Doctrine for Counter Insurgency: The British Army’s Experience

1. Doctrine for Counter Insurgency:The British Army’s Experience Colonel Alexander Alderson Afghan COIN Centre

2. Counterinsurgency “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency”

5. The Evolution of COIN Doctrine Northern Ireland SOPs 2009 2001 1995 - Counter Insurgency Operations 1972 1977 - Counter-Revolutionary Operations NI, Oman 1966 1969 - Counter-Revolutionary Operations Peace Aden 1950 1957 and 1963 - Keeping the Peace Malaya, Kenya, Borneo 1949 - Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power Palestine, Malaya Control 1934 – Notes on Imperial Policing 1909 – Field Service Regulations Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing Expansion 1906 - Callwell’s Small Wars

6. Field Service Regulations (1909)

7. 1923 – Minimum Force? Amritsar, India – April 13, 1919

8. Amritsar: the Change to Policy “The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s Government are determined that [Minimum Force] shall remain, the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire.”

9. Gwynn: Imperial Policing (1934) • Questions of policy remain vested in the civil Government • The amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation demands • Take firm and timely action • Co-operation: the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone

10. Inter-War Assumption: Status quo ante?

11. Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (1952) “The Job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture CT in Malaya. This book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven principles by which this can be done. This book is by no means perfect. Criticisms and improvements are invited by GOC Malaya, who will produce a revised edition in six months’ time.”

12. ‘Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on the bugle, followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the vernacular.’ Land Operations Volume III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 2, p. 103

13. Sir Robert Thompson • The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable • Function in accordance with law • The government must have an overall plan • Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas • In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first

15. Shape Domestic and International Audiences Host Country Security Forces Local Population Key Local Leaders Host Country Government Other Agencies Detainees Media Develop Host Nation Security Forces: train, mentor, monitor and embed Support better governance Support economic development Restore essential services Secure Clear-Hold-Build Find-Fix-Strike Deter, Disrupt, Dislocate

16. Elements of Effective Security • Security for the Population • Presence • Continuity • Embedded Training Teams • Intelligence • ISTAR • Influence • Education

17. Gain and MaintainPopular Support Primacy of PoliticalPurpose Operate in accordance With the Law Unity of Effort Understand theHuman Terrain Integrate Intelligence Secure the Population Prepare for the Long Term Neutralize the Insurgent Learn and Adapt

19. Conclusions