1 / 113

Deterrence – or Destruction?

Deterrence – or Destruction?. Comparative Nuclear Doctrine. I. Modern Deterrence Theory. The cult of the bomber, 1919-1939: Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse

mizell
Download Presentation

Deterrence – or Destruction?

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Deterrence – or Destruction? Comparative Nuclear Doctrine

  2. I. Modern Deterrence Theory • The cult of the bomber, 1919-1939: • Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse • 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban bombers • Deterrence failed: Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II (disproportionate response to German error) • Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale • Britain actually preferred German countervalue targeting (cities) to counterforce targeting (military forces)

  3. B. Types of Deterrence • General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence: Distinction between overall strength (10,000 warheads) and threat in particular situation (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles)

  4. B. Types of Deterrence • General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence: Distinction between overall strength (10,000 warheads) and threat in particular situation (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles) • Direct vs. Extended Deterrence: Attempting to deter attacks on self vs. others (i.e. South Korea, West Germany) • Existential Deterrence: Capability exists to become a threat (i.e. Japan’s nuclear program)

  5. C. Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) • Foundations = bargaining theory, especially game theory at RAND and other “think tanks” • Focuses on manipulating information, costs, and probability of victory to prevent rational opponents from engaging in some behavior

  6. 3. Requirements of Success under RDT • Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: The “Doomsday Device,” tactical nukes in Cuba • Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam • Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failure: Sanctions on USSR over Afghanistan invasion • Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America • Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination?

  7. D. Dilemmas of Deterrence • Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraint (increased incentives to initiate conflict) • Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (US urges Soviets to harden silos) • Rationality Dilemma: Known rationality can be exploited by opponent (as in our bargaining game, or counterforce first strike). Solution = “threat that leaves something to chance” – but this decreases restraint, increasing incentives for enemy to pre-empt

  8. Exercise: By Dawn’s Early Light • Threats to deterrence? • Causes of escalation? • How to terminate a nuclear war?

  9. E. Does deterrence work? • Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working? • General deterrence creates bias: Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed… • Quantitative studies: US-USSR crises accurately described by RDT (responses consistently calibrated to threats, not randomly over time as predicted by political psychology)

  10. 4. Results from Case Studies (Morgan 2003) • Success more likely when challenger motivated by prospective gains than fear of domestic or international loss • Deterrence successes occur early, before crises develop • Military superiority unnecessary for deterrence (consistent with RDT – and French nuclear doctrine…)

  11. 5. Nuclear weapons possession suppresses conventional conflict spiral

  12. 6. Deterring Terrorists: Unexpectedly Violent Retaliation is Key

  13. II. Game Theory: Formalizing Deterrence • Assumptions • Rational choice (Transitive and Connected Preferences) – Note that preferences do not need to be “reasonable” or “sensible,” just consistent • Strategic interaction – My choices affect which choices are best for you

  14. B. Elements • Players – Two or more (Nuclear: Usually two) • Strategies – The choices players have • Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices (what the world looks like afterwards) • Payoffs (Preferences) – How much each player values each Outcome (since the same outcome can be valued differently by different people)

  15. C. Games in Normal (aka Strategic) Form: The Matrix • This form is used to represent simultaneous choice

  16. 1. Solving a Normal/Strategic-Form Game Without Math • Where do the numbers come from? PREFERENCES. First step is always rank-ordering outcomes for each player. • Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice • To Solve: Examine each cell to see if either player could do better by unilaterally choosing a different Strategy, given that its opponent does nothing different. Example:

  17. Solving a Game Without Math c. Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium (prediction = instability / switching between strategies) • Example:

  18. Solving a Game Without Math d. Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria (prediction = one of the following outcomes…) • Example:

  19. C. Common Strategic-Form Games • Prisoners’ Dilemma • Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally!

  20. b. Using PD to model Arms Races (The Security Dilemma) Note that payoff structure is just like a PD

  21. 2. Chicken: Who will swerve?

  22. 2. Chicken: Who will swerve? What If: You could throw your steering wheel out the window?

  23. Nuclear Crises and Chicken: The Cuban Missile Crisis Key distinction: In Chicken, each player would rather be the (nice) sucker than have both players be nasty  Not so in PD

  24. Problem 1: An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis • Determine preferences for each side (discussion) • If Pakistan assembles, what does India want to do? • If Pakistan doesn’t assemble, what does India want to do? • If India assembles, what does Pakistan want to do? • If India doesn’t assemble, what does Pakistan want to do? • Identify any Nash equilibria • Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?

  25. Problem 2: An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis, Phase Two • Determine preferences for each side (discussion) • If Pakistan doesn’t strike, what does India want to do? • If Pakistan strikes, what does India want to do? • If India doesn’t strike, what does Pakistan want to do? • If India strikes, what does Pakistan want to do? • Identify any Nash equilibria • Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?

  26. D. Games in Extensive Form: The Tree • Extensive form adds information: • What is the order of moves? Example: “If you do this, then I will do that.” • What prior information does each player have when it makes its decision? • Elements • Nodes – Points at which a player faces a choice • Branches – Decision paths connecting a player’s choices to the outcomes • Information Sets – When a player doesn’t know which node it is at • Outcomes – Terminal nodes

  27. 3. Solving an Extensive Form Game • Subgame Perfect Equilibrium – Eliminates “non-credible” threats from consideration • Process = Backwards induction – “If they think that we think…”

  28. E. Games of Deterrence: Credible Threat and Restraint War Preferences A: CapB SQ War FSB B: SQ FSB War CapB Nuke Attack Don’t Nuke CapB FSB Don’t Attack Nuke Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Don’t Nuke SQ Deterrence Success!!!

  29. Preferences A: CapB SQ War FSB B:FSB SQ War CapB E. Games of Deterrence: Credible Threat But No Restraint War Nuke Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Attack Don’t Nuke CapB FSB Don’t Attack Nuke Don’t Nuke SQ Deterrence Fails!!!

  30. Preferences A: CapB SQ War FSB B: SQ FSB CapB War E. Games of Deterrence: Restraint, But No Credible Threat War Nuke Attack Don’t Nuke CapB Subgame Perfect Equilibrium FSB Don’t Attack Nuke Don’t Nuke SQ Deterrence Fails!!!

  31. Problem Three: Deterring the USSR Given USSR NFU Doctrine Nuke NWarEUR Nuke Don’t Nuke CWinUS Invade Europe Don’t Nuke WinUSSR NWarCON Don’t Invade Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke NWinUS SQ

  32. Problem Three: If the US is willing to trade New York for Bonn Nuke NWarEUR Nuke Don’t Nuke CWinUS Invade Europe Don’t Nuke WinUSSR NWarCON Don’t Invade Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke NWinUS SQ

  33. Problem Three: If the US is NOT willing to trade New York for Bonn Nuke NWarEUR Nuke Don’t Nuke CWinUS Invade Europe Don’t Nuke WinUSSR NWarCON Don’t Invade Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke NWinUS SQ

  34. F. Problems of Game Theory • Simple two-player games assume: • Common knowledge of preferences – I know exactly what you want, so I can predict your behavior • Terminal nodes – the game actually ends “for good” • Both players ignore third-party decisions (i.e. other nuclear powers, or potential proliferators) • Real world violates these conditions (in many if not most cases) • Adding concealed preferences, N players, and infinite play is mathematically possible – but the result is infinitely many equilibria (the “folk theorem”) • Lesson: Games constrain the strategies of rational players (some are better than others), but can not prove a single strategy is “best” under real-world conditions

  35. III. Elements of Nuclear Doctrine • Goals • Deterrence – Make it irrational for enemies to attack • Compellence – Allow leaders to force changes in others’ behavior • Warfighting – Increase odds of victory in war

  36. B. Key dimensions • Size of force – Minimal to dominant • Command and control – Hierarchy to delegation • Employment – First strike to last resort • Force composition – Land, Sea, Air • Missions – Demonstrations to all-out war • Targeting – Counterforce vs. Countervalue

  37. IV. How do doctrines emerge? • Realism – External threats • All states pursue national interest. Keys: preventing national destruction or defeat, bargaining from a position of strength • Implications: • Deterrence theory: If you want peace, prepare for war • Public declarations are “cheap talk” – states at war abandon scruples and treaties • States try to prevent rivals from gaining superiority

  38. 3. Realist Nuclear Policies • Escalation dominance: Be able to beat any rival at any level of escalation (conventional, tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear) • Preserve autonomy: Do not bargain away decision-making power over weapons • Preserve security: Defend the state with alliances, civil defense, military defense

  39. B. Strategic Culture Theory • Domestic politics determines policy • Implications • Dominant ideology (historical analogies, Marxism, Maoism, etc) shapes war plans • Doctrines have symbolic importance  prestige, shame, pride matter for policy • Civilians target military doctrines which threaten domestic popularity

  40. C. Organizational Politics • Military organizations develop doctrines in unique ways • Militaries focus on military missions, neglecting politics • Militaries pursue parochial interests

  41. 2. Implications • Military control  offensive doctrines (e.g. preventive war, inevitable escalation, counterforce targeting) • Follow-on imperative  new weapons establish vested interests, perpetuate the organization after its initial purpose

  42. D. Technological change • All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines • Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s),

  43. ICBMs and SLBMs: Speed, Reach, and Penetration

  44. D. Technological change • All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines • Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs,

  45. A MIRVed ICBM: The Minuteman III

  46. MIRV Test: Time-Lapse Photo

  47. D. Technological change • All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines • Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s),

  48. PGMs and Guided Cruise Missiles

  49. D. Technological change • All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines • Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD,

More Related