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0. Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism?. Should it do anything? Presentation_00. (2) The Problems and Debates when talking about the United Nations. 0. The debate about what the UN is and what it is not – the creature of the nation states.
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0 Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism? Should it do anything? Presentation_00
(2) The Problems and Debates when talking about the United Nations 0 • The debate about what the UN is and what it is not – the creature of the nation states. • The debate about the purpose of the UN being able to preserve peace and security and enhance the human condition – not join a war offered by a few states. • The problem that the UN structurally is a number of varied bodies, some of which are more autonomous than others: General Assembly (GA), Security Council (SC), Secretary General (SG), many agencies (WHO, UNESCO, WB) and ‘programs’ (UNHCR, UNDP) and funds (UNICEF; UNFPA)
(3) Historically… 0 • The UN has a bad track record in dealing with terrorism – definitional impasse, Israeli- Palestinian issues, etc. • The UN-US rift (UNAUSA; Bennis; Malone) • The contemporary dilemma of UN ‘scandals’ of leadership, the Oil-for-Food program (UN; Inquiry Report; Oil-for-Food Facts; UNAUSA), and sex scandals (Congo; Bosnia; Liberia)
(4) First, what are the aims of global counter-terrorist policies? 0 • Destroy networks, cells, leadership thru • Law enforcement, military means, legal and diplomatic • Deny assets and resources thru • Law enforcement, legal, diplomatic and economic means • Diminish underlying causes & conditions thru • Economic, legal, political and social means
(5) How has the UN responded to the aims of counter-terror policies: 0 Security Council in the Lead • Security Council and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) addressing air piracy, hijacking and air security treaties and codes, (1968–1990). • SC leads UN support for Vienna Conventions on the Protection of Diplomats (1977). • In the 1990s, strong Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) imposing sanctions on Libya (1992; 1993), Sudan (1996: 1044; 1054; 1070) and Afghanistan (1999; 2000) for their direct support of terrorism. Resource: Anti-Terrorism Conventions
(6) Security Council Resolutions 0 • SCR 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) • the ‘Taliban’ resolution which demands extradition of Osama bin Laden • Imposes strict, smart sanctions on assets, travel of leaders; has major humanitarian provisions • Creates the 1267 Committee
(7) Effects of UNSC sanctions 0 • By 2003, Libya and Sudan are considered ‘success stories’ as they renounce terrorist ties and improve other behaviors related to terrorism (weapons issues, etc). • But it is clear that such changed behavior results when the ‘sticks’ used by the SC are enhanced by the ‘carrots’ provided by single member states.
(8) UN’s Response to 9-11 0 • SCR 1373 (9/28) – unprecedented in its scope of demands on states (see list) • 1373 creates the UN Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), with British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock as its 1st chair. • Organizations such as the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation have helped with research and policy development • In its first 27 months great success in getting nations to sign on to eleven key counter-terrorism treaties and in:
(9) Universal counter-terrorism treaties 0 • State self-reporting with regard to compliance… • 1 report: 196 nations • 2 reports: 161 nations • 3 reports: 107 nations • 4 reports: 26 nations • Convention and treaty ratification improves • Counter-Terror Legislative Assistance: • 52 receive general assistance; • 27 specific
(10) 0 • 147 nations request some assistance and/or training in one or more of these areas: • Police and law enforcement • Immigration and border control • Banking issues and supervision • Fraud documentation and control in various areas from immigration, travel, finances
(11) What does all of this mean? 0 • The CTC and the UN are at their most effective when they • (1) form and hold up to all states what the standards of behavior need to be; • (2) provide a ‘switchboard’ role in connecting those in need of service with the ones who can provide the expertise for that service; • (3) report, counsel and hold compliant those states not meeting the standards
(12) The surprises in the system 0 • The pervasive need for technical assistance in varied areas • The tensions between advanced states and regional organizations in identifying recalcitrant states and the work of the CTC, thus SCRs 1456 (Jan 03), 1526 (Jan 04) • The progress of existing organizations and their capacity as underused….thus the CTC as a ‘switchboard’
(13) 0 • Further the human rights agenda of the CT efforts • Work to sponsor new international meetings on smaller critical issues on which states can make progress – most especially at the regional level (i.e. Asia). • Work with various actors on enhancing ‘compliance’ – especially the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC)
(14) To ‘reinvigorate’ the CTC 0 • SCR 1535 (March 2004): establishes the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), with a real staff and a mandate • Establishes a ‘plenary’ of all SC members as members of CTC • SG Annan chooses Spanish Ambassador Ruperez as Exective Director of CTED • But from June 2004-2006, staff still only temporary • Missions are undertaken to three states in March
(15) UN and Big World Politics at CTC 0 • Dilemma of Russian Chair of CTC in autumn of 2004 • The weight of the rift between the US and the UN, Iraq, etc • The emergence of the Danes as CTC chair, April 1, 2005 • How to deal with the malaise that has set in, and the view that the CTC has been by-passed by events
(16) What events and trends? 0 • The strength and commitment of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations to counter-terror operations • The emergence of the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force (1989: FATF) in itself and as a model for revamping the CTC • membership: 31 states & territories, 2 regional organizations (European Commission & Gulf Co-operation Council) and relations with another 50 (2007) • Some other models – like an ‘IAEA’ for finances and immigration suggested
(17) What is then left for the CTC & the UN? 0 • Define the mission of a CTC/CTED • Develop proactive coordination and really institutionalize the ‘switchboard’ function, thus conducting through the CTED credible needs assessments and effective assistance missions. (Check our Matrix) • Spark inter-agency coordination, linking development with such assistance - CTAG