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Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores

Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores. Speaker : YUN–KUAN,CHANG Date : 2010/07/30. Provable Data Possession Schemes - Secure PDP Schemes 1/3. We describe a framework for provable data possession. Send pk, F = (m 1 , . . . ,m n ), Σ = (T 1,m 1 ,w 1 , . . . ,

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Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores

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  1. Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores Speaker : YUN–KUAN,CHANG Date : 2010/07/30

  2. Provable Data Possession Schemes-Secure PDPSchemes1/3 • We describe a framework for provable data possession. • Send pk, • F = (m1, . . . ,mn), • Σ= (T1,m1,w1, . . . , • Ti,mi,wi) • 4. Client delete • F,Σ • KeyGen(1k) → (pk, sk) • pk=(N,g) • sk=(e,d,v) • TagBlock(pk, sk,m,i) → (Ti,mi,wi) • sk=(d,v) • wi=v||i • Ti,m=(h(wi ). gm) d mod N

  3. Provable Data Possession Schemes-Secure PDPSchemes2/3 • chal=(c,k1,k2,gs) • c: F某區塊 • k1←{0, 1}κ • k2← {0, 1}κ • gs= gsmod N • s ← Ζ*N R R R • GenProof(pk, F, chal,Σ) → v=(T,ρ) • pk=(N,g) • F = (m1, . . . ,mn) • Σ= (T1,m1,w1 , . . . ,Ti,mi,wi) • chal=(c,k1,k2,gs) 1≦j≦c • T=(Ta1i1,mi1… Tacic,mic) • ρ=H(gsa1mi1+...+acmicmod N) • CheckProof(pk, sk, chal, • V) → {“S”,”F”} • pk=(N,g) • sk=(e,v) • chal=(c,k1,k2,s) • v=(T,ρ) • τ= Te • = ga1mi1+...+acmicmod N • 2. If H(τs mod N) = ρ → S

  4. Provable Data Possession Schemes-Public verifiability 2/3 • The following changes should be applied to the S-PDP protocol • Send pk, • F = (m1, . . . ,mn), • Σ= (T1,m1,w1, . . . , • Ti,mi,wi) • 4. Client delete • F,Σ • KeyGen(1k) → (pk, sk) • pk=(N,g,e) • sk=(d,v) • TagBlock(pk, sk,m,i) → (Ti,mi,wi) • sk=(d,v) • wi=ωѵ(i) publishes ѵ • Ti,m=(h(wi ). gm) d mod N

  5. Provable Data Possession Schemes-Public verifiability 3/3 • chal=(c,k1,k2,gs) • c: F某區塊 • k1←{0, 1}κ • k2← {0, 1}κ • gs= gsmod N • s ← Ζ*N R R R • GenProof(pk, F, chal,Σ) → v=(T,M) • pk=(N,g,e) • F = (m1, . . . ,mn) • Σ= (T1,m1,w1 , . . . ,Ti,mi,wi) • chal=(c,k1,k2,gs) 1≦j≦c • T=(Ta1i1,mi1…Tacic,mic) • M=a1mi1+...+acmic mod N • CheckProof(pk, sk, chal, • V) → {“S”,”F”} • pk=(N,g,e) • sk=(e,v) • chal=(c,k1,k2,s) • v=(T,M) • τ= Te • = ga1mi1+...+acmicmod N • 2. If gm= τ & |M|< λ/2 → S

  6. Random Oracle Model • Pseudorandom function (PRF) • Pseudorandom permutation (PRP) • Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA-r)

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