LEZIONE 2 Aliquote effettive

1. LEZIONE 2 Aliquote effettive Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I ClamepEconomia della tassazione societariaClamed4 crediti – 30 ore28.9.2009-30.10.2009

2. Aliquote effettive

3. Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (1) • When policy makers or economic agents want to evaluate the impact of taxation on economic activity and understand the usefulness and likely effects of their decisions, they need to assess effective tax burdens. They therefore need to take into account the interplay of the statutory rates, the provisions defining the tax base and the subsequent reduction in tax debt made possible through the existence of tax credits. In assessing effective corporate tax burdens, two types of framework can be distinguished. • One approach measures effective tax rates on the basis of current data arising from aggregate macroeconomic accounts or from the accounts of existing firms. Because it is based on the observation of ex-post data, it is known as a “backward-looking” – macro or micro – approach. Effective tax rates based on macro backward-looking methodologies are often referred to as “implicit tax rates”. • The second framework is based on ex-ante indicators involving the calculation of effective tax burdens, for a hypothetical prospective investment project or company, over the assumed life of the project. As they are based on future hypothetical behaviour, these indicators are defined as “forward-looking”.

4. Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (2) • The existence of different indicators is not, per se, a shortcoming of this kind of analysis, but simply reflects the fact that each indicator measures different things. Different indicators can be appropriate for different policy issues (see OECD 2001). Therefore, it is worth emphasising that it is impossible to compute the “universally valid” effective tax rate. Moreover, this measure not only depends on the chosen approach, but also on the particular way the approach is applied. • When policy makers are concerned with the effects of the increasing mobility of capital in terms of a gradual shifting of the tax burden from capital to labour or consumption, or when they are interested in knowing the actual tax burden on small versus large firms or the tax burden on different industries or types of economic activity located in their country, compared with others and over time, then the use of backward-looking indicators may be a useful policy tool. Generally,this approach is useful for addressing issues related to the distribution of the tax burden and the effects of tax legislation and possible changes of the tax code on corporate cash flow. It also permits better understanding of the sensitivity of tax revenues to the economic cycle.

5. Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (3) • While backward-looking indicators may give an accurate picture of the tax position of a particular company, they cannot single out the incentives generated by a particular tax regime for a number of reasons. In particular, tax payments in any period may depend appreciably on the past history of the company and hence may vary between companies that are currently identical in all other respects. When the analysis of the impact of taxation on investment behaviour is the objective, and therefore the effects of tax legislation on future choices have to be pinpointed, then forward-looking indicators arepreferable by far. They make it possible to isolate the structure of the incentivesand disincentives offered by the elements of the tax systems for specific investments,and to take into account the interrelations of the different tax systems.Therefore, they allow a comparison of international tax regimes and identificationof the most important tax drivers influencing effective tax rates.(Giannini, Maggiulli, 2002)

6. Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (4) • Forward-looking measures of effective tax rates seek to illustrate the effectof the tax code on the current incentive to invest. However, these measures may not fully capture allof the special provisions of the tax code which affect the incentives to invest in particular sectors orassets. Some studies have therefore focused on “backward-looking” measures of effective tax ratesbased on actual revenues collected. The actual taxes paid in any given year will be a function ofpast decisions over investment, the profitability of those investments, loss carry forward and a rangeof other factors. Thus it is not clear that backward-looking measures of effective tax rates are verymeaningful for evaluating the effects of changes in tax rules on investment incentives, althoughthey do of course provide information on the ability of governments to collect revenue from capitalincome taxes (Griffith, Hines e Sorensen, 2008…. ).

7. Indicatori forward looking • ALIQUOTE => rendimento lordo – rendimento netto su un progetto di investimento (in %) • EFFETTIVE => tengono conto dei criteri di determinazione dell’imponibile (es. deducibilità ammortamenti, interessi,..) e imposta (es. crediti) • MARGINALI => se riferite ad un investimento che copre appena i costi (rendimento lordo = “costo del capitale”) • MEDIE => se riferite ad un investimento che genera extra-profitti (rendimenti lordi maggiori del “costo del capitale”)

8. Relazione (usuale) fra aliquote effettive, marginali e medie, e aliquota legale Aliquota legale Aliquote medie effettive (ciascuna in corrispondenza di un diverso livello di extra-profitto) Aliquota marginale Effettiva (una) 0 Extra-profitti

9. Aliquote effettive marginali di imposta (METR) Quanto investire Che beni capitali Che fonte finanziaria Aliquote effettive medie di imposta (AETR) Dove investire I due indicatori forniscono informazioni diverse e complementari

10. Un semplice esempio per calcolare METR (1) • Profitto (contabile): P = R-C-AM-IP R=ricavi =F(K,L) C= costi di esercizio (per beni intermedi e del lavoro)= 0, per ipotesi AM= ammortamenti =dK (d “vero” ammortamento economico) IP = interessi passivi= rK P = F(K,L)-dK-rK • Ipotesi finanziamento con debito

11. Un semplice esempio per calcolare METR (2) • Profitto economico (extra-profitto): P = R-C-AM-rK K = B(debito) + E (capitale proprio) rK = costo del finanziamento: • costo effettivo (contabile, IP) se finanziamento con debito • costo opportunità, se finanziamento con capitale proprio

12. Scelte di investimento in assenza di tassazione P = F(K,L)-dK-rK • Max P (derivata prima =0) FK =d + r • Impresa investe fino al punto in cui FK = UCK (user cost of capital per un investimento di valore unitario) FK = UCK = d + r • L’impresa investe fino al punto cui il valore della produttività marginale del capitale uguaglia il costo d’uso del capitale (ammortamento e costo finanziario)

13. Scelte di investimento in assenza di tassazione: METR FK - d = p = r METR = (p-r)/p =0 Non vi è alcun cuneo di imposta fra rendimenti lordi e netti sull’investimento marginale.

14. Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (1) PN= F(K,L)-dK-rK–T T= t(F(K,L)-arK) • Si deduce il costo finanziario per una percentualea PN = F(K,L)-dK-rK-t(F(K,L)-a rK) Max P N (derivata prima =0) FK(1-t) = d + r (1- at)

15. Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (2) NB: • Per semplicità non ho tenuto conto, nella definizione di base imponibile, della deducibilità per ammortamenti. • Ne tengo conto considerando che il valore attuale del risparmio di imposta dovuto alle deducibilità delle quote di ammortamento è come una riduzione del costo effettivo dell’investimento. Per un investimento di valore unitario il costo effettivo sarà dunque (1-tA) che è <1, se A>0. • A esprime il valore attuale delle quote di ammortamento

16. Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (3) Abbiamo dunque

17. Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione: due casi speciali Calcolate p e METR nelle seguenti due ipotesi alternative: • A=1;a=0 ossia ammortamento immediato e indeducibilità del costo finanziario (“Cash Flow Tax”, CFT) • a=d ; a=1 ossia ammortamento fiscale = ammortamento economico e deducibilità del costo finanziario (“Profit tax”, PrT) Esempio numerico con: a=d=10% r=5% t=40%

18. Imposte neutrali e distorsive: esempi Sulla base della seguente espressione Calcolate il cuneo di imposta p-r e l’EMTR = (p-r)/p aggiungendo alle ipotesi precedenti: d=10% r=5% t=40% a=0; a=1 Le seguenti ipotesi alternative: a= 20% (a> d) a= 5% (a< d)

21. Imposte neutrali e imposte distorsive (1) • L’imposta societaria può essere congegnata in modo da non produrre alcun cuneo tra rendimenti lordi e netti sull’investimento, in modo cioè da essere neutrale rispetto alle decisioni di investimento (Cuneo e METR=0). • Sia PrT che CFT nelle loro forme pure consentono questo risultato: • La PrT perché deduce il costo finanziario del capitale e il vero ammortamento economico • La CFT perché consente la deducibilità immediata delle spese di investimento (lo stato diventa un partner dell’impresa e così come concorre ai costi dell’investimento, nella stessa percentuale, determinata dall’aliquota di imposta, beneficia del rendimento) • Vi sono altri schemi neutrali … • Solitamente i sistemi concretamente adottati si differenziano da questi schemi neutrali e distorcono (disincentivano o incentivano) le scelte di impresa.

22. Imposte neutrali e imposte distorsive (2) • Se il costo del finanziamento è deducibile (come è il caso usualmente degli interessi passivi) e: • l’ammortamento a fini fiscali è uguale al vero ammortamento economico, il sistema è neutrale • l’ammortamento fiscale supera il vero ammortamento economico (es. ammortamenti anticipati), vi è di fatto un incentivo agli investimenti (cuneo di imposta negativo) • l’ammortamento fiscale è inferiore a quello economico il cuneo di imposta è positivo • Se il costo del finanziamento non è deducibile(come è solitamente il caso se il finanziamento è con capitale proprio) • si ha neutralità solo se si consente l’immediata deducibilità dell’investimento (ammortamento istantaneo). • in caso contrario (non piena deducibilità degli investimenti) si ha cuneo di imposta positivo.

23. METR in pratica (OECD, 2007) “ This section presents the evolution of marginal effective tax rates over time. The traditional method of measuring the impact of corporate income tax on the level of capital investment is through the user cost of capital – defined as the pre-tax real required rate of return on an investment project, taking into account the financial cost of the investment as well as depreciation (Hall and Jorgenson [1967], King [1977], King and Fullerton [1984]). The basic idea is that a firm will invest up to the point at which the marginal product of capital is just equal to the cost of capital – so that, at the margin, the project just breaks even. As investment increases, the marginal product is assumed to decline, resulting in a unique profit-maximising level of investment. The impact of taxation on the cost of capital is measured by the marginal effective tax rate (METR). A higher marginal effective tax rate increases the cost of capital, and therefore reduces the stock of capital…..

24. METR in pratica (OECD, 2007) …The marginal effective tax rates are measured by considering the impact of the corporate tax system on a hypothetical investment project. The form of the investment modelled is, of necessity, simple and limited. In common with other such measures, risk is ignored. The underlying method assumes a mature manufacturing firm. The marginal effective tax rates presented here also apply only to an investment in plant and machinery,financed by equity; estimates for investment in other assets and for other sources of finance are not presented. The tax treatment of losses or other forms of tax exhaustion is not considered. The taxes that are levied on shareholders and taxes paid by corporations that are not based on profit are not included. The underlying method does not include any industry-specific measures and does not allow for any form of tax avoidance. Despite all of these limitations, the measures do provide a summary of the combined effect of the tax rate and tax base, at least on a specific form of investment”.

25. METR: dal semplice modello alla applicazione pratica • Il modello può essere reso più aderente alla realtà, tenendo conto di: • Imposte personali (dipende dallo scopo analisi) • Inflazione (se ne tiene sempre conto) • Perdite, elusione etc… (più difficili da incorporare; vi sono studi) • Hp finanziamento molto importante (debt e equity trattamento fiscale solitamente molto diverso) • La misura ( METR) varia al varare del tipo di bene capitale (diverso a e diverso d) Vi sono diversi studi e applicazioni (che includono anche altri indicatori oltre a EMTR): Commissione UE (2001): 5 beni capitali e tre fonti di finanziamento Eurostat…, Structures… (questo e altri indicatori) .

27. Figure 1.8 shows that, given a fixed inflation rate of 3.5 per cent, the unweightedaverage of the marginal effective tax rates has remained fairly stable until 1988 andbetween 1993 and 1997. The unweighted average dropped substantially between 1989and 1993 and between 1997 and 2001. It has remained fairly constant since then. (OECD; 2007) A larger and more pronounced reduction in the unweighted average of the marginaleffective tax rates can be observed if the actual inflation rates in each country and year areused. This result reflects the fact that with a lower inflation rate, a given tax depreciationallowance is more generous, leading to a lower marginal effective tax rate. Since 2002, thisdecrease has stopped. The average remains relatively constant since 2001 at an average of18.5 per cent.This reduction in marginal effective tax rates over time then shows that the reductionsin the statutory corporate tax rates have had a stronger impact on the marginal corporate taxburden than the base broadening measures that have been undertaken as well. (OECD,2007)

28. Aliquota media effettiva (AETR) “Corporate tax systems also have an influence on the discrete choices made by, for instance, multinational firms, which face a choice between alternative locations of production. For example, if an American firm wants to enter the European market, it could locate production in one of a number of different European countries. Given the structure of its costs, it will probably not locate in all countries. The firm might choose that location (or locations) offering the highest post-tax profit. The impact of tax on this decision can be measured by the extent to which the pre-tax profit is reduced by taxation – this is measured by an average effective tax rate (AETR). Conditional on this location choice, the scale of the investment will be determined by the cost of capital and the METR.” (OECD, 2007)

29. Ancora sulla AETR “… multinational companies usually face a choice between two ormore exclusive projects (exporting or producing abroad, and in the latter case,the country of investment) expected to earn more than the minimum requiredrate of return. To take the decision, they will compare the expected post-taxeconomic rents of each alternative. Hence, they will be interested in seeing howlarge a share of the pre-tax value of a profitable investment project will be paidas corporate income tax. A measure of this share is an effective “average” taxrate, since it expresses the expected total tax burden in relation to total profits.. (Giannini, Maggiulli, Cesifo economic studies, 2002).

30. … sulla relazione fra METR e AETR (1) “… both effective marginal and average tax rates are important butthey serve different purposes: the latter may be more appropriate for identifyingthe effect of taxation on the choice of location, while the former impact on thechoice of how much to invest, once the choice of location has been made. ………………. The Commission services study [2001] presents effective marginal and average taxrates for a large number of different hypothetical investment projects. It is thefirst comprehensive analysis of effective average tax rates ever undertaken forthe EC countries, which represents its most important innovation with respect toprevious studies, including the Ruding Report. (Giannini, Maggiulli, Cesifo economic studies, 2002).

31. … sulla relazione fra METR e AETR (2) “…. To compute the effective average tax rate the Commission study mainly relies on the methodology developed by Devereux and Griffith (D&G 1998). This approach, which can be considered an extension of the K&F methodology, has the advantage of allowing the computation of both effective marginal and average tax rates within a single framework. In practice, the D&G model computes what we may simply call an “effective tax rate” for alternative hypothetical investment projects with different rates of profitability, illustrating respectively: • the effective marginal tax rate, if the real pre-tax return is the minimum rate required to undertake the investment, that is to say, is equal to the cost of capital; • the whole range of effective average tax rates, if the project is not marginal, i.e. if it generates economic rents. The effective tax rate (ETR) is measured as the ratio between the present value of taxes and the present value of pre-tax income a company expects to earn from alternative new investment projects that can be either marginal (effectivemarginal tax rate) or infra-marginal (effective average tax rate) in their posttaxreturn.

32. Methodology to compute AETR “ The D&G analytical framework is fairly simple as it is based on a one-period perturbation of the capital stock: a hypothetical investment undertaken in period t, and providing a real return equal to p, is reversed in period t + 1. The financial policy of the company strictly follows this one-period perturbation of the capital stock: the company issues equity or debt in period t and repurchases equity or repays the principal, along with interest, in period t + 1. The value of the firm is derived from a standard capital market equilibrium condition, according to which a representative shareholder (a domestic resident) will hold equity shares only up to the point where their net return is equal to the net return from selling the company and investing the assets in the best alternative investment available (Treasury bonds, for example). If the value of the firm does not change as a consequence of this one-period perturbation of the capital stock, the pre-tax return of the investment undertaken in period t is equal to the cost of capital and the investment is marginal. If, on the contrary, the one-period change in capital stock increases the value of the company, then the investment project is earning economic rents….” (Giannini, Maggiulli, 2002)

33. … sulla relazione fra t, METR e AETR “In a world of increasedinternational capital mobility, we highlight how the corporate tax system can affect • where firms choose to locate their investment, • how much they invest, and • wherethey choose to locate their profits. The average tax rate in different countries mightinfluence the first decision, the marginal tax rate the second, and the statutory tax ratethe third” (Auerbach et al, 2008 ES).

35. Figure 1.10 shows that, given a fixed inflation rate of 3.5 per cent, the unweightedaverage of the average effective tax rates has remained fairly stable until 1986 andbetween 1993 and 1997. The unweighted average dropped substantially between 1987and 1993 and between 1997 and 2001. It has declined very little since then. A larger andmore pronounced reduction in the unweighted average of the average effective tax ratescan again be observed if the actual inflation rates in each country and year are used….. (OECD 2007)

36. The differences between these two series are smaller in the case of average effectivetax rates than in the case of marginal effective tax rates (Figure 1.8), since the averageeffective tax rates depend rather more on the statutory corporate tax rate and rather lesson tax allowances. Nevertheless, the two approaches give a similar qualitative picture ofthe development of the corporate effective tax rates. This result therefore confirms that thereductions in the statutory corporate tax rates have had a stronger impact than the basebroadening measures that have been undertaken. (OECD 2007)

37. Indicatori macroeconomici

39. The ratio increased for the small-sized OECD countries from 2.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent and for the medium-sized OECD countries from 2.2 per cent in 1982 to 3.8 per cent in 2004…. … The corporate tax to GDP ratio has decreased for the large-sized OECD countries from 3 per cent in 1982 to 2.7 per cent in 2004. This downward trend is primarily caused by the decrease in the corporate tax to GDP ratio in Japan; it decreased from 5.2 per cent in 1982 to 3.8 per cent in 2004. The ratio has remained relatively constant over time for the other large-sized OECD countries. (OECD, 2007)

41. Lower tax burdens but no decrease in corporate tax revenues • Despite the strong reduction in statutory corporate tax rates, corporate tax revenueshave kept pace with – or even exceeded – the growth in GDP, and the growth in revenuesfrom other taxes in many OECD countries. The fact that small-sized and medium-sizedOECD countries now raise more revenue from taxing corporate income and that large-sizedOECD countries, except for Japan, do not raise less revenue seems to be inconsistent withthe strong reductions in statutory corporate tax rates and marginal and average effectivetax rates. Indeed, this is a puzzle which requires further research and explanation. Anumber of arguments might however offer an explanation…… (sempre da OECD, 2007)

42. 1. First, the strong reductions in statutory corporate tax rates have been partly offset bythe expansion of the corporate tax base through the implementation of less generous taxdepreciation allowances and through the elimination of special tax deductions andprovisions. Less generous tax depreciation allowances have broadened the corporate taxbase especially during the second half of the 1980s, as shown in Figure 1.6.

43. 2. Second, changes in corporate profitability may explain the increased corporate taxrevenues as more profitable corporations pay more corporate taxes. This might not only bepart of a cyclical movement but might also be the result of fundamental changes inprofitability. Becker and Fuest (2007) for instance demonstrate for Germany thatglobalisation has increased pre-tax profitability in the economy, thus leading to highercorporate tax revenues. Moreover, the reduction in the corporate tax rate may haveincreased the total amount of investment that is undertaken by the corporate sector, whichthen might have increased the corporate tax liabilities and corporate tax revenues as well.

44. 3. The increase in corporate tax revenues in low-tax countries may be caused by the inflowof investment and/or mobile corporate profits that are shifted out of high-tax countries inorder to avoid corporate taxes. For example, Ireland has had a low 10 per cent tax rate onmanufacturing activity since the early 1980s. One consequence has been a strong increase ininward investment – and probably inward flows of profit: this in turn has boosted corporateincome tax receipts as a share of GDP and as a share of tax revenues, despite the continuinglow tax rate. This argument may partly explain why corporate tax revenues in small-sizedOECD countries have increased more than in large-sized OECD countries.

45. 4. Another argument that might offer an explanation is that lower corporate tax rateshave increased the incentive to incorporate and to shift income from the non-corporateinto existing corporations, thereby increasing the relative size of the corporate sector. Fuestand Weichenrieder (2002) have studied the share of corporate savings in total privatesavings for OECD member countries. They show that higher capital income tax rates at thepersonal level may increase the fraction of saving performed within corporations. Lowercorporate tax rates may then shift significant amounts of savings from the householdsector to the corporate sector. De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) analysed income shifting viaincorporation using a panel of European data. They found that the increasing gap betweenpersonal income and corporate income taxes has a significant positive effect on theincorporation of new and existing firms. The revenue effects of lower corporate tax rateswill then partly show up in lower personal income tax revenues rather than lowercorporate income tax revenues.

46. 5. In addition, Sorensen (2007) notes that the growing importance of the corporate sectormight also be explained by the decline of certain sectors such as agriculture where thenon-corporate organisational form was dominant. Auerbach (2006) suggests that the risingshare of the financial sector in the economy might have partly caused the increase incorporate tax revenues as well.

47. Sorensen, 2007, scompone il rapporto fra il gettito dell’imposta societaria (R)e il Pil (Y), nel seguente modo: “Here R is total corporate tax revenue, Y is GDP, C is the total profitearned in the corporate sector, and P is the total profit earned in theeconomy as a whole. The fraction R/C may be seen as a rough indicatorof the average effective corporate tax rate, since it measures totalcorporate taxes paid relative to the total pre-tax earnings of thecorporate sector.9 Thus the decomposition suggested above will showwhether an increase in the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP is dueto an increase in the effective tax burden on the corporate sector, R/C;whether it reflects an increase in the share of total profits accruing to thecorporate sector, C/P; or whether it is due to an increase in the profitshare of total GDP, P/Y…”.

48. Osservando i dati conclude: “…Thus part of the reason why governments have managed tostabilize or even increase the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP isthat the corporate sector has expanded at the expense of non-corporatefirms. In part this may reflect the secular decline of certain sectors such asagriculture where the non-corporate organizational form has tended todominate, but it may also reflect income-shiftinginto the corporate sectorinduced by the large drops in statutory corporate tax rates. In both casesthe gain in corporate tax revenue will tend to be offset by a loss of revenuefrom the personal income tax. However, none of the countries have experienced a significant drop in their aggregate effectivecorporate tax rate (R/C), and in several countries such as Australia,Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Italy, the effective corporate tax rateeven seems to have increased. In other words, it appears that governmentshave made up for the drop in statutory tax rates by broadening thecorporate tax base, e.g. by eliminating special deductions and movingtowards less generous rules for asset depreciation, etc. in line with the taxcut-cum-base-broadening philosophy that became popular in the 1980sand early 1990s.. (Sorensen, 2007).

49. 6. Moreover, the reduction in statutory and effective corporate tax rates reduces thebenefits of (excessive) corporate tax-planning. Lower corporate tax rates reduce forinstance the benefits of profit-shifting through transfer pricing and thin capitalisation (seealso Haufler and Schjelderup [2000]). This might also have reduced the correspondingcorporate tax compliance costs, which are deductible from the corporate tax base. Thereduced corporate tax-planning efforts might therefore have increased the taxablecorporate tax base, which may have partly offset the tax revenue loss due to the lowerstatutory and effective corporate tax rates. (OECD, 2007)

50. 7. Finally, the fact that corporate tax revenues did not decline may partly be caused bystricter corporate tax enforcement policies enacted by OECD countries. Indeed, OECDcountries have increased their efforts to reduce the shifting of profits betweenjurisdictions. Some countries may also have intensified their tax audits in order to reducecorporate tax-avoidance and evasion behaviour.