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“Liability Issues in Anti-Spyware Software”. Peter P. Swire Ohio State University Center for American Progress Anti-Spyware Coalition Public Workshop January 31, 2008. Overview. Background & Disclaimer Kaspersky case Safe harbor statute
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“Liability Issues in Anti-Spyware Software” Peter P. Swire Ohio State University Center for American Progress Anti-Spyware Coalition Public Workshop January 31, 2008
Overview • Background & Disclaimer • Kaspersky case • Safe harbor statute • A current case – should anti-spyware delete opt-out cookies?
Background & Disclaimer • To “balance” the panel, Ari asked me to highlight critiques of anti-spyware software • I worked extensively with this Coalition in formative stage • Ari & CDT have done such a good job that I have been happy to let them take the lead since • I am enormously appreciative of contributions of anti-spyware software
Kaspersky • I share the general happiness for the overall outcome – Zango loses • Two broad holdings that perhaps make bad law • “Interactive computer service” • “Otherwise objectionable”
“Interactive Computer Service” • Court admits it gives a very broad reading to ICS • Broad as well on “access software provider” • Maybe would mean a service that lets the user access an outside service • Court’s definition means any “phone home” software is included – put that in your software and you are immune • Court goes broad, but perhaps another court would find differently
“Otherwise Objectionable” • One of these things is not like the other? • Obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing • Ads for a legal product • Purpose of the law – the “Communications Decency Act” – restrict children’s access • Ejusdem generis – canon of statutory interpretation • No discussion of these issues in the district court decision
Safe Harbor & Kaspersky • ASC and long hours spent drafting versions of safe harbor legislation • Kaspersky is broader safe harbor • Kaspersky would block FTC & state AG enforcement • No need to act in good faith • No need to have a reasonable process to define malware or manage disputes • District court holding in Kaspersky may go too far in immunizing anti-spyware software
A Current Issue • FTC comments on behavioral profiling due Feb. 22 • I’m working on comments about technical barriers to effective consumer choice • One existing tool for consumer choice is the “opt out cookie” • Technical problems with these, at least partially fixable • Comments today are tentative & welcome your input • Have reached out to the ACM
Opt Out Cookies - I • Monday I opt out of tracking • DoubleClick • Network Advertising Initiative • Maybe a lot more given FTC involvement • Tuesday I delete my cookies • Wednesday I am being tracked again
Opt-Out Cookies: II • Monday I opt out of tracking • Tuesday my anti-spyware software deletes all cookies (or all 3d party cookies) • Wednesday I am being tracked again • (At least until the next anti-spyware cleaning of my computer)
Change to Anti-spyware? • First problem is for the browsers – more granular control over cookies so opt out cookies persist better • Second problem is for anti-spyware vendors • What barriers to allowing opt-out cookies to persist? • Need standards to define “opt out cookies”? • Security holes or vulnerabilities if bad guys use “opt out cookies”?
Some Implications • Perhaps it’s worth it to tune anti-spyware so opt out cookies can persist • Better ways to enable consumer choice on behavioral profile? In reasonable amount of time? • If not, then bigger importance of tuning anti-spyware software to preserve opt-out cookies, soon.
Finally • If it is worth getting persistence of opt-out cookies • And if vendors decided not to tune their products • ThenKaspersky would block the FTC and state AGs from legal action • That might not be the right legal regime for how anti-spyware fits into the rest of the legal system