Emergent Organizations and Networks in Catastrophic Environments

1. Emergent Organizations and Networks in Catastrophic Environments Session 11

2. Objectives • Discuss and refute several common but inaccurate assumptions about disasters and catastrophic events. • Define emergent groups and networks and highlight the conditions under which they develop. • Describe the role which people convergence plays in the development and functioning of emergent networks. • Discuss factors which facilitate the effective integration and visibility of emergent organizations and networks.

3. Myths and Realities of Disasters (and Catastrophes) • Myth: Widespread role abandonment by emergency responders • Research indicates that emergency responders generally do not abandon responsibilities, particularly after assurances that their family is safe. • Myth: Responses are solely actions of isolated heroes • Research indicates that responses are multi-organizational. • Myth: Response are solely the responsibility of government organizations • Research indicates that responses include the full range of individuals, groups, agencies, and businesses. • Some organizations exist prior to the event, some are quite formal in their organizational structure, some only develop in the aftermath of the event, and some are quite informal in their organizational structure. • DRC typology of organizations: Established, expanding, extending, emergent

4. Organizations in Disasters: Structures Old New Old Established Expanding Tasks (e.g. fire dept) (e.g. American Red Cross volunteers) New Extending Emergent (e.g. school providing shelter) (e.g. search & rescue bucket brigades) See:, Dynes, R.R. 1970. Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

5. Organizations in Catastrophes: Structures Old New Old Established Expanding Tasks (e.g. fire dept) (e.g. Red Cross volunteers) New ExtendingEmergent (e.g. school providing shelter) (e.g. search & rescue bucket brigades) The roles of expanding, extending, and emergent organizations increase as the level of event increases (i.e. they play a greater role in disasters than emergencies, and in catastrophes than disasters).

6. Myth and Realities • Myth: Centralized decision-making and response is always appropriate • Command and Control incorrectly assumes: • Government is the only responder. • Information from outside official channels is inaccurate. • Role abandonment • Standard operating procedures will always function. • Citizens are inept, passive, and irrational. • Society will break down. • Ad hoc emergence is counter productive. • Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2), 197-224.

7. Myth and Realities • Myth: Centralized decision-making and response is always appropriate • Research shows that while authority, leadership, and accountability are necessary, communication and coordination as well as resource management are better than command and control approaches (Drabek & McEntire, 2002) • Complex disasters necessitate decentralized decision making structures and networks. That is, a decentralized network will emerge in post-event environment of a large-scale disaster or catastrophe. The challenge is to maximize coordination and communication across that network. • Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2), 197-224.

8. Reality: • Disasters, and certainly catastrophes, disrupt the patterns of what can be absorbed by routine procedures. As Tierney (2002) states, these types of events are largely defined by their need for improvised responses. Tierney, K.J. 2002. “Lessons Learned from Research on Group and Organizational Responses to Disasters.” Paper presented at Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Academy of Sciences, February 28 – March 1.

9. Incident Management System • “A generic term for the design of ad hoc emergency management teams that coordinate the efforts of more than one agency under a unified command” (p.1) Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, and F. Winslow. 2001. “An Overview of Incident Management Systems.” Perspectives on Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. No. 4 (September).

10. IMS proponents highlight advantages: • A functional management system that integrates personnel from different home organizations • Identification of an incident manager or a unified management team when jurisdictional areas or responsibilities overlap • Standard terminology that facilitates cooperation (although some minor regional variance remains) • Rules for chain of command, unity of command, and span of control • Protocols for communications and flow of information • Emphasis on logistics planning and centralized resources allocation • Planning functions on an equal level with operations and logistics functions Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, and F. Winslow. 2001. “An Overview of Incident Management Systems.” Perspectives on Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. No. 4 (September).

11. IMS critics argue that the model has the following limitations: • Fall short in appreciating or contending with emergence in organizations and social networks • Impractical in large, complex, and dispersed events • Organizational structure is too hierarchical, roles are too formal, and decision process to too centralized in more complex events • May not fit within the system of shared governance prevalent in the United States • May generate problems for the local response efforts • Not suited to organizational culture of many non-governmental and emergent groups • Difficult to integrate those not familiar with IMS or with not-previously-connected groups Waugh, 2006. Mechanisms for Collaboration in Emergency Management: ICS, NIMS, and the Problem of Command and Control. Power Point Presentation to the Collaborative Public Management Conference, The Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Washington, DC, September 28-30. Accessed August 30 2008 at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parc/AAA%20-%20Powerpoints/William%20Waugh.ppt Waugh, W.L. 2007. Terrorism and Disaster. (eds. H. Rodriguez, E.L. Quarantelli, and R.R. Dynes) Handbook of Disaster Research. Springer: New York, NY, p. 388-404. Tierney, K.J. 2007. Recent Developments in U.S. Homeland Security Policies. (eds. H. Rodriguez, E.L. Quarantelli, and R.R. Dynes) Handbook of Disaster Research. Springer: New York, NY, p. 405-412.

12. Emergent Organizations • Emergence is likely when members perceive a present threat, when the social climate is supportive of emergence, when social ties are in place – at least to some degree – before the mobilization, when the social setting legitimizes the groups, and when resources are available (Quarantelli et al., 1983). • Quarantelli, E.L., with K.E. Green, E. Ireland, S. McCabe, and D.M. Neal. 1983. Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Activities: An Interim Report. Newark DE. University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.

13. Emergent Organizations • Given that catastrophes involve situations where: • Most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted….[and] the facilities and operational bases of most emergency organizations are themselves usually hit • Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this often extends into the recovery period • Help from nearby communities cannot be provided • Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and concurrently interrupted • The mass media system, especially in recent times, socially constructs catastrophes even more than they do disasters • Because of the previous five processes, the political arena becomes even more important …the level of emergence necessary to contend with these severe and unanticipated conditions is likely to be greater than more typical disaster situations. - Quarantelli, E.L. 2005. Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Implications for Crisis Planning and Managing drawn from Katrina. Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. Social Science Research Council. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org

14. Cultural Considerations • Emergent activity in response to crisis has a strong cultural component. • In some societies where formal emergency management organizations are non-existent, emergent activity may be the only or primary response to high-consequence events (particularly before outside help arrives). • In other cases, there may be less of a history of emergent activity. For example, the convergence of individuals and groups after the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, as well as their informal participation in the response, was considered unusual, whereas the occurrence would have been considered a typical social behavior were the same event to have happened in the United States (Tierney, et al., 2001). • Tierney, K.J., M.K. Lindell, and R.W. Perry 2001. Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States. Joseph Henry Press, Washington, DC.

15. Emergent Networks • Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks (EMONs): • The “structure of relationships that form among organizations, or segments of organizations, that are focused on a specific [activities or response functions]” (Drabek, 1996: 21-11) • Form during the emergency period for a limited time in order to address emerging needs • In catastrophic events, EMONS are often simultaneously comprised of a range of established, expanding, extending, and emergent organizations. • Drabek, T.E. 1996. The Social Dimensions of Disaster. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

16. Emergent Networks • Emergent organizational networks are defined as such not necessarily because they are comprised of emergent groups, but because of the newly formed relations between organizations.

17. Transactive Memory Systems Theory • Majchrazak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead (2007) apply transactive memory systems (TMS) theory to emergent response groups. A TMS is a shared system that works to help explain how people in collectives learn, store, and coordinate their knowledge to accomplish various goals. Majchrazak, Ann, Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, and Andrea B. Hollingshead, 2007. Coordinating Expertise Among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters. Organization Science 18(1) p. 147-161.

18. Indicators of Transactive Memory Systems Theory • Memory (or expertise) specialization: The tendency for groups to delegate responsibility and to specialize in different aspects of the task • Credibility: Beliefs about the reliability of members’ expertise • Task (or expertise) coordination: The ability of team members to coordinate their work efficiently based on their knowledge of who knows what in the group “The greater presence of each indicator, the more developed the TMS and the more valuable the TMS is for efficiently coordinating the actions of group members.” p. 151 Majchrazak, Ann, Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, and Andrea B. Hollingshead, 2007. Coordinating Expertise Among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters. Organization Science 18(1) p. 147-161. Drawing upon Lewis 2003 and Moreland & Argote 2003)

19. May be able to act more quickly as they are outside of a formal bureaucracy May have a better pulse of what emerging needs are as they connected to emergent systems and networks May meet needs unidentified or not being met by formal systems May not be governed by the same standards or systems of oversight as formal organizations May have less of a feel for emerging needs as they not necessarily part of the formal network where certain information is directed to May generate overlap and compete with existing systems May be characterized by unclear leadership May have unstable definitions of tasks Emergent Groups Benefits and Challenges Drabek, T.E. and D.A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and Opportunities from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2): 97-112.

20. Discussion Question • Organizations and groups typically studied using TMS theory are relatively stable and operate in routine periods (although they may also continue to operate in crisis conditions) • Emergent response groups have different characteristics. According to Drabek and McEntire (2003), they: • Have volitional member participation • Have fleeting membership • Are geographically distributed with diverse and unfamiliar group members • Pursue multiple, simultaneous, changing and possibly conflicting purposes • Need to adapt to unstable task definitions and flexible task assignments • How might these features impact the established way of considering TMS theory? Draw upon Hurricane Katrina examples provided in Majchrazak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead (2007) or consider implications in even more catastrophic events than Hurricane Katrina’s impact to the American Gulf Coast in 2005.

21. Expanding TMS Theory to Emergent Response Groups

22. In-Class Activity • Students should form into small working groups of 5 or 6 • Using the chart on TMS, students should develop a different catastrophic event scenario (perhaps based on hazard type to ensure there is no duplication in the class) and apply features of the chart to specific examples regarding how they may play out in that particular event. • Students should briefly present their application to the class at the end of the exercise. • The goal of the exercise is to reinforce the application of TMS to emergent response groups.

23. Role of Personal Convergence in Emergent Groups and Networks Personal or people convergence involves the influx of people to areas associated with the disaster milieu (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Fritz & Mathewson, 1957). - Fritz, C. and J. H. Mathewson. 1957. Convergent Behavior: A Disaster Control Problem. Special Report for the Committee on Disaster Studies. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C. - Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf, 2003. Reconsidering Convergence and Converger Legitimacy in Response to the World Trade Center Disaster. Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas (ed. Lee Clarke). Research in Social Problems and Public Policy (11), 97-122.

24. People Convergers • Returnees • Anxious • Helpers • Curious • Exploiters • Supporters* • Mourners/Memorializers* * These two additional types were noted in the 2001 World Trade Center disaster. Their presence was partially accounted for by the protracted nature of the response. Kendra, J.M., and T. Wachtendorf, 2003. Reconsidering Convergence and Converger Legitimacy in Response to the World Trade Center Disaster. Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas (ed. Lee Clarke). Research in Social Problems and Public Policy (11), 97-122.

25. 1. The Returnees • Residents • Business owners and employees

26. 2. The Anxious Family members looking for missing loved ones

27. 3. Helpers • Local personnel • Neighboring jurisdiction personnel under mutual agreements • Uniformed or skilled personnel from outside area • Volunteers

28. Gaining Entree… Successful unaffiliated helpers have • Skills • Ability to identify, or create, niche markets for themselves • Ability to work largely unsupervised

29. 4. Curious • Political officials • Celebrities • General public

30. 5. Exploiters • Merchants overcharging for goods and services • Claims of proceeds going to charity • Those searching for ways to commit fraud

31. 6. Supporters and 7. Mourners/Memorializers • Public that comes out to show support and solidarity • Individuals who gather to mourn and memorialize those who have died • These two categories were identified after the 2001 World Trade Center disaster

32. Convergence During the response to the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, a range of vessels (including tugs, ferries, dinner cruise boats, private vessels, and those vessels operated by Coast Guard and harbor pilots) converged towards Lower Manhattan to help evacuate residents and commuters from the island. This activity was not previously planned for, and the participants became part of an emergent network of organizations (including some emergent groups) to help with this unmet need. For more information, see Kendra, Wachtendorf, and Quarantelli, 2003 or Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2005. NEW YORK, New York (Sept. 11)--Coast Guard crew members patrol the harbor after the collapse of the World Trade Center. Terrorists hijacked four commercial jets and then crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside. USCG photo by PA3 Tom Sperduto. The U.S. Coast Guard Imagery Server is provided as a public service by the Office of Assistant Commandant for Governmental and Public Affairs. - Kendra, J. M., T. Wachtendorf, and E.L. Quarantelli, 2003. The Evacuation of Lower Manhattan by Water Transport on September 11: An Unplanned Success. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety 29(6), 316-318. - Wachtendorf, Tricia and James M. Kendra, 2005. Improvising Disaster in the City of Jazz: Organizational Response to Hurricane Katrina, Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. Social Science Research Council. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Wachtendorf_Kendra/ Accessed October 15, 2005.

33. Network Visibility • As existing groups take on new roles or other groups emerge, information about key organizations is often not known across the social network. • In catastrophic events where convergence and emergence may play an even larger role than in typical disasters, network visibility, which allows for both open and coordinated systems, becomes paramount. - Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, J. Holguin-Veras, and S. Ukkusuri, and Perez. (In preparation). Network Visibility in Emergency Supply Chain Management.

34. The photo below is from the weeks following Hurricane Katrina and include a site in Mississippi. All photos are copy written 2005 by the Disaster Research Center. All rights reserved. The photo is free for use for educational purposes and can be added to lecture slides by the course instructor. Photo must note the following caption: Photo courtesy of The Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware

35. In Class Activity: In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergent groups, previously existing groups undertaking new tasks or with new organizational arrangements, and established organizations all formed new organizational networks as they contended with the many response needs. Different types of groups played more predominate roles than others in different stages of the response and early recovery, with respect to different tasks, and in working with different communities. One of the challenges was coordinating and communicating across these networks. Imagine that you become part of an emergent group that has come together to address a particular response need in this catastrophic event. What steps might you and those in your group take to become a connected part of the emergent multi-organizational response network? Remember the severe impact to communication systems, infrastructure, facilities, and community function that would contribute to the setting in which you would need to work.

36. All photos below were taken in India following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. All photos are copy written 2005 by the Disaster Research Center. All rights reserved. Photos are free for use for educational purposes and can be added to lecture slides by the course instructor. Photos must note the following caption: Photo courtesy of The Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware

37. Following the Indian Ocean tsunami, many formal and informal groups came together to form multi-organizational networks around debris removal. Even when formal organizations such as USAID provided resources, it was often an emergent group of local citizens and organizations that undertook much of the work.

38. All photos below were taken in China following the 2008 Wenchuan (Great Sichuan) earthquake. All photos are copy written 2008 by the Disaster Research Center. All rights reserved. Photos are free for use for educational purposes and can be added to lecture slides by the course instructor. Photos must note the following caption: Photo courtesy of The Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware

39. On May 12, 2008, the town of Yingxiu was one of many communities in Sichuan Province that suffered devastating impacts of the catastrophic earthquake. Three quarters of the population of this small town were killed in the event. Earthquake and rain-induced landslides made roads to the town impassible, and local citizens initially had to perform search and rescue operations before government help arrived, including in this middle school where many students died.

40. Following the May 12, 2008 earthquake in China, established organizations, such as Half the Sky – an organization that routinely provides care for orphaned children in the country – became part of emergent networks within the temporary resettlement camps. They took on somewhat new roles (including helping those impacted, not just orphaned by the earthquake). Although relying on relatively the same internal organizational structure, they did develop somewhat new organizational arrangements within the network appropriate for the response as Half the Sky needed to coordinate with other organizations working on children’s issues, as well as with other organizations working on entirely different issues within the camps.