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The EU and Myanmar: Obsessed with ‘security’ in Southeast Asia?

Smart, Sustainable & Inclusive: Researching the EU from Australia & New Zealand Australian/New Zealand EU Centres Joint Conference, 8-11 September 2013, Canberra. The EU and Myanmar: Obsessed with ‘security’ in Southeast Asia? Dr Ludovica MARCHI Balossi-Restelli (PhD)

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The EU and Myanmar: Obsessed with ‘security’ in Southeast Asia?

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  1. Smart, Sustainable & Inclusive: Researching the EU from Australia & New Zealand Australian/New Zealand EU Centres Joint Conference, 8-11 September 2013, Canberra The EU and Myanmar: Obsessed with ‘security’ in Southeast Asia? Dr Ludovica MARCHI Balossi-Restelli (PhD) Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, UK

  2. Structure of the talk 1-introduction: task 2-background: President Thein Sein selling the New Myanmar to the West 3-analysis: are there Europeans’ security preoccupations behind their offer of development cooperation & military assistance? 4-searching for an approach: to explain Thein Sein’s drive to the European capitals 5-applying the approach: the Rejectionist School and the EU-Myanmar Partnership 6-conclusions

  3. 1- The paper’s task is to argue that Europeans’ (the EU & the member states) attention to Myanmar (i.e. its transition towards a civilian government) tended to tie in with their attention to China, that created security preoccupations for its increasing influence on Myanmar and Myanmar’s neighbouring region

  4. 2- President Sein selling the New Myanmar to the West: From development assistance to military assistance Either to increase his government’s credibility in relation to the 2014 Myanmar’s chair of the ASEAN, or with regard to the country’s 2015 general elections, and perhaps seeking to expand his government’s international legitimacy, President Sein intensified his country’s foreign relations in 2013

  5. In March, Thein Sein toured European capitals and primarily the European institutions in Brussels Sanctions from the EU have been lifted, excluding arms embargo; EU development aid has been more than doubled, with Brussels exploring the feasibility of a bilateral investment agreement, and offering to re-instate a preferential tariffs deal with Yangon.

  6. kkk Non-EU state Norway, together with Finland, Austria, Belgium and Italy have been visited. European capitalsexpressed their particular interests in bridging in with Myanmar. Beyond their offer of infrastructural, technical and business aid, also interest in the field of security emerged, with cooperation in this area being proposed Ahtisaari (former Finland’s President & Nobel Laureate) discussed (4 March) with Sein the proposal that he made through his group -- the Crisis Management Initiative -- to the EU, to engage & assist Yangon in peace-making processes

  7. kkkk On 3 June, Britain’s Chief of Defence Staff (who served as commander of the UK peacekeeping contingent in East Timor, General Sir David Richards) discussed opportunities for military cooperation during his mission to Myanmar. He was the first western military chief to visit the country in decades General Richards acknowledged ‘a genuine desire for reform’ among the military officers that he had met, and concluded that ‘a new generation of military officers deserve encouragement’

  8. Via diplomatic sources, member states were informed that Myanmar’s military leadership was willing to gain more expertise and to professionalise, and also to cede its dominant role in politics On 6 June, Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (Nay Pyi Taw) was in Moscow to discuss military cooperation, further cementing the relationship between the two countries’ armed forces The EU & the member states are concerned about Myanmar’s military assistance from non-European countries

  9. 3- behind development & military cooperation with Myanmar: are there Europeans’ security preoccupations? The EU & member states are also anxious about Myanmar’s Chinese ties: It is clear that Chinese strategists have visualised the long term need for reaching out to the Indian Ocean Very strategically bypassing the Strait of Malacca, China sought to import Myanmar’s gas, and oil from the ME, via two Myanmar-China pipelines

  10. kkk Over the past two decades China supplied Myanmar with military hardware at ‘friendship’ price Since 1994, it held a military base in Coco islands, in the Northeastern Indian Ocean, on a leased land, belonging to Myanmar It funded strategic roads, linking China’s Yunnan province to Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal

  11. uuu Also, China’s increased military spending is a factor of concern for the EU & the member states: In 2011, China swelled its defence budget by 6.8 per cent - & this caused the growth of the region’s military expending In 2011, defence spending across Southeast Asia rose by 13.5 per cent

  12. lll China is the world’s largest arms importer, followed by South Korea in fourth place, and Singapore in fifth. Also Indonesia’s defence spending has expanded, and almost quadrupled in the past six years According to some estimates, China’s defence disbursement is expected to exceed the EU-28 defence spending by 2020 Britain, France, Germany and Italy have fallen down the category of top ten military spenders, respectively as fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth

  13. oooo China has also quietly supported, enlarged and armed its proxies to hold Myanmar to ransom It has been arming the ethnic Wa (opposition) group over the years, which has a fighting force of about 30,000, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) It has recently supplied the UWSA with ‘medium helicopters fitted with air-to-air missiles’ -- as current reports (9 June 2013) from multiple sources (including the Janes Information Group) suggested -- with great potential of destabilising Myanmar and unwanted reflection into the nearby region

  14. uuu China and its policies intertwine with Europeans’ attention to Myanmar. The EU has interests in the East and Southeast Asian region, firstly, in the ‘open’ sea lanes of communication. Secondly, at least two member states (France and the United Kingdom) hold a few strategic outlets in the area (overseas territories and military facilities in Nepal, Brunei and Singapore),

  15. kkk and at least one (United Kingdom) has security commitments through the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, which came into force (1971) as a loose consultative mechanism involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.

  16. kkk European critics of China’s encroaching presence in East and Southeast Asia argue that the Europeans would need to be ready to give ‘a response to emerging geopolitical changes in the region’, ‘consolidate existing alliances’ & and involve more actively in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (EU Guidelines of foreign & security policy in East Asia 2012, 16).

  17. ggg The Europeans would partake more frequently in military exercises with the EU’s ARF partners (which include Myanmar), project their forces’ confidence within the region, and remain fully inter-operable with the region’s other military powers (South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and also China). With renewed interest in the ARF, this forum would become a mechanism to enable active European and Asian participation in a security structure that sits literally at the geopolitical heart of the Southeast Asian region

  18. 4- looking for an approach With which lenses can we observe Myanmar and its ties to China, which are a factor of concern for the EU and the member states, and also explain Thein Sein giving shape to Myanmar’s foreign policy in the European Union?

  19. nnn Three analytical schools with a focus on Myanmar’s linkages to China (Selth 2007) are considered in the paper: the Domination School (Ghoshal 1994; Bedi 2000; Malik 1997), the Partnership School (Garver 2001; Badgley 2004) & the Rejectionist School (widely used in India, Australia and the US) (Hill 2002; Ashton 2004)

  20. The Domination School ‘harks back to the great power politics and strategic balances of the Cold War’. It discounts Myanmar’s ability to manage its own affairs in the face of China’s overwhelming strategic weight. The intelligence connections developed between Yangon and Beijing are understood as an integral part of a wider Chinese design. Looking further afield, the Yangon regime would be characterised as an agent of the Chinese government, able and willing to subvert regional councils, like the ASEAN, on behalf of its patron.

  21. The Partnership School disbelieves the idea that China will simply impose its wishes on reluctant Myanmar. It perceives this process developing gradually along the lines of a more even-handed strategic alliance. While Myanmar may not be prepared to agree to a significant Chinese military presence now, Yangon government will ultimately come to recognise the benefits of a ‘deeper strategic partnership’ with Beijing. This outcome would become a reality if the US, and like-minded countries, apply pressure on Myanmar’s government, in an attempt to bring about regime change.

  22. The Rejectionist School bases its influence on three main convictions. Firstly, it acknowledges that, throughout history, Myanmar has always been very suspicious of China, and only turned to Beijing when the West applied sanctions. Secondly, this school maintains that China has not been as successful in winning Myanmar’s confidence as is often reported. Thirdly, should Myanmar escape from China’s embrace, there is little chance that it is left to manage this process alone. The western democracies would be ready to offer Myanmar their support and a range of other options.

  23. 5- applying the approach: the Rejectionist School The Rejectionist School leads to see Thein Sein committing his country to Brussels & accepting the challenge of creating a ‘lasting EU-Myanmar Partnership’ What considerations does this approach suggest?

  24. hhh President Sein has not expressly committed his country to a strategic partnership with Beijing, as the Partnership School would envision. Neither Myanmar could be considered as that ‘isolated and economically troubled’ place which ‘inevitably succumbs to the pressure of China’, as the Domination School would expect (Selth 2007, 19).

  25. ggg As the Rejectionist School contemplated, Yangon holds the ASEAN countries as a model for its government and economy, not China. That this is true is confirmed by Myanmar’s acceptance of its role of chairing the ASEAN in 2014.

  26. ggg Also, the rejectionist ideas have found confirmation in the several interviewees in Yangon, in January 2013. Their responses highlighted Myanmar’s refusal of chronic outsiders’ interferences. Current rejection of China (and India for its strong influence) was openly declared.

  27. hhhh In Brussels, Sein accepted the challenge (5 March 2013) of creating a ‘lasting EU-Myanmar Partnership’. Sein undertook the commitment of working ‘together on preparedness, response and resilience to emergencies, by building up a professional and effective response system’ (p.2). What is the meaning of that clause?

  28. ggg Apparently that paragraph of the agreement indicates the decision to create an operative system, prepared to intervene in prevention and reaction to emergencies, crises and natural disasters. That system is intended to be resilient and robust. It is expected to be professional, benefiting from training, underpinned by constant practices and exercises conducted in joint forces. It is implied that European forces will be in support of this cooperation in the civil-military field.

  29. ggg The Rejectionist School does not hide the fact that the EU & member states promoted their foreign and security policy in Southeast Asia. The EU-Myanmar Partnership, as explained above, offers a chance to the Europeans to give a partial answer to their concerns built upon China. 

  30. hhhh Not that all of the Europeans’ preoccupations would be under control (China’s opaque presence in Myanmar and penetration in the Indo-Pacific area, the risk that it encourages destabilising tensions around the Malacca passage and in the South Pacific, the fact that security voids and governance gaps – which characterise under-developed and un-democratic countries, as Myanmar could still be – may allow China destabilising Myanmar through its military and political support of the ethnic Wa group in the country’s Northeastern corridor to China),but, at least, with the new agenda, the EU and member states can justify their presence and possible initiatives in the region.

  31. 6-conclusions i) China’s full-fledged arms import, enlarged defence budget and increased expenditure, joined to military cooperation with Myanmar and holding Myanmar to ransom, all of them were source of concern to the Europeans, and interacted with Europeans’ relation to Myanmar

  32. hhh ii) the Rejectionist School approach explained why Myanmar would not fall into China’s tough encirclement, & featured Sein building up Myanmar’s foreign policy in the EU

  33. hhh iii) the paper made to emerge the central role of the ASEAN: • ASEAN has been at the basis of the EU-Myanmar Partnership; • ASEM (as an ASEAN’s annex) contributed to the development of both China’s multilateral conduct, & China’s behaviour as a partner rather than a competitor or aggressor within the region (Shambaugh 2004; Percival 2007). THANK YOU

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