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SPLASH Sécurisation des ProtocoLes dans les réseAux mobileS ad Hoc

SPLASH Sécurisation des ProtocoLes dans les réseAux mobileS ad Hoc. http://www.inrialpes.fr/planete/splash.html 12 Décembre 2003. Refik Molva Institut EURECOM molva@eurecom.fr. Wireless & Mobile Limited Energy Lack of physical security Ad Hoc Lack of(or limited) infrastructure

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SPLASH Sécurisation des ProtocoLes dans les réseAux mobileS ad Hoc

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  1. SPLASHSécurisation des ProtocoLes dans les réseAux mobileS ad Hoc http://www.inrialpes.fr/planete/splash.html 12 Décembre 2003 Refik Molva Institut EURECOM molva@eurecom.fr

  2. Wireless & Mobile Limited Energy Lack of physical security Ad Hoc Lack of(or limited) infrastructure Lack of a priori trust Cooperation Enforcement • Key management MANET Security Requirements • Secure Routing [Recent security solutions for mobile ad hoc networks In “Ad Hoc Networks” IEEE Press - Wiley Ed]

  3. Key Management Objectives • Bootstrapping from scratch • Fully distributed • Minimum dependency

  4.   Key Management Approaches • Symmetric crypto [Basagni et al.] • (ID, PK) binding • Certificate = (ID,PK)CA • Self-organized Authorities [Zhou, Haas] [Kong, et al.] [Yi, Kravets] [Lehane, et al.] • Web of trust(PGP) [Hubaux, Buttyan, Capkun] • Certificate-less • Crypto-based IDs: ID = h(PK) [Montenegro, Castellucia] [O’Shea, Roe] [Bobba, et al] • ID-based Crypto: PK = f(ID) [Halili, Katz, Arbaugh] • Context-dependent authentication • location-limited channels [Balfanz, et al.] • Shared passwords [Asokan, Ginzborg]

  5. Self-organized Admission Control Performance Comparison • Centralized (simple signatures) • member gets t signatures from other members • Server grants GMC when t or more signatures are shown. • Distributed (threshold signatures) • member gets “partial” certificates (mSKi) from other members. • member combines t certificates to get a GMC GMC = mSK1 mSK2 mSK3.. mSKt = mSK Threshold signaturesare NOT suitable in MANET and sensor networks. • Currently investigating Bilinear mappings [Admission Control in Peer-to-Peer: Design and Performance Evaluation, ACM SASN Workshop, October 2003.] [On the Utility of Distributed Cryptography in P2P and MANETs, ICNP 2003.]

  6. (ID, PK) binding without a PKICrypto-Generated Addresses (CGA) • Statistically Unique Cryptographically Verifiable IDs [Montenegro, Castellucia] [O’Shea, Roe] IPv6 @ = prefix | h( prefix | PK ) • Secure Routing using CGA: AODV [Castellucia, Montenegro] DSR[Bobba, et al] PROs: no certificates, no PKI CONs: generation of bogus IDs • New: CGA based on the small primes variation of the Feige-Fiat-Shamir (MFFS) [Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable Addresses: concepts and applications. ACM TISSEC, Feb. 2004] [Protecting AODV against impersonation attacks, ACM MC2R, October 2002]

  7. Cooperation enforcement mechanisms Threshold cryptography Token-based [Yang,Meng,Lu] Nuglets [Buttyan,Hubaux] SPRITE [Zhong, Chen, Yang] CONFIDANT[Buchegger,Le Boudec] CORE [Michiardi,Molva] Beta-Reputation [Josang,Ismail] Micro-payment Reputation-based

  8. Cooperation Enforcement Evaluation with Game Theory • Cooperative GT • Study the size (k) of a coalition of cooperating nodes • Nash Equilibrium  lower bound on k • Non-cooperative GT • Utility function with pricing • Pricing used to guide the operating point (i.e. maximum of utility function) to a fair position • ri : dynamic reputation of node ni evaluated by her neighbors [Michiardi,Molva,CMS’02, WiOpt’03] [Srinivasan,et al.,INFOCOM’03]

  9. Simulations: CORE – uniform traffic

  10. Simulations: TFT – uniform traffic

  11. Summary • Specific requirements • Self organized bootstrapping of security associations • Cooperation enforcement • Prospects • New tools from crypto bag of tricks (Id-based crypto, . . .) • Integrated mechanisms: reputation + key management • Participation in MOBILEMAN project on Ad Hoc Networks • ESAS 2004 1st European Workshop on Security in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks. (5.-6. August, 2004) 

  12. ESORICS 2004 – RAID 2004September 13-17Institut EURECOMSophia Antipolis - FRANCE

  13. THANK YOU

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