Justifying moral case solutions

1. Justifying moral case solutions Presentation ASFPG, HamburgDec 5th 2005Ellen-Marie

2. The ethical matrix in brief • Created in the 90’s by Ben Mepham in Nottingham • Builds upon Beauchamp and Childress’ principle based ethics in biomedical ethics • Used in several projects in Nottingham and in Oslo: for evaluating dairy technology and other biotechnologies, fisheries technology, radiation restoration strategies, etc. • Also used in various other contexts

3. An ethical matrix for food biotechnology issues

4. Filling in the matrix • Invite the stakeholders to do it themselves (stakeholder workshop) • The principles and stakeholder categories is the framework • Indicate if there are any particularly important values (give weights) • Gives an overview of the most important ethical concerns to an issue and a (consensual) foundation for evaluating policy options

5. A consequence matrix for introducing production of Roundup Ready rape seed GT73 in Europe

6. Questions to ask: • Who are the winners? • Who are the losers? • Is the distribution of burdens and benefits fair? • Can the situation be changed by informed consent and/or compensation? • …

7. Making the judgement • One might not simply sum up pluses and minuses, not even adjusted with the weights… • … because the judgement needs to take into account many variables: • The current distribution of benefits and burdens  are any groups currently underprivileged? • How vulnerable are the different groups? • What are the groups relative sizes • Etc.

8. The result from using a matrix process • In some versions of the matrix method we come to a conclusion on an issue • How can we claim that this conclusion is justified, - or as justified as possible? • There are different options, for instance using Beauchamp and Childress’ account (building on Ross) or using Habermas • But there’s a problem with this principle based account

9. Principle based accounts • It is natural to deal with these particular two because the matrix method historically relies on Beauchamp and Childress’ approach and because the assumptions behind taking a participatory approach can be given a discourse ethics grounding • The two approaches are similar in that they both rely on prima facie principles

10. The problem with prima facie principles • Prima facie means ‘at first glance’, and can be said to hold ‘other things being equal’. A prima facie principle holds in general, not taking particular situational matters into account. It will always supply an obligation to take it into account, but it might be overridden in particular situations, provided good reasons are given. • Thus: they are general and does not indicate how they should be applied in concrete moral circumstances when two or more prima facie principles apply and cannot both be followed.

11. Some alternatives for solution • Judgement (intuitive judgement, phronesis) • Substantive decision rules (e.g. lexical ordering, political decision rules, etc.) • Quasilogical (i.e. not substantial), impartial rules like • Coherentism • ‘critical thinking’

12. But… • In the public context we don’t like unexplicated judgements • Within a pluralist ethics context we don’t like dogmatism • So we want something ‘neutral’ to help us. Coherentism has been the most popular for a while.

13. Coherentism – the solution? • Both B&C and Habermas realise there is an application problem and refer to coherentism as its solution, - however without going into detail on how this is to be done. B&C ‘outsource’ it to Rawls/Daniels and Habermas ‘outsources’ it to Klaus Günther • (Remember: This is also going to be a problem for the matrix method, and I want to avoid the demonstrated problems. So I want to go into this a bit closer.) • Situations where more than one prima facie principle apply will be solved by picking the principle which renders the solution most coherent

14. Coherent with what? • Daniels: coherence between intuitions about moral case solutions, established ethical principles and moral theory (WRE) • Günther: coherence with earlier case solutions

15. Coherentism - The question of prima facie principles • Prima facie principles are already validated and will not be adjusted just because of some case solutions (they are ‘above’ specific cases) • The only way principles can have a place in RE is if they are revisable • Are prima facie principles revisable? • Øyvind: no • Habermas: not once their validity is established in a justificatory discourse • Beauchamp and Childress: They are certainly contingent, but perhaps not revisable in a given culture? Thus, in practice: no • Hare: yes (p. 50 MT). This is in conflict with f.ex Searle’s and Ross’ definition of prima facie principles. • My assumption will be: no. Prima facie principles are contingent, but once they are there they can not be revised in RE.

16. Coherentism – more on Daniels’ WRE • The principles are not prima facie (he does not discuss this, but it is clear that they are not). • Does his model then apply to approaches that stresses the prima facie character of the principles? • No, because the principles would then be taken out of the equilibrium system • There would only be case comparisons, perhaps informed by moral theory

17. Does Günther help? • The problem is that he does not spell out how to measure coherence,- so he doesn’t give an account of how the application will be done

18. Possible solution A – strict principles? • Why can’t we simply follow Daniels and say that the principles are not prima facie, - that they always hold? In this case we could use RE, which perhaps is nice. • The problem is that either we presuppose that moral conflict is only apparent (which is unlikely) or we have to suppose a substantive priority rule between principles and we don’t want that in pluralist ethics. We also have to presuppose principles with so many clauses (to account for every possible application of the principle) that it would not be possible either formulate or follow.

19. Possible solution B – only check list for case descriptions? • Arguments: • This is in itself not an unimportant thing • It seems the principles do not have a very clear role in the justificatory account anyway, so why insist on keeping their importance (i.e. we don’t need either strict or prima facie principles)? • I guess we can still call them prima facie, but we have to make sure they are not going to be confused with principles in RE  We need a different account of coherence, RE won’t do

20. General problems … RE • Coherentism is an approach to justification which is a result of acknowledgement that final justification cannot be had • In stead it claims that all elements of our morality are justified by how they fit together in a coherent whole • But it does not (at least not Rawls or Daniels or any other of those advocating RE) specify how we are supposed to know what is more coherent • My claim: the method of RE is popular because, and not in spite of, it is vague. Of course it is important to be coherent, but coherentism implies a much more developed account than just being recommending coherence.

21. Alternative account of coherence • We have rejected principles (other than as a checklist) for logical reasons • I would also like to reject moral theory (which is an element in WRE) because it does not provide a unified account with which propositions can be compared. Moral theory is likely to create more incoherence than coherence. • I.e., we are left with the cases

22. Case coherence – does it still provide justification? Three options: • Thagard – provides a specific, concrete account of how to measure coherence • Casuistry – can give acceptable conclusions, if not justified ones • Particularism – can it give justification at all?

23. A defence of another model of coherence • I think that if this account is not ‘strong’ enough to provide justification, then Daniels’ account shouldn’t be accepted either, - not until he has given an account of the status of the principles in WRE • Casuistry has been accepted as providing sufficient justification for judgement in centuries. Casuistry does not have more resources than my model. • On the other hand, is this nothing but casuistry? Not necessarily. Thagard offers a different account which is more comprehensive than casuistry

24. Objections 1: Contingent prima facie principles must be revisable • Obviously. Perhaps it is appropriate to distinguish between two levels: case solutions and theory building. (Note that Rawls’ makes this distinction, but not Daniels). At the case level they are not revisable; at the theory building level they are. If this solution works we might characterise the value matrix as the theory building stage (compatible with how Rawls describe theory building), and the rest case solution. Pretty plausible?

25. Objections 2: making case solutions into new principles • It seems plausible that we can formulate a maxim for the case solution which can be seen as a specification of one of the prima facie principles. • Yes, but let me explain. Any case solution, in order to be moral, must be universal (that is, it must hold whoever the individuals in the case might be). But it can still be entirely non-general. A principle must have a general character. So it can not be seen as a specified prima facie principle simpliciter. This does not mean, however, that it might not be related to a prima facie principle (after the fact), but this prima facie principle will not have any justificatory effect.

26. The other impartial option – critical thinking • ‘What critical thinking has to do is to find a moral judgement which the thinker is prepared to make about all other similar situations. Since these will include situations in which he occupies, respectively, the positions of all the other parties in the actual situation, no judgement will be acceptable to him which does not do the best, all in all, for all the parties.’ (Hare, MT, p. 42)

27. Participation and coherence • Hare thinks, like Kant, that universalization can be done by a single moral expert. Habermas is right in recognising that universalization should be done by the parties themselves. But Hare is right in recognising that also moral conflict solution should be universalised. So what if we compare Hare and Habermas – and let the affected parties try to universalise a proposition for a case solution. • This is (coincidentally…;) ) exactly what we do in the matrix process.

28. Conclusions • We end up with two main options for justification: • Some kind of case coherentism • Participatory critical thinking (pragmatist justification a la Peirce’ end of inquiry: this is how we validate any (empirical or normative) proposition

29. Thanks!