Trustworthy Wireless (Joint ISA100/ISA99)

Trustworthy Wireless(Joint ISA100/ISA99) Wayne W. Manges; Oak Ridge National Laboratory Scott Mix; North American Electric Reliability Corporation 1

Early Adopters Lead the Way! Wireless Vibration Sensor 2#

No Inherent Flaw – Can Wireless Be As Trustworthy As Wire? • Marketing – sell what I have, bandwidth is king • Emotion – “Wireless scares me, I can’t control it!” • Incompetence/Laziness – Too difficult to configure, too big a learning curve • Cost/Benefit/Risk – ROI in a day, why bother? • Are we expecting to much – does wireless need to be more trustworthy than wireline really is?

Trustworthiness – More Than a Feeling • Quantifiable – When is a system trustworthy enough? How can I make it more trustworthy? What will it cost to achieve a required level of trustworthiness? • Predictable – design trustworthiness into the system before it’s installed • Verifiable – how can I be sure? • Real-time – Can an installed system become less trustworthy in operation? • Sustainable – Can an installed system keep from becoming less trustworthy over time? • Forensics – can I learn from experience?

Industrial Network Topology Standards and Practices • Plant Data Network • SP95 Enterprise Control Systems Integration • ISA99 Control Systems Security • OPC Foundation • Control and I/O Networks • Foundation Fieldbus ext. • Open Automation & Control Group (OAGC) • ISA100 • Device and sensor Networks • IEEE 1451 • DeviceNet • HART (WiHART) • ISA100 • Operator Interface Networks • SP65 Industrial Process Measurement and Control • SP50 Foundation Fieldbus

“Can You Hear Me Now?” – May Not Be Good Enough? IEEE 802.15.4 ISA100.11a WiHART

ISA100 efforts will result in standards, recommendations, and technical reports focused on assuring successful wireless deployments in industrial environments ISA100 Compliance will assure: Supplier specifications are consistent and easy to interpret User requirements are succinct, relevant and easy to interpret Options are clear and easily differentiable Probable outcomes are quantitatively evaluated against options Standards – Results Focus 7#

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100 ISA99

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100 ISA99 .11a

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100 ISA99 .11a STG

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100 ISA99 PTG .11a STG

Bound and Scope for TWIG ISA100 ISA99 PTG .11a STG TWIG

Florida Meeting • Joint with ISA99 • Discuss relationship of TWIG to other activities • Agree to bounds and scope of TWIG • Document agreements

Nice meeting • Elevation to WG • Mission • Scope • Schedule • Deliverables Interest Group Study Group Birds of a feather Working Group Define deliverables, schedule, Generate work products

Mission Proposed Mission: The ISA100 Trustworthy Wireless Work Group will develop and maintain policies defining the responsibilities of ISA100 standards developers to address the issues of trustworthiness (which includes security) with respect to other standards, other wireless and wired devices anticipated in the industrial work space, and other standards under development. It will also, when required, offer assessments to the ISA100 committee regarding the degree to which ISA100 standards developers have conformed to those conventions. This WG may also develop security documentation of interest to the technical community outside ISA100. TWIG Cleveland – 5/22/08

Trustworthiness in Wireless Industrial AutomationOutline • Forward • The ISA100 Series • Relationship of the ISA100 standards to TWIG • Relationship of TWIG to ISA99 • Introduction • Scope • References • Lexicon Telecon April 2008

Outline • Industrial Wireless Standards • ISA100 draft • Industrial Wireless • Policy • Signal Characteristics • Strength • Attenuation • Power Consumption • Bandwidth • Modulation Techniques (needs additional work …) • DSSS • CDMA • Microwave, Celluar, Packet Radio, etc. • Emerging Technologies • WiFi versus WiMax • Others?

Outline • Industrial Wireless versus Traditional Wireless Networks • Conduit • Service Access Points (SAP) • Gateways • Terminal servers • Serial points of access • Wireless Access Points • Frequency Ranges

Outline • Industrial Wireless in Comparison to Wired Control Networks • Stability • Deterministic versus non-deterministic • Latency • Hard Real-time (DCS) • Deterministic • Soft Real-time (SCADA) • Deterministic with thresholds • Best Effort (non-deterministic) • Discovery and Recovery Periods • Security • Authentication, Encryption and Integrity Impact algorithms with respect to latency for wireless network implementations • IEEE 802.11i • WPA, WPA2 • Zoning • Attack Prevention • DoS via RF Scrambling/Interference • Protocol Ramifications • Ethernet/IP, Modbus/TCP, Profinet, CompoNet, ControlNet, OPC, etc.

Outline • Metrics of Trustworthiness • Trust Levels • Security Levels (from ISA99) • Consequences of failure for both expected and unexpected modes of activity • “Characteristics” of trustworthiness • Classes • Wireless applications only • Monitoring (5) • Logging (4) • Supervisory (open-loop) control (3) • Closed-loop control (2) • Alert (1) • Safety (0) • Appendix • Table of Figures • Table of Tables • Acronym List • Use Cases

Terms: Trustworthiness Reliability Security Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authentication Access Control Fragility Non-repudiation Failure Terms: Scale Industrial Automation Industrial Automation Encryption Compression Network Resilience Survivability Interference Lexicon

Error Curves 1.0 1.0 Probability of False Positive Probability of False Negative 0.0 0.0 Low Resource:Money / Technology High

Error Curves 1.0 1.0 Probability of False Positive Probability of False Negative Sweet Spot 0.0 0.0 Low Resource:Money / Complexity High

Error Curves 1.0 1.0 Curve Shapes are defined by current technology Probability of False Positive Probability of False Negative Sweet Spot 0.0 0.0 Low Resource:Money / Complexity High

Error Curves 1.0 1.0 Curve Shapes are defined by current technology: Change curve shapes by changing technology Probability of False Positive Probability of False Negative Sweet Spot 0.0 0.0 Low Resource:Money / Complexity High

Wireless Wins – Just Make It Work!

PHY Layer Security – The Holy Grail? • No Bits – must be present to win! • LPI/LPD – low probability of intercept/detect • Stealthy – buried in the noise • Demonstrated – labs and DoD • Low Transmitted Power – easier on surrounding stuff • Denial Of Service Attacks – only at RF level On the other hand: • Requires High Process Gain – around 60 db (1000 chips/bit) vs 12 db (15 chips/bit) today • Export Control Issues – considered too stealthy • Highly Complex – no currently available commercial products • Key Management – always an issue

Where Are We Headed? • Deliverable – key document for use by wireless industrial network community • “Trustworthiness in Wireless Industrial Automation” • Lexicon – definitions • Metrics – measures of success • Use Cases – bound the problem • Participation – sign up!!! • Interface – ISA99, ISA100 Current members include participants from: Honeywell, Emerson, NIST, DOE (ORNL, PNL, INL, ANL), DHS, Shell, Control Chief, NERC, Certicom, and several private consultants IAEA – An interested party!

Could Wireless Provide the Business Case for Cyber?! • Automobiles • EPA provided the impetus for first microprocessors in autos • Now 38 per vehicle! • Internet • Home computing was just a hobby until the first browsers. • Now “Google” is a verb! • Wireless Is Enabler • Enterprise visibility • Mobility • Agility Two Fuses In Entire Vehicle!

Who Will Lead, Who Will Follow, Who Will Whine? • Technology is ready - driven by cellular personal / business / DOD communications • Market is ready – over $2000/ft for wires in some plants • Are we ready? – partnerships, consortia, standards and collaborations – 400 members strong “CBM Is the Next Killer App For Wireless” – Dr. Jay Lee, Fortune Magazine, July 2002 33#

Trustworthy Wireless (Joint ISA100/ISA99)