330 likes | 435 Views
Digital Signature for Flows and Multicast. Chung Kei Wong, student Member,IEEE and Simon S. LAM, Fellow,IEEE IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, AUGUST 1999. Outline. Introduction Main idea Detail design Conclusion. Introduction. Basic concerns of securing data Confidentiality
E N D
Digital Signature for Flows and Multicast Chung Kei Wong, student Member,IEEE and Simon S. LAM, Fellow,IEEE IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, AUGUST 1999
Outline • Introduction • Main idea • Detail design • Conclusion
Introduction • Basic concerns of securing data • Confidentiality • Authentication • Integrity • Nonrepudiation
Main idea • We present chaining techniques for signing/verifying multiple packets using a single signing/verification operation. • To further improve our procedures, we propose several extensions to the Feige–Fiat–Shamir digital signature scheme.
Existing Techniques for Signing Flows • Sign-each • Flow • Nonreal-time generated flow • Real-time generated flow • Signing rate is important • Delay-sensitive flow • verification rate is important
Characteristics in delivery of flows and multicast • For a multicasted flow, many receivers are limited in resource compared to sender, which is typically a dedicated server machine. In some environments, both senders and receivers may be limited in resource, e.g.,mobile computers using wireless communication.
Characteristics in delivery of flows and multicast (cont.) • Delay sensitive flows require fast processing at receivers.Real-time generated flows require fast processing at senders as well. • Receivers may have widely different capabilities/resource. For example, receivers may be personal digital assistants, notebook computers, or desktop machine. Moreover, the resource available to a receiver for verifying signatures may vary over time.
Requirements • The signing procedure is efficient and, for real-time generated flows, delay bounded. • The verification procedure is efficient(since many receivers have limited resource). • Packet in a flow are individually verifiable. • Packet signatures are small (I.e., small communication overhead).
Chaining techniques • A. Star Chaining • D1,…D8,D1-8=h(D1,…,D8) • Di:message digest of packeti • D’1-8 = h(D1,D2,D3’,…,D8)
Chaining techniques • B. Tree Chaining
Comparison of Chaining Techniques 16 packets,deg = 2 Total:0.21+12.7 = 12.9ms Ave:12.9/16 = 0.81ms 12.7/0.81=15.68 Chaining time (milliseconds) for a block (a) at a signer
Comparison of Chaining Techniques 16 packets,deg = 2 Total:0.4+0.24 = 0.64ms Ave:0.64/16 = 0.04ms 0.4/0.04=10 Chaining time (milliseconds) for a block (b) at a verifier (with caching of verified nodes).
Bounded Delay Signing • Ds = T + chains(m) + Tsign • in period T at most m packets are generated and their packet digests computed. • chains(m):chaining time • Tsign:block digest signing time • Ds:delay upper bound • Real-time generated flow • Ds > 2(Tsign + chains(m))
THE eFFS SIGNATURE SCHEME • A. Basic FFS Scheme • Parameter • (k,t) • N = p * q ( p , q : large prime) • V1,v2,…,vk(k random integers) • Si^2 = vi^-1 mod n • Signing key {s1,…sk,n} • Verifacation key {v1,v2,…,vk,n}
THE eFFS SIGNATURE SCHEME • Signing step • 1)r1,…rt : t random integers between 1 to n. Compute xi = ri^2 mod n. for I = 1,..t. • 2)Calculate message digest:h(m,x1,…xt) {bij} : first k*t bits of message digest • 3)yi = ri * (s1^bi1 * … * sk^bik) mod n
THE eFFS SIGNATURE SCHEME • Verify step • 1) zi = yi^2 * (v1^bi1 * … * v^bik) mod n • First k*t bits of message digest h(m,z1,…zt) = {bij}?
Extensions to Speed up FFS • 1) Small Verification Key (small v-key) • To use the first k prime numbers as verification key components {vi}. • 2) Chinese Remainder Theorem (crt) • yi = ri * (s1^bi1 * … * sk^bik) mod n ((ai – bi) * q *qp^-1 +bi) qp^-1 = q^-1 mod p ai = ri * (s1^bi1 * … * sk^bik) mod p bi = ri * (s1^bi1 * … * sk^bik) mod q
Extensions to Speed up FFS • 3) Precomputation (precomp) • k = 4 yi = ri * (s1^bi1 * … s4^bi4) mod n sb1…b4 = s1^bi1 * … s4^bi4 • 4-bit precomp,k=128,512modulus 128/4 * (2^4 – 1) = 480 additional memory :480*512 bits or 31kB • 8-bit,12bit,16bit:261kB,2.88Mb,33.6MB
Adjustable and Incremental Verification • Multiple keys(with different modulus size) • t-level signature • xi = yi^2 * (v1^bi1 * … * v^bik) mod n • To verify a t-level signature of message at security level l • (1) compute zi = yi^2 * (v1^bi1 * … * v^bik) mod n for I = 1 … l • (2) verify that z2,…,zl are equal to x2,…,xl respectively
Adjustable and Incremental Verification • To increase the verification security level l1 from to l2 • 1) compute zi = yi^2 * (v1^bi1 * … * v^bik) mod n for I = l1+1 … l2 • 2) verify that zl1+1,…,z2 are equal to xl1+1,…,xl2 respectively • The size of a t-level signature • Kt + (2t - 1) * |n| • For 512-bit modulus and product kt = 128, a 1-level signature is 80 bytes and a 2-level signature is 208 bytes.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SIGNATURE SCHEMES • 1024-byte packets • Pentium II 300-MHz machine running Linux. • Four different modulus sizes, 384, 512, 768, and 1024 bits,
Conclusion • We have designed flow signing and verification procedures, based upon a tree-chaining technique, to meet the following requirements: • 1)flow signing is efficient and, for real-time generated flows,delay-bounded; • 2) flow verification is efficient (for receivers with limited resources); • 3) packets in a flow are individually verifiable (for best-effort multicast delivery); • 4) packet signatures are small (for a small communication overhead); and • 5) verification at a receiver is adjustable to different security levels and can be carried out incrementally (for receivers with limited resources).
Conclusion • we propose several extensions to the Feige–Fiat–Shamir digital signature scheme to speed up both the signing and verification operations. • 1) eFFS is the fastest in signing (by a large margin over any of the other four schemes) and as fast as RSA in verification (tie for a close second behind Rabin). • 2) eFFS allows a tradeoff between memory and signing/verification time. • 3) eFFS allows adjustable and incremental verification by receivers.
Conclusion • Question • Key management • Signing key size is very large • If the signer has only few resource?