1 / 19

START Follow-on Update

START Follow-on Update. November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution spifer@brookings.edu. Background: 1991 START Treaty. No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)

mave
Download Presentation

START Follow-on Update

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. START Follow-on Update November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution spifer@brookings.edu

  2. Background: 1991 START Treaty • No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers) • No more than 154 heavy ICBMs • No more than 6000 warheads • No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs • No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs • No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs • Detailed verification measures • Expires December 5, 2009

  3. Background: 2002 SORT Treaty • No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads • No limits on SNDVs • No verification measures • Expires December 31, 2012

  4. Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009 • SORT count at/near 2200 warheads • Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs capable of carrying 5916 warheads: 550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 1600 96 Trident I SLBMs 576 336 Trident II SLBMs 2688 47 B-1 bombers 47 18 B-2 bombers 18 141 B-52 bombers 987

  5. Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009 • SORT count unknown • Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs capable of carrying 3897 warheads: 465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001 268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288 76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608

  6. July Joint Understanding • Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100 • Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty • New treaty to contain provisions on: • Counting rules • Elimination and verification (based on START, simplified and less costly as appropriate) • Interrelationship between offense and defense • Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

  7. START Follow-on Treaty • Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT • Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations • Missile defense • SNDV limit • Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs • Verification

  8. Missile Defense • Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms” • Russians sought to restrict missile defense • US position: missile defense not a subject for START follow-on negotiation

  9. SNDV Limit • Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100) • Reasons for higher US proposal: • SNDVs converted to conventional roles • “Phantom” systems • Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US plans to download missiles

  10. Conventional Systems • US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles • B-1 bombers • Four Trident SSGNs • How to assure no nuclear role?

  11. “Phantom” Systems • SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules • US “phantoms” include: • B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB • MX ICBM silos • Some Minuteman III silos

  12. “Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s

  13. “Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo

  14. Eliminated Minuteman Silo

  15. Closing SNDV Limit • Possible ways to address: • Verification measures to confirm conventional systems have only conventional role • Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on less demanding elimination requirement • Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems

  16. Upload Potential • Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles • Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three warheads will have five empty warhead slots • The dog that’s not barking? • May be issue for next round

  17. Conventional Warheads • US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads • Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems

  18. Counting and Verification • Possible warhead counting regimes • Type attribution rule (START) • Actual load counting -- US plans to vary number of warheads on Trident SLBMs • Simplifying verification measures • Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems

  19. Prognosis • Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong on both sides • Both presidents strongly endorse treaty • Question = when will treaty be completed?

More Related