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GBE Lingkungan Internasional. Nanang Pamuji Mugasejati. Faktor. Politik: Regulasi Internasional Perubahan Teknologi Hegemoni Kekuatan Pasar. Global Commodity Chain. Commodity chain: “ a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity ” (Wallerstein).
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GBE Lingkungan Internasional Nanang Pamuji Mugasejati
Faktor • Politik: Regulasi Internasional • Perubahan Teknologi • Hegemoni Kekuatan Pasar
Global Commodity Chain Commodity chain: “a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finishedcommodity” (Wallerstein)
Global Commodity Chain “sets of interorganizational networks clusteredaround one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, sociallyconstructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organization (Gereffi et al., 1994: 2).
Fokus: chain coordination Chain coordination reinforces or enhances barriers to entry, but more importantly allows ‘driving’ agentsto institute measures which reduce costs and risks while increasing the speed and reliability ofsupply, or which increase sales. It thus offers a way out of the apparent circularity of dependencytheory, where power within the global economy was measured in terms of profits, while profitswere explained in terms of monopoly power. Since chain co-ordination leads to genuine increasesin efficiency and cost-reduction it also offers a means of avoiding a zero-sumapproach, in whichprofits are derived solely at the expense of all subordinate agents in a chain. On the other hand,it is stressed that chain co-ordination is still typically directed from northern countries, since itis usually associated with those links (or ‘nodes’) in a chain which have particularly high barriersto entry, and because international income distribution remains extremely uneven.
4 Dimensi GCC • Struktur input-output • Teritori • Internal governance structure • Institutional framework
Investment-based globalization (1950-1970) The global reach of verticallyintegrated TNCs dates from the late 19th century in primary products (oil, mining, agriculture) and from the early decades of the 20th century in manufacturingsectors such as automobiles. International production networks were the primary vehicles for this form of globalization. In the 1950s and 1960s, the multinational spread of TNCs accelerated in a growing number of manufacturing andraw material industries, and the ability of global companies to try to manage theworld as an integrated unit was seen by some as a threat to national sovereignty.
Transisi (a) the dramatic increase in the supplyof finished-goods exports from low-cost, developing-country locations (b) the vertical disaggregation and globalization of supply chains.
Trade-based globalization (1970-1995) In the 1970s, there was a markedshift to export-oriented industrialization as a preferred development strategy inmany parts of the developing world, beginning with East Asia, but spreading inthe 1980s to Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere .This shift in national development strategies toward exports was premised onthe rapid and diversified industrialization of a wide range of developing nations.In effect, the center of gravity for many manufacturing industries moved fromthe core to the periphery of the world economy. The emphasis on internationalproduction networks controlled by the headquarters of TNCs (producer-drivencommodity chains) shifted to international sourcing networks controlled bylarge retailers and global marketers based in developed countries (buyer-drivencommodity chains)
Digital Globalization In the mid-1990s, the information revolution and a growing acceptance of the Internet began to create an explosion inconnectivity due to the open and almost cost-free exchange of a widening universe of rich information “Long Tail Economy”
The New Regionalism:Localization of Globalization The new regionalism ‘is an alternative centred on mobilising the endogenous potential of [regions] through efforts to upgrade a broadly defined local supply-base. It seeks to unlock the “wealth of regions” as the prime source of development and renewal’ (Amin, 1999: 366).
Why local-region? regional competitive advantage predominantly derives from local social and institutional conditions: trust, norms, routines, conventions, practices and learning. Regional competitive advantage derives from a suite of locally specific ‘untraded’interdependencies that may promote trust, collaboration and the accumulation of social capital across the full range of state, economic and civil society organisations.
Institutional Thickness • a strong and broad local institutional presence; • a high degree of interaction among local institutions, embodied in shared rules, conventions and knowledge; • the ensuing emergence of progressive local power structures and/or forms of collective representation; • the emergence of an awareness among the participants in institutional networks that they are involved in a common enterprise. regional economy dynamic, flexible institutions, innovation, high levels of trust and effectiveknowledge circulation.
Fragmentasi Fragmentation: “physical separation of different parts of a production process” Fragmentation allows production in differentcountries to be formed intocross-border production networks that can be within or between firms. “Integration of Trade” and “Disintegration of Production”
Supplier-Buyer Relationship (1) the ‘commodity supplier’ that provides standardproducts through arm’s length market relationships, (2) the ‘captive supplier’ that makes non-standard products using machinery dedicated to thebuyer’s needs, and (3) the ‘turn-key supplier’ that produces customizedproducts for buyers and uses flexiblemachinery to pool capacity fordifferent customers.
Market Market linkages do not have to be completely transitory, as istypical of spot markets; they can persist over time, with repeattransactions. The essential point is that the costs of switching to new partnersare low for both parties.
Modular Value Chains Typically, suppliers in modular value chainsmake products to a customer’s specifications, which may be more orless detailed. However, when providing ‘turn-key services’ supplierstake full responsibility for competencies surrounding process technology, use generic machinery that limits transaction-specific investments,and make capital outlays for components and materials on behalf ofcustomers.
Relational Value Chain In these networks we see complex interactions between buyers and sellers, which often creates mutual dependence andhigh levels of asset specificity. This may be managed through reputation, or family and ethnic ties. Many authors have highlighted the roleof spatial proximity in supporting relational value chain linkages, buttrust and reputation might well function in spatially dispersed networkswhere relationships are built-up over time or are based on dispersedfamily and social groups.
Captive Value Chain In these networks, small suppliers are transactionally dependent on much larger buyers. Suppliers face significant switching costs and are, therefore, ‘captive’. Such networks are frequently characterized by a high degree of monitoring and control by lead firms.
Hierarchy This governance form is characterized by vertical integration.The dominant form of governance is managerialcontrol, flowing frommanagers tosubordinates, or from headquarters tosubsidiaries andaffiliates.
Faktor yang menentukan tipe-tipe Governance A. The complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction, particularly with respect to product andprocess specifications; B. the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specificinvestment between the parties to the transaction; and C. the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction.
Kapan Market Muncul? When transactions are easily codified, product specificationsare relatively simple, and suppliers have the capability to make theproducts in question with little input from buyers, asset specificity willfail to accumulate and market governance can be expected. In marketexchange buyers respond to specifications and prices set by sellers. Because the complexity of information exchanged is relatively low, transactions can be governed with little explicit coordination.
Kapan MVC muncul? When the ability to codify specifications extendsto complex products, value chain modularity can arise. This can comeabout when product architecture is modular and technical standardssimplify interactions by reducing component variation and by unifyingcomponent, product, and process specifications, and also when suppliers have the competence to supply full packages and modules, whichinternalizes hard to codify (tacit) information, reduces asset specificityand therefore a buyer’s need for direct monitoring and control. Linkages based on codified knowledge provide many of the benefits of arms-length market linkages – speed, flexibility, and access to low-cost inputs– but are not the same as classic market exchanges based on price. Whena computerized design file is transferred from a lead firm to a supplier,for example, there is much more flowing across the inter-firm link thaninformation about prices. Because of codification, complex informationcan be exchanged with little explicit coordination, and so, like simplemarket exchange, the cost of switching to new partners remains low.
Kapan RVC muncul? When product specifications cannot be codified,transactions are complex, and supplier capabilities are high, relationalvalue chain governance can be expected. This is because tacit knowledgemust be exchanged between buyers and sellers, and because highly competent suppliers provide a strong motivation for lead firms to outsourceto gain access to complementary competencies. The mutual dependencethat then arises may be regulated through reputation, social and spatialproximity, family and ethnic ties, and the like.
Kapan CVC muncul? When the ability to codify – in the form of detailedinstruction – and the complexity of productspecifications are both highbut supplier capabilities are low, then value chain governance will tendtoward the captive type. This is because low supplier competence inthe face of complex products and specifications requires a great dealof intervention and control on the part of the lead firm, encouragingthe build-up of transactional dependence as lead firms seek to lock-insuppliers in order to exclude others from reaping the benefits of theirefforts.
Kapan H muncul? When product specifications cannot be codified, products arecomplex, and highly competent suppliers cannot be found, then leadfirms will be forced to develop and manufacture products in-house. Thisgovernance form is usually driven by the need to exchange tacit knowledge between value chain activities as well as the need to effectivelymanage complex webs of inputs and outputs and to control resources,especially intellectual property.
Bacaan: Gary Gereffi, “Shifting Governance Structures inGlobal Commodity Chains,WithSpecialReference to the Internet”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 44 No. 10, June 2001 1616-1637 Gerrefi, Humphrey, Sturgeon, “The Governance of GlobalValueChains”, Review of International Political Economy 12:1 February 2005: 78–104.