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Enhanced Digital Signature with Message Recovery

This paper introduces an improved digital signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public keys and variants. It addresses vulnerabilities in existing schemes and provides a robust method for verifying signatures and message retrieval. The proposed scheme combines self-certified public keys and message recovery for enhanced security.

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Enhanced Digital Signature with Message Recovery

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  1. Improvement of digital signature with message recovery using self-certified public keys and its variants Zuhua Shao, Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 159, Issue 2, pp. 391-399, Dec. 2004 Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  2. Introduction • In the paper, the author showed out that Tseng et al.’s scheme will suffer from some attacks. • The author combines the concepts of self-certified public key and signature with message recovery. • The proposed scheme has two properties in verifying the signature : • The signer’s public key can simultaneously be authenticated. • The receiver obtains the message. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  3. Notations • p, q: p = 2p’+1, q = 2q’+1, where p’, and q’ are prime numbers which is only known by trusted authority (TA). • N: N = p*q, • g: a base element of order p’*q’, • h(): one-way function, • IDi: a user’s identity, • (Xi,Yi): a key pair of user i, where Yi = (pi-IDi)h(IDi)-1 mod N, • (ei, di): a key pair used in RSA. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  4. TA Self-Certified Public Key • The notion of self-certified public keys was first introduced by Girault, in 1991. 3. PKi, IDi User i 1. Select a random secret key Xi 2. Compute PKi =gXi mod N 4. Compute and publish user i’s public key Yi = (PKi-IDi)h(IDi)-1 mod N Yih(IDi)+IDi = gXi mod N Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  5. Message Recovery based on RSA • The message recovery of signature of RSA is as follows. 2. C User i User j 3. Message recovery and verify M=(CdB mod NB)eA mod NA 1.Compute signature and ciphertext S = MdA mod NA C = SeB mod NB Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  6. Message Recovery based on Discrete Logarithm (DSL) • The original signature based on DSL could not provide the capability of message recovery. • In 1993, Nyberg and Rueppel first proposed a concept about message recovery scheme based on DSL. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  7. Nyberg and Rueppel’s Message Recovery Scheme • Authenticated encryption scheme is an application. 3. R1, R3, S User i User j 1. Select random c, k 2. Compute signature R1 = gc mod p R2 = Mg-k mod p R3 = YjcR2 mod p S = k – XiR2 mod p 4. Compute R2 = R3R1-Xj mod p 5. Verify and message recovery M=gSYiR2 R2 mod q Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  8. Tseng et al.’s Signature Scheme (Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 136, No. 2-3, 2003) • Signature scheme with message recovery 3. R, S User j User i 4. Message recovery M=RgS(Yih(IDi) +IDi)h(R) mod N 1. Select a random k 2. Compute signature R, S R = Mg-k mod N S = k – Xih(R) Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  9. Tseng et al.’s Signature Scheme (Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 136, No. 2-3, 2003) • Authenticated encryption scheme 3. R, S User j User i 4. Message recovery M=R(gS(Yih(IDi) +IDi)h(R))Xjmod N 1. Select a random k 2. Compute signature R, S R = M(YjH(IDj)+IDj)-k mod N S = k – Xih(R) Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  10. Tseng et al.’s Signature Scheme (Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 136, No. 2-3, 2003) • Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages 3. R, S, r1, r2, …, rn 4. R’ = h(r1∥r2 ∥… ∥rn) Check R’ ?= R 5. gk = gS(Yih(IDi)+IDi)R mod N t = (gk)Xj 6. Message recovery and verify Mi=rih(ri-1⊕t)-1 mod N 1. Dispute message M = {M1, M2, …, Mn} 2. Compute signature set r0 = 0 choose a random k t = (Yjh(IDj)+IDj)k mod N ri = Mih(ri-1⊕t) mod N R = h(r1∥r2 ∥… ∥rn) S = k-XiR Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  11. Receiver Insider Forgery Attack on Tseng et al’s Authenticated Encryption Scheme • TA, and receiver conspiracy. 3. PKj’, IDj’ TA 1. M’ be any message Compute d = M’/M R’= dR mod N S’=Sh(R’)h(R)-1 mod p’q’ 2. Choose Xj’ Compute PKj’ = gXj’ mod N 4. Publish the public key Yj’ Yj’ = (PKj’-IDj’)h(IDj’)-1 mod N They can claim that {R’, S’} is the signature of the message M’. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  12. Forward Security of Tseng et al’s Authenticated Encryption Scheme 1. Assume that a third party has known message M. 2. M = R(gS(Yih(IDi)+IDi)h(R))Xj mod N = R(gXiXj)h(R)(Yjh(IDj)+IDj)S mod N 3. The third party can derive the value gXiXj, and henceforth he can use it to derive all messages. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  13. TA Arbitration (Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages) • When there are some disputes over the message signed, the signer and the receiver should reveal the value t. 2. ti 2. tj gk = gS(Yih(IDi)+IDi)R mod N tj = (gk)Xj 1. ti = (Yjh(IDj)+IDj)k mod N t = (gXiXj)R(Yjh(IDj)+IDj)S mod N Derive (gXiXj)R 3.Verify with ri = Mih(ri-1⊕t) mod N R = h(r1∥r2 ∥… ∥rn) Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  14. Improvement of Signature Scheme User i User j 3. R, S, r1, r2, …, rn 1. Dispute message M = {M1, M2, …, Mn} 2. Compute signature set r0 = 0 choose a random k t = (Yjh(IDj)+IDj)k mod N e = gk mod N ri = Mih(ri-1⊕t) mod N R = h(M, e) S = k-XiR 5. gk = gS(Yih(IDi)+IDi)R mod N t = (gk)Xj 6. Message recovery Mi=rih(ri-1⊕t)-1 mod N 7. Verify the signature R ?= h(M, gS(Yih(IDi)+IDi)R mod N) Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  15. Conclusion • The authors pointed that Tseng et al.’s authenticated encryption scheme will suffer from insider attacks and exits forward security weakness. • When there are some disputes the message signed, the third party will obtain a knowledge gxixj . • The authors counter the weaknesses and proposed an improvement scheme. Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  16. Comment – Based on FAC and DL • The system parameters are chosen by a trusted authority (TA) : • P = 4p1q1+1 • p1= 2p2+1 • q1= 2q1+1 • N = p1q1 • g is the order of p1p2 in ZP • TA sets p1, p2, q1, q2, P are all primes. • Each user selects a private key X in ZN such that gcd(X2, N)=1, and the public key y=gX2 mod P Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  17. Comments- Based on FAC and DL • Signature scheme with message recovery 3. R, S User j User i 4. Message recovery M=RgS(Yi)H(R) mod P • Select a random T in ZN such that gcd(T2, N)=1 • 2. Compute signature R, S • R = Mg-T2 mod P • S = T2 – Xi2H(R) mod N Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  18. Authenticated encryption scheme 3. R, S User j User i 4. Message recovery M=R(gSYiH(R))Xjmod P 1. Select a random T in ZN such that gcd(T2, N)=1 2. Compute signature R, S R = MYj-T2 mod P S = T2 – XiH(R) mod N Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

  19. Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages 3. R, S, r1, r2, …, rn 4. R’ = h(r1∥r2 ∥… ∥rn) Check R’ ?= R 5. gT2 = gS(Yi)R t = (gT2)Xj mod P 6. Message recovery and verify Mi=riH(ri-1⊕t)-1 mod P 1. Dispute message M = {M1, M2, …, Mn} 2. Compute signature set r0 = 0 choose a random T such that in ZN such that gcd(T2, N)=1 t = YjT2mod P ri = MiH(ri-1⊕t) mod P R = h(r1∥r2 ∥… ∥rn) S = T2-Xi2R mod N Speaker: Chi-Yu Liu

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