Approach

1. Review of the Civil DefenceEmergency Management Responseto the 22 FebruaryChristchurch EarthquakeIan McLeanStuart Ellis

2. Approach • Ian McLean • Outline of review and how it was conducted • Broader issues beyond CDEM Response • Utilising volunteers • Supporting community responses • Information to communities • Links to business and response • Stuart Ellis • Agency Response • The role of doctrine (CIMS) in determining structures • Policing vs CDEM roles in overall control of emergencies • Generating a common operating picture and the role of Intelligence • Pre-determined IMTs

3. Background to Review of the Response Tragedy • I wasn't out there among the dust and the rubble, the devastation and the danger, the heat and then the cold southerly, and the hundreds of people - many wanting to help and many needing it. • I wasn't trying to make sense of the unfathomable, control the overwhelming, or build a plan on a foundation of uncertainty, rumour and conjecture. • What a hell of a job and, under the circumstances, they did a hell of a job. Let's not forget that. Professor Mike Ardagh; Christchurch hospital ED

4. The Review was • Reporting to Director CDEM • independent • covered the response period • interviews – 1st hand in response • very experienced team www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/For-the-CDEM-Sector-Publications-Review-of-the-Civil-Defence-Emergency-Management- Response-to-the-22-February-Christchurch-Earthquake?OpenDocument

5. Review Team • Ian McLeanRotorua • David OughtonWellington • Stuart EllisAdelaide, Australia • Basil WakelinWellington • Claire B. RubinWashington DC, USA.

6. Findings • Overall Response was well managed and effective • CRC difficult internally • No prior planning for NC move to disaster site • Merger of disparate organisations • Emergency services - impressiveresponse overall • Most lifelines were well prepared • Community organisations of immense value • Significant improvements suggested for most aspects of response

7. Volunteers Prior doctrine Established volunteers are: • affiliated (a member of a recognised group); • trained with CDEM relevant skills; • accountable and responsible (through their organisation). Spontaneous volunteers are: • unaffiliated (not a member of an organised, recognised group); • untrained in CDEM relevant skills; • not responsible or accountable to any given organisationCDEM “Group planning should include arrangements with local voluntary organisations that have community welfare as a principle objective “The Guide v1.2

8. Volunteers - Christchurch Spontaneous • Most immediate rescues by “volunteers” CDEM Volunteers at Christchurch • Managed welfare centres • NZ Response Teams • Role ‘light rescue’ • little prior liaison with USAR Also • Red Cross, Salvation Army, Volunteer Fire, etc

9. Spontaneous Organisations Student Army

10. Spontaneous Organisations Farmy Army

11. Spontaneous Organisations Well organised • Planning • Briefing • Health and safety • Leadership in the field • Debrief and wind-down. But there’s more

12. Spontaneous Organisations Flexible and very responsive Innovative Student army:social media Farmy Army: morning reconnaissance Essential did task beyond official response’s • resources; or • management

13. Spontaneous Organisations Liaison with CRC • Not easy – little place in doctrine • Improved when CRC manager moved to their HQs at Showgrounds • Succeededbecause CRC didn’t try to manage groups internally • Channels into policy inadequate

14. Supporting Community Responses CRC not able to support wellbeing • CCC service centresin East not re-opened • Welfare centres in East closed – Burnside instead - across city from most impacted suburbs

15. Location of Burnside High

16. Supporting Community Responses CRC not able to support wellbeing - (2) • Food requirements much beyond contracts • Information flow to CRC inadequate • Informationfrom CRC dated, not local - delayed to produce glossy document

17. Supporting Community Responses Who did provide response? Major response in badly impacted suburbs provided by community groups: Community associations plus

18. Supporting Community Responses Grace Vineyard Church

19. Supporting Community Responses Marae

20. Supporting Community Responses Sumner lifeboat Institution

21. Supporting Community Responses Sen/Sgt Roy Appley

22. Supporting Community Responses • Liaison with CRC • Locals felt isolated • Local Police and Fire aware of situationSevere impact – the needy most affected • Lower income suburbs (no reserves food or money) • Ethnic minorities (CALD) Christchurch Migrant Inter-Agency Group — lessons learned following the earthquakes

23. community and voluntary response • Major component of resilience • Crucial element of social ‘coping’ • Therapeuticfor those not directly impacted to assist others

24. Supporting Community Responses Support needed • Good liaison on ground • Support resources • Effective contactin CRC • Links with CALD • Recognition of lower income groups’ needs

25. information to communities Problems • No power – hence no TV, radio or cellphone • Limited newspaper circulation • Needed info continually - food water and sewerage disrupted

26. Good daily local info - WDC 2010

27. Christchurch brochure March 2011

28. Christchurch brochure March 2011

29. information to communities Requirements • Local real needs – food water welfare today • Right up to date • Frequent – daily during critical times • Accurate • No PR spin • Distributed widely near every house

30. business and the response Traditionally • Business ignored in response plan - left to recovery • Jobs unnecessarily lost • Response efforts can increase losses - e.g. initial cordon Why ignored? • Huge impact on a CBD unusual in recent times (apart from Kobe) • Hence little documentation

31. business and the response Positive in Christchurch • Cashinjections - trust was the key • Liaisondeveloped • High percentage of businesses survived Negatives • CBD access initially poor • “Cordon” different meanings among agencies • No business “desk” in CRC • RMA consentingnot responsive enough to situation

32. conclusions for response • Flexibility important – not just follow doctrine • Response needs to look outwards • Much of the effective response is outside CDEM structure • Community effectiveness enhanced by agencies’ support • Need to link community and business response to CDEM effort • 2 way information flows are vital

33. Part Two: Stuart Ellis • Shifting focus from external to internal: • Should doctrine determine incident management structures? • The role of CDEM and Policing in overall control of out-of-scale events? • The need to generate a common operating picture? • Optimal models for multi-agency teams?

34. 1. Should doctrine determine incident management structures?

35. CIMS • With the movement of the National Controller from Wellington to Christchurch, it presented a dilemma regarding what structure should be developed. • National CDEM Plan and CIMS offers a ‘doctrinal’ solution, (CIMS designed for incident management). • But this was to support the National Controller in a never-before-considered deployment.

36. Local politics • There was also the influence of local politics. • There was friction between CCC and the local CDEM Group after the Sep 2010 earthquake response. (Cracks appear during earthquakes when relationships are not robust). ‘Dysfunctionally divided’. • A structure was needed that would accommodate the local politics and the existing capabilities. • Politics is the art of the possible!

37. ‘doctrinal’ Structure

38. What we were told eventuated

39. Neither is right of wrong • Those trained will look for doctrinal solution. It is the doctrinal solution probably because it has worked best in the past. • If not prepared/or able to establish the doctrinal solution, remember you have to live with what you have. • Would have benefited greatly from an effective ‘Chief of Staff’ capability. • Be flexible and have alternate plans.

40. AIIMS

41. Local politics

42. Why is intelligence needed? • Only recently formally introduced within AIIMS-4. • Generates the ‘so what’. • Provides the best possible support to decision makers. • Reflects the incident management approach long adopted by the military and policing.

43. CIMS has those elements in Local politics

44. AIIMS is a system not a manual or doctrine in isolation

45. So should doctrine determine incident structures? • Needs to be the base line foundation. • Options and alternatives need to be considered and planned for. • There needs to be good reason to adjust it during operations. • Your previous investment in training is eroded if you change at the time. • Relying on the adaptability of your people.

46. 2. The role of CDEM and Policing in overall control of out-of-scale events

47. Who is in control of out-of-scale events? • Initial duplication of control between EOC’s at CCC and Regional CDEM group. • EOCs became centralised at the CCC alternate EOC, the adjacent Art Gallery. • Structurally sound but floor plan inhibited a cohesive EOC. • Police continued to operate from Police HQ.

48. CDEM were in control of event overall. • Police (and ES) were probably in control of much of the information. • EOC responded to media but may have failed to communicate with the people of Christchurch most needing advice. • ‘Information is power’ and we need to share it around to ‘em-power’ communities.

49. Unity of Command • CDEM controlled incident from EOC. • Police and Fire Communications in Police HQ was the location of twice daily operational briefings. No CDEM staff were present. • Police in particular, became ‘very well informed’. • How can this be best shared across multi-agencies in a time critical way?

50. Trained staff performed well • When all were concentrated at CCC EOC to become the single EOC, there were inadequately trained individuals operating within the EOC. The root cause appeared to be a lack of appreciation that management of major emergencies requires skills beyond those needed for day-to-day roles. • It became evident that those with the appropriate training performed well: Training does lead to positive operational performance! • This was reinforced by those from other sectors who were well trained and were supporting the EOC effort such as the health sector, the military, most lifelines and police.