1 / 13

A secure and scalable rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks

A secure and scalable rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. Authors: Song Guo, A-Ni Shen, and Minyi Guo Source: IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems, Vol.E93D, No.3, p.p.421-429, 2010. Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu ( 呂勇志 ) Date: 2010/12/02. Outline. Introduction

maylin
Download Presentation

A secure and scalable rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. A secure and scalable rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks Authors: Song Guo, A-Ni Shen, and Minyi Guo Source: IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems, Vol.E93D, No.3, p.p.421-429, 2010. Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu (呂勇志) Date: 2010/12/02

  2. Outline • Introduction • Related Work • Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (B-PCGR) • Proposed Scheme • Security Analysis • Performance Evaluation • Conclusion • Comment

  3. Introduction (1/2) • Goal • Rekeying • Against attack • Eavesdropping attack • Node capture attack • Forward secrecy • Backward secrecy • Saving resource • Computation cost • Communication cost • Storage Overhead

  4. Introduction (2/2) • Wireless Sensor Networks Three-tier hierarchical WSNs Pure flat WSNs Cluster Head: High-End Sensor AP: Access Point Sensor Node: Low-End Sensor

  5. Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (1/3) W. Zhang and G. Cao, IEEE INFOCOM, 2005. • Key pre-distribution phase • Sensor Node • Ex: g(x)=3x2+5x1+2 , x=0,1,2,… g(x) g(x) Base Station g(x) distribution :Sensor node g(x) g(x): a t-degree g-polynomial

  6. Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (2/3) • Setup phase Step1: Generates Step2: Calculates Step3: Sends esi(x,Sj) to Sj Step4: Removes g(x) and esi(x,y) Ex: g(x) =3x2+5x1+2 , t=2 Step1: e(x,y) = x2y1+4y1+5 , t=2, u=1 Step2: e(x,1) = x2+9 g’(x) = 4x2+5x+11 Step3: e(x,2)=2x2+13 e(x,3)=3x2+17 Step4 g(x) g’(x) SI Step3 S2 Step3 S3 Secure Channel e(x,y): a bivariate (t,u)-degree e-polynomial si: theId of sensor node i S1: 1 S2: 2 S3: 3

  7. Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (3/3) • Rekeying Phase • Sensor node • g’(x), x=0,1,2,… • esj(x,Si), j ≠i g’(x) SI e(x,2)=2x2+13 Step2 S2 Step1:e(0,2)=2x2+13 =13 e(0,3)=3x2+17 =17 Step2: S2sends (2,13) to S1 S3 sends (3,17) to S1 Step3: Toreconstruct the polynomial e(0,y)=5+4y Step4: computes g(0)=g’(0)-e(0,1) =11-9 =2 Step2 S3 e(x,3)=3x2+17 Secure Channel

  8. Proposed Scheme (1/2) • Key pre-distribution phase • Cluster Head • Id • KBS,CHa • KCHa,Si • Sensor node • Id • KBS,Si • KCHa,Si K: a pair-wise key BS: Base Station

  9. Proposed Scheme (2/2) • Group key establishment and rekeying CHa Si 1. Generates a Group key GKka 2. E(Rki, KCHa,Si) Generates a Rki E(gka(x), GKk-1a) GKka= gka(Rki) Ωa:a set of all compromised nodes detected in cluster-a k: k-th

  10. Security Analysis Verification-Based Group Rekeying (VGR) nc:The average number of sensor nodes in a cluster ω: The number of compromised nodes in a cluster t,u: The degree of a polynomial Lkey: The number of bits of a key Lid: The number of bits of an id

  11. Performance Evaluation nc:The average number of sensor nodes in a cluster ω: The number of compromised nodes in a cluster t,u: The degree of a polynomial Lkey: The number of bits of a key Lid: The number of bits of an id

  12. Conclusion • Robustness to the node capture attack • Reactive rekeying capability to malicious nodes • Low communication and storage overhead

  13. Comment • the degree of a polynomial ≧the number of sensor nodes in a cluster • Compare ECC with polynomial • IDS is a heavy burden for the cluster head. IDS: Intrusion Detection System ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography

More Related