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Automated Intrusion Response Project. Ivan Balepin, Karl Levitt UC Davis Computer Security Lab. Why Study Automated Response?. Immediate: contain the attack quickly Kill the offending process Slow down the attacker Roll back to a safe state, etc. Cleanup - needs to be done carefully
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Automated Intrusion ResponseProject Ivan Balepin, Karl Levitt UC Davis Computer Security Lab
Why Study Automated Response? • Immediate: contain the attack quickly • Kill the offending process • Slow down the attacker • Roll back to a safe state, etc. • Cleanup - needs to be done carefully • Weighing cost of response against potential attack damage • High cost of false positives – can be used for DOS attacks • Prevent the same attack from happening on this system • Report the attack to other security systems (firewalls, IDS’s, JIGSAW, HACQIT, etc). • Long term: generalize the attack and warn others • Synthesize an attack signature and report it. • Deceive and study the attacker.
Example: Responses toopen() • Autonomic Responses: • not open • lock the file • delete the file • kill the process(es) • alert • Complex Responses: • start a combination of response actions • start checkpointing • change permissions • reboot the system • block the user • slow down the process(es) • roll back • return a random result • perform a random action • operate on a fake file
Categorizing Response • Areas a Response Action Affects: • Data Integrity: deleting files, killing the process, etc. • Confidentiality: changing permissions, etc. • Availability: slowing down a process, disabling certain calls, etc. • Level of a Response Action: • Single process • Group of Processes • User • Group • System • Network
Example: Selecting the Response System System System Spec-Based IDS Spec-Based IDS Spec-Based IDS Response Broker
Example: Selecting the Response System System Spec-Based IDS Spec-Based IDS • Incident Data: • Resources involved • Specs violated • Suggested responses Incident Incident Response Broker
Example: Selecting the Response System Spec-Based IDS • Incident Data: • Resources involved • Specs violated • Suggested responses • System Data: • Resource ownership • Level of threat, etc. System Data Incident Response Broker
Example: Selecting the Response System Spec-Based IDS • Incident Data: • Resources involved • Specs violated • Suggested responses • System Data: • Resource ownership • Level of threat, etc. • Which Responses Satisfy our Rules? • Integrity • Confidentiality System Data Incident Security Principles: Integrity Confidentiality Response Broker
Example: Selecting the Response System Spec-Based IDS • Incident Data: • Resources involved • Specs violated • Suggested responses • System Data: • Resource ownership • Level of threat, etc. • Which Responses Satisfy our Rules? • Integrity • Confidentiality • Pick the Least Costly One • Look at the whole chain • Estimate resources used: level hierarchy Incident Security Principles: Integrity Confidentiality Response Broker Respond
Example: Selecting the Response System Spec-Based IDS • Incident Data: • Resources involved • Specs violated • Suggested responses • System Data: • Resource ownership • Level of threat, etc. • Which Responses Satisfy our Rules? • Integrity • Confidentiality • Pick the Least Costly One • Look at the whole chain • Estimate resources used: level hierarchy • …or Pick the Least Costly Way to Preserve Incident Security Principles: Integrity Confidentiality Response Broker Respond Preserve
Response: Project Plan • Current progress • Defined the problem and the scope of study • Initial experiments with spec-based IDS’s: hard-coding response • Developing response hierarchy • Web page: http://wwwcsif.cs.ucdavis.edu/~balepin • Work to be done • Formalizing response model • Implementing response on a spec-based IDS • Testing and evaluating performance • Applying response model to other systems