Securing Data in ePassports Policy Issues

1. Securing Data in ePassports Policy Issues ICAO/NTWG

2. John Davies Director of Systems, UK Passport Service Chairman NTWG PKI Task Force ICAO/NTWG

3. The presentation will address: • Why secure electronic data? • Why use PKI/encryption? • How a globally interoperable PKI could work for passports ICAO/NTWG

4. Why secure electronic data? • To ensure the electronic data was loaded by the appropriate passport issuing authority • To ensure the electronic data has not been overwritten or amended in any way. • To protect inappropriate access to data by unauthorised persons or organisations. ICAO/NTWG

5. e-Passports will initially contain the following electronic data: • Biometric information • Portrait Data (mandatory) • Finger print and iris data (optional) • Personal details from the passport biodata page ( name, date of birth, passport number, etc.) ICAO/NTWG

6. e-Passport specifications will offer read only access to the electronic data and will not initially offer any updating facility. • This limitation will facilitate a simple form of security implementation in the first instance. ICAO/NTWG

7. There is a tension between: • Ensuring the electronic data is secure from inappropriate access • Ensuring the electronic data can be accessed easily by immigration authorities. ICAO/NTWG

8. The PKI scheme is based on open access but allows individual states to choose optional additional security methods to protect personal data. ICAO/NTWG

9. Why use a public key infrastructure (PKI)? • PKI is a well established method of protecting and authenticating data held on computer chips. • No other scheme offers equivalent security for chip technology. ICAO/NTWG

10. Why use encryption? • The proposals do not include encryption for basic personal data or the facial biometric. • Encryption of fingerprint or iris data could be considered by states who choose to use these forms of biometric, but encryption specifications have not been developed. ICAO/NTWG

11. The PKI scheme proposes: • A peer-based environment with each state independent and autonomous with respect to passport security. • An agreed means of sharing and updating public keys. ICAO/NTWG

12. Responsibilities for states issuing e- passports: • Generate key sets and protect from unauthorised access. • Manage distribution of country signing certificates using bilateral secure diplomatic means. • Manage certificate revocations when a key is compromised. • Facilitate dissemination of information about public keys via ICAO public key directory . ICAO/NTWG

13. The PKI specifications recognise many individual states already have a PKI infrastructure : • RSA or DSA or elliptic curve and related hashing algorithms are included in the specifications. ICAO/NTWG

14. PK1 responsibilities for states reading e-Passports : • Maintain up to date information about public keys and certificate revocations on their systems. • Provide suitable reader infrastructures. ICAO/NTWG

15. ICAO Responsibilities: • To provide an efficient and reliable public key directory • Ensure the directory is only updated by member states. • Provide open access to public key information to participating states and organisations . ICAO/NTWG

16. The PKI Technical report: • Aimed at specialists familiar with PKI. • Proposes a technical framework and guidelines to enable each country to develop secure e-Passports. ICAO/NTWG

17. The technical report includes an annex on PKI and security threats. This is intended to aid individual states with their own risk analysis and mitigation decisions. ICAO/NTWG