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Indian Blackouts- July 30 & 31, 2012 Recommendations and Further Actions

Indian Blackouts- July 30 & 31, 2012 Recommendations and Further Actions. CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Anish Gaikwad ( agaikwad@epri.com )

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Indian Blackouts- July 30 & 31, 2012 Recommendations and Further Actions

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  1. Indian Blackouts- July 30 & 31, 2012Recommendations and Further Actions CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Anish Gaikwad (agaikwad@epri.com) Project Manager, Electric Power Research Institute Knoxville, TN, USA Suresh C Srivastava (scs@iitk.ac.in) Professor, Dept. of Electrical Eng. Indian Institute of Tech. Kanpur, India Contributing Authors: Vikas Singhvi, EPRI and SudhirAgarwal, General Reliability

  2. Outline • Impact of the two Indian blackouts • 30th July, 2012 at 2:35 AM Indian Standard Time (IST) • 31st July, 2012 at 1 PM IST • A summary of sequence of events for the two blackouts • Root cause analysis and recommendations for system planning and operations IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  3. Indian Regional Grid Source: http://www.desismartregion.com/2012/08/indian-power-region-blackout-reasons-and-future-requirements/

  4. Impact of the July 30th Blackout • Occurred at 2:33 AM IST • Affected more than 300 million people in Northern Region across 9 states including the capital New Delhi • Collapse time : 02:33 AM • Restoration time :16:00 PM • Duration (from blackout to recovery): ~ 13:30 hrs • MW generation lost :more than load loss • MW load lost :36000 MW • Number of successive events : no exact count but a large no. • Approximate cost : No official data available but a huge figure IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  5. Blackout-1: Prior System Conditions IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  6. Blackout-1: Sequence of Events • The 765 kV circuit ‘2’(being operated at 400 kV) between Gwalior-Agra and 400 kV Zerda-Kankroli were down before the event. • Gwalior-Agra ckt ‘2’ was on planned outage since 28th July for upgrade to 765 kV. • Zerda-Kankroli line was on planned outage since 07/28 Outaged lines before the event (Red line is a double ckt.) http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3718641.ece http://www.nldc.in/Flasher/Flash%20Report_NLDC_region%20Disturbance%20in%20Northern%20Region_30072012_Revision1.pdf

  7. Blackout 1 : Sequence of events

  8. Blackout 1 – Frequency Separation • Rise in frequency in WR close to 51 Hz indicates inadequate primary frequency response from generators

  9. Impact of July 31st Blackout • Occurred at 1:00 PM IST • Affected 670 million people in Northern, Eastern, North-Eastern regions across 22 states • Restoration time :All regions by 21:00 PM • Collapse time : 13:00 PM • MW generation lost : more than load loss • MW load lost :48 000 MW • Number of successive events : no exact count a but large no. • Duration (from blackout to recovery): ~ 5 hrs (NR), 8 hrs (ER) and 2 hrs (NER) • Approximate cost : No official data available but a huge figure IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  10. Blackout-2: Prior System Conditions • A large number of lines were out of service before the outage. The system was in an insecure condition • Instructions from NR load dispatch center to shed loads were neglected by states in NR

  11. Blackout 2 – Sequence of Events • 10 min. prior to the blackout, two 220 kV lines connecting NR-WR were tripped due to overload due to tripping of a 250 MW thermal plant • At 13:00 hrs, Bina-Gwalior (ckt 1) the line tripped again on zone-3 mis-operation due to overload • This led to angular separation between ER and WR and isolated WR from ER+NER+NR • Not adequate relief from UFLS and df/dt schemes in NR and ER • No primary frequency response from governors in NEW grid • Cascade tripping of lines occurred due to overvoltage, power swing, zone-3 protection. Generators were tripped on under frequency • This initially separated NR and then resulted in collapse of ER and NER

  12. Blackout 2 – Frequency Separation

  13. Recommendations and Actions Taken as on 3rd July 2013 (Source: CEA New Delhi)

  14. Challenges in Improving Long-term Reliability of the Indian Grid • Inadequate coordination in planning, operation & maintenance • Investments in T&D not in same proportions as in generation • Lack of Grid Discipline and lack of adherence to grid protocols • Lack of transparency and red tape • Overlapping governance by a number of ministries, departments, and states • Difficulties in revenue recovery IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  15. Acknowledgement • We would like to thank the EPRI personnel: • Arshad Mansoor, Sr. VP, R&D, EPRI • Mark McGranaghan, VP, Power Delivery & Utilization, EPRI • Daniel Brooks, Sr. Program Manager, Grid Operations and Planning, EPRI • Karen Forsten, Director, Grid Operations and Planning, EPRI • Central Electricity Authority (CEA) New Delhi, Study Task Force Members and Power System Operation Corporation Ltd. (POSOCO) New Delhi IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  16. Thank You IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

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