. . . None of us believed that the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was

1. . . . None of us believed that the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was that all answers can be found in Washington. . . . On the other hand, the call for increasing the military’s role in domestic affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can stand up when others have fallen? --House Select Committee Bipartisan Report “A Failure of Initiative” February, 2006

2. Policy Question Should the Department of Defense assume the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) role in Catastrophic Incident Response?

3. Policy Implications • What are the policy implications of transferring DOD to the federal lead? • Will laws have to be changed? • Federalism and the U.S. Constitution • Public affairs impacts of such a profound and historic shift in the military’s domestic use in our society

4. Hurricane Katrina: “A Failure of Initiative” . . . “A Nation’s Shame” . . .

5. They Waited . . .

6. 1st Responders Overwhelmed . . .

7. Rich and poor, young and old, all lives were touched . . .

8. “The magnitude of destruction has created tremendous problems that have strained state and local capabilities and many citizens simply are not getting the help they need, especially in New Orleans. That is unacceptable.” --President George Bush, September 3, 2005

9. Will We Be Ready Next Time? • Hurricane Katrina exposed the “seams” in federal catastrophic response • President Bush asked Congress to consider transferring the LFA role from DHS to DOD • U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is responsible for coordinating all DOD support for Catastrophic Incident Response and would be impacted by this policy shift

10. If the Federal Government’s performance during Katrina is a dress rehearsal for “the big one,” we’re closing down opening night. --Anonymous

11. Project Scope/Methodology • Policy/legal issues surround LFA shift from DHS to DOD • Qualitative research approach • Congressional testimony from key DOD and DHS officials from September 2005 through March 2006 • Open-source media reports and government documents • Conducted personal interviews with U.S. Northern Command chief of staff, senior attorneys, congressional liaison and Interagency Coordination Division • Interviewed Oregon National Guard State Adjutant General (TAG) • Attended NORAD-NORTHCOM Legal Conference April 18-20, 2006

12. Why Look to DOD? • Culture of leadership, training and discipline • Can bring operational resources to bear quickly in large-scale emergency • Organic logistics capability • Military inspires confidence in time of true national crisis • Americans look for leadership and authority during times of extreme national vulnerability

13. Legal Issues • Are current legal authorities sufficient? • Articles II and X, U.S. Constitution • Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) • Insurrection Act • Stafford Act American Bar Association Report: “Yes”

14. DOD Response to Katrina • Once “triggered” DOD response was admirable • Dual-Status Command Concept proved problematic during Katrina • Political realities and federalism will force DOD and National Guard to continue working within two military “chains of command” • DOD response could have been faster had civilian response agencies understood the National Response Plan, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and the National Incident Management System

15. Political Realities of LFA Shift • State Governors are “in charge” unless President invokes Insurrection Act • Insurrection Act is politically “unpalatable” • Little political support in Congress to give DOD LFA role • Just as “all politics are local” so too are disasters • Most effective response “starts small, scales fast”

16. Lessons Learned • Lack of communication/situational awareness between U.S. Northern Command, National Guard Bureau and forces in the Katrina Area of Operations • Early hours--communications breakdown in New Orleans hampered National Guard, FEMA and NORTHCOM response • Civilian response agencies lacked knowledge of National Response Plan, NIMS • Senior FEMA/DHS officials did not invoke the Catastrophic Incident Response Annex which would have “triggered” DOD forces en masse

17. DOD Support-- Larger Role or Smarter One? • DOD/NORTHCOM can play critical leadership role without assuming formal lead • Infuse leadership, discipline and planning into struggling federal civilian agencies through increased interagency liaison and cooperation • Create military staff liaison positions throughout 10 FEMA regions • Support interagency “cells” built on Joint-Interagency Task Force (JIATF) concept • Build “sub-council” of Homeland Security Council-key interagency stakeholders

18. Recommendations to U.S. NORTHCOM • Capitalize on National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard civil-military experience to support/build JIATF teams • Build JIATF-like cell out of U.S. Northern Command headquarters to be led by U.S. Coast Guard officer or Coast Guard SES • Establish Full-Time Defense Coordinating Officer positions at FEMA regional offices • Build off-the-shelf operations “contingency” packages to facilitate the Request for Assistance process

19. DHS/FEMA Institutional Reform • Review federal civilian employee and contractor accountability systems • Tie knowledge of National Response Plan, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and the NIMS to job performance and evaluate during TOPOFF exercises • Mandate homeland security exercise participation by top DHS/FEMA leadership up to and including Secretariat level staff • Provide federal funding for FEMA “surge” teams and tie DOD staff to deploy alongside FEMA (or replacement) agency

20. Conclusion • National policy makers should not turn to the U.S. military to be the federal lead during catastrophic incidents • Build and strengthen effective response capabilities within designated federal civilian agencies • Strong civilian agency response is consistent with our federalist traditions and the U.S. Constitution • National leaders must make tough choices and demand accountability through leadership

21. Conclusion • Resuscitate FEMA -- Direct time, attention and resources to build a renewed capability • Build and resource first responder capabilities at the local/state level • Correct communications inoperability issues between DoD/National Guard/1st Responders • Train federal/state/local civilian response officials in NRP/NIMS to know when and how to ask for federal assistance • Hold top civilian leadership accountable for agency performance “pre-disaster” and “post-disaster”

22. Post-Publication Update • DHS/DOD liaison strengthened since Aug. 2006 • Full-Time Defense Coordinating Officers (National Guard) placed throughout 10 FEMA regions • DHS Office of Operations Coordination (D.C.) now includes full-time, 24/7 DOD Support (GS-15 Civilians) • Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) includes interagency representation from 40 different federal agencies (including DOD)

23. Post-Publication Update FEMA Revitalization Act has strengthened federal civilian response organizations’ capabilities, training and resources FEMA Administrator allowed direct access to President under certain circumstances Insurrection Act revised to clarify Presidential Authority to intervene in state matters when Constitutional protections and rights are threatened by circumstances resulting from any “insurrection, public disorder, domestic violence combination or conspiracy”

24. Questions? Kathleen J. Gereski CAPSTONE Research Project (719) 264-0854