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Nuclear Removal Objective

GTRI’s Nuclear Removal Programs Kelly Cummins Director of Former Soviet Union and Asian Threat Reduction National Nuclear Security Administration Presented to the 2009 National Spent Fuel Program Meeting. Nuclear Removal Objective.

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Nuclear Removal Objective

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  1. GTRI’s Nuclear Removal Programs Kelly CumminsDirector of Former Soviet Union and Asian Threat ReductionNational Nuclear Security AdministrationPresented to the 2009 National Spent Fuel Program Meeting

  2. Nuclear Removal Objective Goal: Remove or dispose of excess WMD-usable nuclear materials located at civilian sites worldwide: • Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh and spent fuel from research reactors • U.S.-origin fresh and spent nuclear fuel from research reactors • Gap nuclear materials not covered by other removal efforts These efforts result in permanent threat reduction because each kilogram of this dangerous material that is secured and disposed of removes it from possible diversion for malevolent purposes.

  3. Russian-origin HEU Removal Scope: Partner with the IAEA and Russia to repatriate Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh and spent fuel from over 20 Russian-supplied research reactors in 17 countries. • Agreement to convert reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel required for facility eligibility • HEU fresh fuel removed under an IAEA mechanism • HEU spent fuel removed under direct contracts with the facility Under the February 2005 Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation, the United States and Russia developed an overall prioritized accelerated schedule of shipments.

  4. Russian-origin HEU Removal Accomplishments: • FY07 – Germany, Poland, Vietnam • FY08 - Czech Republic, Latvia*, Bulgaria* • FY09 – Hungary *Latvia and Bulgaria are now HEU-free The program goal is to complete repatriation of eligible Russian‑origin HEU spent fuel currently stored outside of research reactors by 2010. • To date, 765 kilograms of HEU fuel have been repatriated from 10 countries Completed Russian HEU Fuel Shipments

  5. U.S.-origin HEU Removal Scope: Repatriate U.S.-origin HEU and LEU spent nuclear fuel and HEU target material. • Agreement to convert reactor to LEU fuel required for facility eligibility In 2004, DOE approved a ten-year extension of this program. Currently the United States will accept eligible spent fuel that is irradiated by May 2016 and returned to the United States by May 2019.

  6. U.S.-origin HEU Removal • GTRI has repatriated 1,200 kilograms of HEU spent fuel and 3,153 kilograms of LEU spent nuclear fuel from 27 countries in 46 shipments • 16 countries have returned all of their eligible U.S.-origin HEU fuel Countries with Eligible U.S.-origin Material for Repatriation

  7. U.S.-origin Shipments • 46 shipments completed • 36 via Ocean to East Coast • 8,587 spent fuel assemblies, from 27 countries • 8 cross-country shipments completed, one west coast shipment completed • 203 casks/7,169 assemblies to SRS 19 casks/1,383 rods to INL 13 casks/35 assemblies to Y-12

  8. Shipments to Date • 2 Shipments to Y-12 • Argentina • South Korea • 8 Shipments to INL • South Korea • Romania, Slovenia, Italy and Germany • United Kingdom • Germany • Japan • Indonesia • Japan • Romania 36 shipments to SRS • Canada • Italy and Germany • Japan • Chile and Argentina • Austria, Germany, and Netherlands • Germany, Sweden, and Japan • Denmark • Denmark, Germany, and Sweden • 21 &22. Japan • Indonesia • Germany • Japan • Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Colombia, and Chile • Canada • Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Italy • Japan, Sweden, Germany, and Spain • Denmark, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Greece • Australia • Venezuela, Uruguay, Japan, Sweden, and Spain • Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan • Germany, Denmark, and Sweden • Portugal and Denmark • Japan (via Europe) • Brazil and Venezuela • Netherlands and Sweden • Austria and Greece • Netherlands and Germany • Australia • Japan • Sweden • Argentina and Brazil • Sweden, Germany and Japan • Portugal • Germany and Japan • Canada

  9. Upcoming Shipments • Australia: 14.6 kg HEU and 56.5 kg LEU • Indonesia/Taiwan Joint Shipment: • 53.6 kg LEU from Indonesia • 4.8 kg of HEU and 34.8 kg of LEU from Taiwan • Turkey/Israel Joint Shipment: • 5.0 kg of HEU from Turkey • 20.0 kg of LEU from Israel • Japan: 5.1 kg of HEU and 282.7 kg of LEU

  10. Gap Removal Scope: Facilitate the disposition of high risk, vulnerable nuclear material not covered by other removal efforts. The materials could include: • U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel not covered by the existing U.S.-origin fuel return program • HEU material of non-U.S.-origin and non-Russian-origin • U.S.-origin HEU fresh research reactor fuel • Separated plutonium Accomplishments: • Since the program began approximately 146 kilograms of HEU has been removed from Belgium Canada, the Netherlands, and Italy

  11. Strategy • Provide assistance to facilities in characterizing, packaging, or down blending fuel for disposition in their own domestic repository • Assist facilities in locating viable commercial disposition options • Where no acceptable commercial option is available, bring certain high-risk material to the United States • Revised Record of Decision approved by NNSA Administrator in January 2009 allows GTRI “to transport up to 1 metric ton of spent nuclear fuel (Gap Material SNF) from foreign research reactor locations to the United States and safely store this Gap Material at a DOE site pending disposition.”

  12. Program Requirements • According to the Revised Record of Decision, material must also meet the following 4 conditions: • pose a threat to national security, • be susceptible to use in an improvised nuclear device, • present a high risk of terrorist threat, and • have no other reasonable pathway to assure security from theft or diversion • First priority is to find a commercial disposition pathway • Approximately 100 kilograms have been sent to Areva for disposition, working on dispositioning additional plutonium and HEU materials

  13. Program Requirements • Bringing gap material to SRS is considered a last resort • Will be done on a prioritized basis, based on: • Material attractiveness • Vulnerability • Threat Environment • Primary candidates are Chile and South Africa • Chile - approximately 20 kilograms of HEU spent fuel from France and the United Kingdom • South Africa - 130 kilograms of HEU spent fuel of South African origin

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