Building Sustainable Inspection Reforms Jordan Coordination Model

1. Building Sustainable Inspection Reforms Jordan Coordination Model Wafa’a M. Aranki June 2014 Amman – Jordan

2. Work Plan • Quick Scans® • Framing the options • Problem Definition & Institutional Options • Impact Assessment (Legal, Economical) • Analysis – per option • Consultation • Selection of “Best options Presentation to the GoJ • Selection of preferred option • Draft action plans • Political decision and legalization • Political decision • Drafting legal measures

3. Options Considered for the Jordan Case • Option 0: No Action Option • Option 1: Cooperation Agreement / Memorandums of Understanding • Option 2: Coordination Body – Slovenia, Netherlands • Option 3: Merger of inspections with similar policy areas - Lead Agency - UK • Option 4: Consolidated functions into single inspectorate – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia

4. Option 0: No Action Continue working with the current enforcing system without introducing any changes Cons Pros Law enforcement to ensure compliance and protection of public interest • Estimated Government cost at $20 M • Estimated private sector cost at $60 M (time, samples , fees, etc) • Ineffective visits • Expected increase in formal sector

5. Option 1: Cooperation Agreements /MOUs Signing cooperation agreements or MoU between two or more inspectorates to coordinate inspection functions jointly or on behalf of each others. Examples are Jordan Food and Drug Administration and Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Health and JFDA, MoH - GAM Cons Pros Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process • CAs and MoUs need to be renewed and monitored frequently • Not binding and depends on the inspectorates commitment and willingness • May not ensure sustainability given frequent changes in top management • May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap

6. Option 2: Coordination Council Establish a coordination body responsible for the strategic directions of reform that enjoy the power and resources required to draft policies, execute reforms and monitors performance of the different inspectorates Cons Pros Estimated savings at $50 M Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process Streamlined requirements expected to enhance risk based targeting May not require major restructuring of inspection authorities • May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap • Require political well and commitment to ensure proper functioning of the council

7. Option 3: Merging Inspectorates with Similar Functions Lead Agency • Merging inspectorates that has similar mandates under one agency and could include giving the lead agency (e.g. Environment, Food, Safety, etc) the sole authority to inspect certain sectors Cons Pros Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M Creating a collaborative culture Enhance efficiency and effectiveness of inspection functions Optimal use of resources • May not serve inspectorates with limited or narrow mandate • Difficult to reverse if proven ineffective

8. Option 4: Consolidated FunctionsSingle Inspectorate Approach Creating a single authority where all the inspection functions in the different authorities are moved under a one authority Cons Pros Estimated Savings for GoJ at $60 M Powerful and influential inspectorate to enforce regulations Consistent law enforcement system due to common practices under one authority Expected to enhance risk based targeting Enhance public accountability and responsibilities Optimal use of resources • Requires strong political well and commitment to sustain and finance • Requires substantial change in the government structure • Sudden and transformational change could create confusion • Very difficult to reverse if proven ineffective

9. Complementary Option:Inspection Legal Framework Enacting a legal framework to authorize the inspection structure, the adoption best practices, roles and responsibilities of regulators and firms, and the like Cons Pros Ensures sustainability and maintenance of reforms Ensures underlying inspection principles are adopted and implemented Ensures proper governance and transparency of the system • Cost of drafting and enactment of a legal framework could reach $3M • Needs supporting enforcement and awareness to execute efficiently and effectively

10. “Best” Option within the Jordanian Context Coordination council titled The Higher Committee for Inspection Reform

11. Higher Committee’s Goal Create a national committee from highest ranking officials to oversee and monitors inspection reform with the following mandate • Setting policies and strategic plans to improve regulatory delivery in Jordan • Ensure that reform initiatives are implemented across inspectorates • Monitor and Evaluate performance to ensure results are achieved

12. Higher Committee – Org Structure Council of Ministers Economic Development Ministerial Committee IFC – Technical Advisor Co- Chairpersonship Minister of Industry and Tradeand Supply and Minister of Public Sector Development Private Sector Reps Secretary General - MoIT Sec Gen/ DG Agency ….n Sec Gen/ DG Agency 2 Sec Gen/ DG Agency 1 HC – Secretariat MoIT Inspectorates – Working Groups – Technical Committees

13. Higher Committee – Workflow Identify Reform Priorities Form Relevant Working Groups Define the objectives and scope of the WGs Involved Agencies: • Inspectorates • Higher Committee • Working Groups • HC – Secretariat • IFC • Private Sector representatives • Council of Ministers WGs puts proposals for the HC HC evaluates proposals No Approve Yes HC submits to the CoM No Approve Yes Implementation Evaluation and Continuous Improvement

14. Jordan Council of Ministers Decree approving the Higher Committee mandate, roles and responsibilities Dated October 24, 2013

15. Thank You Questions and Answers