments • Consensus decision-making • Data driven risk management • Implementation-focused • The GA JSC is a means to… Focus Limited Government/Industry Resources on Data Driven Risks and Solutions

  8. General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) Steering Committee Co-Chairs: Bruce Landsberg (ASI) Tony Fazio (FAA/AVP) Government - FAA (AFS, AIR, ATO & ARP) - NASA (Research) - NWS Industry - AOPA, EAA, GAMA, NATA, NBAA, LAMA, Insurance • Strategic guidance • Management/Approval of Safety Plan • Provide direction • Membership Outreach • Provides linkage to ASIAS • Identify future areas of study/risk • Charter safety studies • Provide guidance and direction • Draw data from various areas • Develop a prioritized Safety Plan • Develop metrics to measure effectiveness of safety solutions Safety Analysis Team (SAT) Co-chairs: Corey Stephens (FAA) Jens Hennig(GAMA) Members: FAA, NTSB, AOPA, EAA, FSF, CGAR, FAST, NAFI, LAMA, Insurance, SAFE, etc. Working Groups (WGs) (To include SMEs from various general aviation segments, depending on study) • Data analyses • Safety enhancement / mitigation development

  9. What is the CAST model? • Work began in 1997 after two significant accidents in 1996 (TWA 800 & ValueJet 592) • CAST focus was set by: • White House Commission on Aviation Safety • The National Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC) • Opportunity for industry and government to focus resources on one primary aviation safety initiative

  10. GA JSC Working Group Process • WGs to be formed based on risk (example: LOC) • Broad-based teams (30-40 specialists /team) • Teams can be divided by aircraft or operation type (example: turbine, reciprocating and homebuilt reciprocating/turbine) • Detailed event sequence - problem identification from US accidents and incidents

  11. GA JSC Working Group Process • WGs to develop mitigations based on problems found and build Detailed Implementations Plans (DIPs) • DIPs will describe each mitigation and explain steps to implementation • Groups are identified for leadership and metrics are developed • DIPs then go to the SAT for resource/benefit evaluation

  12. GA JSC SAT Process • SAT identifies the most effective solutions derived from all accident categories • Considers effectiveness vs. resources • Tests solutions against fatal accidents • Creates draft master strategic safety plan • Plan is submitted to GA JSC for approval

  13. GA JSC SAT Process • Once plan is approved, industry and government begin implementation • SAT will track implementation schedules and levels (are mitigations on time and at levels we were expecting) • SAT will work to track effectiveness of the mitigations in place • SAT will identify and recommend areas for future study/mitigation

  14. Summary: GA JSC, SAT & WGs Moving Forward • History shows focused action and introduction of new capabilities have led to accident risk reductions • Joint industry and government teams working together to a common goal can further enhance the safety of our very safe aviation system • Full implementation will require a coordinated effort between industry and government • The GA JSC is moving forward to meet the challenge

  15. Risk Mismanagement as the Root Cause of Most Fatal Accidents presented by: Jim Lauerman, President

  16. Our Unique Perspective • All the losses • Direct Insurer • Established Relationship

  17. Personal Background • Then • Now Friday Meetings

  18. Real Costs • Human • Financial • Public Relations • New Rules • Unintended Consequences

  19. Why Aren’t We Solving the Problem? • Regulations? • Technology? • Training?

  20. “It’s not so much what pilots know that gets them in trouble –” • But What They Care About

  21. The Culture of General Aviation • More Ethical than Technical • Matters of the Heart, not Just the Head • We Pilots Aren’t Good at This • A More Professional Attitude • Accepting that there is risk • Being “grown ups” • Accepting Responsibility for Managing the Risks

  22. Questions?877 359 2836avemco@ave.com 411 Aviation Way, Suite 100, Frederick, Maryland 21701

  23. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Bill Rhodes, Ph.D. Aerworthy Consulting, LLC

  24. Acknowledgments • Portions of the research underlying this presentation were conducted under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with the Department of Philosophy, USAF Academy • Avemco is AERI’s charter sponsor

  25. Who is this guy? • Former USAFA prof • Professional identity formation • Author in applied ethics • Private pilot/AC owner • AERI lead investigator

  26. What I’ll Suggest • Hardware/software innovation • Improved technical skills, new rules etc. • …Address some pilot-induced mishaps • Professional ethics will address all • …And it’s not all that hard to do

  27. Ethics: Why? • Mishap pilots • Pass the tests (know the rules) • But not the most relevant tests • Are products of a “perfect design” • Notice subcultures of aviators • Where would you like your kid to learn airmanship • Why?

  28. Ethics??? • I AM NOT SUGGESTING • Additional regulation • Invasion of privacy • “Compliance” with a list of constraints • I AM SUGGESTING • Humble regard for aviation and the stakes • Determining selves to be trustworthy Airmen • Fostering the same in our community

  29. Professional ethics • Do’s and Don’ts can only get us so far • Education in addition to instruction: limit • Professional identity formation • Professionally-minded don’t need to be told Judgment: figure out what’s best Self-mastery: do it (short run) Self-determination: habitually (long run)

  30. Professionalism??? • I AM NOT SUGGESTING • A matter of jurisdiction • Or a matter of being paid • I AM SUGGESTING • Committing to functional identity—who pilot is • Able to reach goals reliably—what pilot does • Worthy of trust—OTG and OK

  31. DEVELOPING PROFESSIONALS • Self-Mastery (short term) • …in today’s context Who pilot is (dispositions) What pilot does Outcome (OTG and OK Plus?) • Self-determination (long term) • …in cultural context

  32. Where to begin • Forthright confrontation of problem • The culture (enemy is us) • Messages • What is admired • What is disdained—even mocked • Social norms are powerful • But what messages should be sent?

  33. Aviation Insiders Know • What sort of pilot is scary? • What sort of pilot do you trust? • SME interviews: Insurance underwriters, investigators, CFI’s, and examiners convergent • Draft concepts are compiled • One example: professional detachment

  34. Professionalism at home • Quality matters • Make no apologies for education and devotion • Admit that current cultural values • …may differ from professional imperatives • And select the professional imperatives • Reform demands seeing past “our way” to what works

  35. Aerworthy Consulting, LLC. May, 2011 brhodes@aerworthy.com (719) 229-7369

  36. IT’S TIME TO CREATE A CULTURAL SEA-CHANGE IN GENERAL AVIATION

  37. There has been virtually no change • In the general aviation accident rate for the last 20 years

  38. If we keep on doing what we have been doing • We are going to keep on getting what we’ve been getting • Even if we do it better

  39. What we have been getting • Is unacceptable

  40. Solutions to problems • Are not obvious until after they are solved

  41. 3 Counter-intuitive solutions • Ban low airspeed “phobia” • Ban the “big lie” • Ban “safety”

  42. Ban low airspeed phobia • One-third of all fatalities come from stalls/spins while maneuvering • So therefore we should tell pilots to slow down when maneuvering

  43. Most people think • Stall/spin accidents come from flying too slow

  44. Let’s consider • That they may be caused by flying too fast

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