Application of the Process Safety Management Standard in Canada

1. Application of the Process Safety Management Standard in Canada Presented by: Holly Elke, CRSP, CSP, CMQ/OE Senior QHSE Advisor SH&E System Solutions

2. Process Safety Management • Also called Safety Systems Management or Process Safety Management; • The purpose is to manage the risk to personnel, property, production, the environment and the company reputation

3. Process Safety Management • Regulated in 1992 by OSHA • Known as the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Explosives and Blasting Agents: OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119.

4. Process Safety Management

5. Process Safety Management • The main objective is to prevent the release of highly hazardous chemicals, such as toxic, reactive, flammable and/or explosive substances, which may cause harm to humans.

6. Process Safety Management Processes that involve: • Explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics; • Chemicals, above a specified quantity in Appendix A of the PSM std. • Flammable liquid or gas in excess of 10000 lbs Must have a PSM program.

7. Process Hazards Analysis PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the consequences?

8. Qualitative Risk Analysis • Process Hazards Analysis is the predictive identification of hazards, their cause and consequence and the qualitative estimation of likelihood and severity.

9. Qualitative Risk Analysis

10. Qualitative Risk Analysis

11. Qualitative Risk Analysis

12. Qualitative vs. Quantitative

13. Elements of Facility Risk A systematic approach that considers the following process components: • Process Design and Technology; • Operational & Maintenance Activities & Procedures; • Non Routine Activities & Procedures; • Emergency Preparedness plans/ procedures • Training Programs

14. Process Hazards HAZARDOUS MATERIALS+ PROCESS CONDITIONS

15. Human Factors or Errors HUMAN FAILURE ERRORS VIOLATIONS • Deliberate actions • Different from those prescribed • Carries known associated risks • Ignores operational procedures • Violation errors occur because of a perception of lack of relevance, time pressure or laziness. MISTAKES SLIPS • Incorrect intention • Inadequate knowledge • Incorrect information processing • Inadequate training • Mistakes occur because of incorrect assumptions or incorrect “tunnel vision” application of rules. • Competency exists • Intentions are correct • Slips occur while carrying out habitual, routine, skill based activity.

16. Site or Location Hazards • Adjacent facilities • Nearby communities • Transport availability • Availability of Utilities; • Topography/ average weather conditions; • Environmental sensitivity; • Layout considerations regulations, standards location/spacing, occupancy, extreme process conditions

17. Environmental Issues “LIVING” ENVIRONMENTPOTENTIAL IMPACTS

18. The Deviation List

19. PHA Methodologies • Hazard & Operability Study; • What-IF, Checklist or What If/Checklist study; • Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA, FMECA); • Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); • Or an appropriate equivalent methodology (Hazid, Hazcan)

20. HAZOP • Rigorous review of the design and operability of a system; • Identify potential hazards and/or operability problems; • Uses guidewords & parameters; • Drawings broken into Nodes are assessed.

21. What – If / Checklist • Requires experienced and knowledgeable team members; • A series of “what if” questions are asked for each system / subsystem; • Each question represents the potential for equipment failure or an error in operating procedure.

22. PHA Methodologies

23. FMEA • Initially used in aerospace and automotives to predict the reliability of complex products; • The method determines how and how often the components of a product could fail; • Evaluates the effects of failures on a system.

24. Fault Tree Analysis • Developed by Bell Laboratories for the US Air Force; • Focuses on the possibility of one undesired event occurring; • Maps the complex relationships that can cause the event by including all of the contributory factors that are known.

25. Selecting the “Right Method” • Purpose of the study; • Type of results desired; • Type of information available; • Relative risks associated with the chemicals, the process and/or the facility location; • PHA team experience level; • Past Incidents • Development stage of facility.

26. Corrective Action Management and Closure “Due diligence” can only be shown if every effort has been made to implement and verify that the actions needed to make the process safe have been taken.

27. The Closure Loop • Assign responsibility to recommendations; • Use a flexible CAR management system that leaves a “paper trail”; • Document the resolution of recommendations; • Acceptance, rejection, substitution, or modification of any recommendation must be documented; • Rejection of a recommendation must be communicated to the study team.

28. QUESTIONS ?