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HUMR 5134: The Right to Peace Development and the Right to Peace

HUMR 5134: The Right to Peace Development and the Right to Peace Traps of Violence and Institutional Responses 5 September 2014 Bård A. Andreassen Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo. Main questions addressed. Peace and development – concerns conditions for development

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HUMR 5134: The Right to Peace Development and the Right to Peace

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  1. HUMR 5134: The Right to Peace Development and the Right to Peace Traps of Violence and Institutional Responses 5 September 2014 Bård A. Andreassen Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo

  2. Main questions addressed • Peace and development – concerns conditions for development • Traps of violence as underrated in analysing conditions for development; focus is mainly on social justice as condition for peace • Main problem addressed: the relationships between the right to peace and “development deficiencies” (poverty) – what is causing what? Legal perceptions (positive: DD – V/W), empirical evidence (ambiguous, trend: V/W - DD) • Institutional and governance responses to resolve traps of violence Discussion points: • Does law – and soft law – matter? What is the role of soft law? Clarity vs. “declatority” • Institutional and governance requirements for ending violence and achieving development

  3. Structure and argument • Right to peace and development – what is at stake? Traps of violence as underrated in analysing conditions for development • To argue this – some conceptual discussion – what is peace? • And some references to Human Rights Law – about violence/development • We rely on new definitions/evidence of changes in the conduct of war to argue that “new types of war” (violence) trap development • We keep in mind the HR/peace paradox – violence may be legitimate and legal

  4. Structure and argument • We turn to our main issue: Peace and development - what is causing what? Si vis pacem, cole justitiam Si vis justum, cole pacem, our focus • Central here is a critique of structural violence (development requires absence of structural violence!)….. • Hence, traps of violence constrain development • Some empirical evidence? Selected evidence, explanation and theories (causal mechanisms) from the literature • So what? How to solve the problem that traps of violence and constrain development? Institutional reforms to resolve development deficiencies • And certainly also governance responses – e.g. power-sharing models of governance

  5. What is peace? • Peace as absent of war (negative peace), but more • Building the conditions for peace to sustain peace after violence/war (positive peace) • Social and economic conditions – social justice as positive peace • Peace as a process – ways and mechanism to resolve conflicts and transform factors and conditions that cause war

  6. Human rights law some reference and definitions • The Declaration on the right of peoples to peace (12/11/1984): • the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, • abandoning the use of force in international relations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means • Declaration on a Culture of Peace (13/9/1999: GA): We are “recognizing that peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation”

  7. Ref to Human Rights (Soft) Law • UDHR (1948): Preamble • “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” • Article 28: “Every one is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized” • Article 30: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein”

  8. Human Rights (Soft) Law • Preamble of the Declaration on the Right to Development: “international peace and security are essential elements for the realization of the right to development”. Peace dividend – go to “comprehensive development” • Draft Declaration on the RtPeace Article 9: “All peoples have the right to the elimination of obstacles to the realization of the right to development, such as the servicing of unjust and unsustainable foreign debt burdens and their conditionalities or the maintenance of an unfair international economic order that generates poverty and social exclusion” Implicit: development – precondition for the realization of the right to peace

  9. New definitions of war – and peace? • Traditionally: international law in defining war as international war (The UN Charter, the Geneva conventions) • New wars: Internal, domestic, “civil”: Former Fed Rep of Yugoslavia (140’/4 mill IDPs), Rwanda (800’), Angola (350’), Liberia (150’), Kenya (1.300), Iraq (500?) • Fighting «amongst the people: The people in the cities, towns, streets and their houses … can be on the battlefield” (Rupert Smith) • War conditioned by state breakdown, state failure • Privatisation, non-state actors, asymmetric • The RtP – both levels (internal/international)?

  10. New definitions of war Broaden the definition of war – and peace - to capture variation and new trends: • Inter-state war • Colonial war • Guerrilla war • Civil war • Tribal/ethnic/clan • Terrorism

  11. The human rights - peace paradoxes • The Preamble of the UDHR: “Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations…..” “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law…..” • All peace declaration in the UN – international peace, while the majority of wars are domestic! • Building peace with non-peaceful means: just wars and humanitarian intervention, based on human rights? • Acceptable under chapter 7 – self defence, threat to international peace A realism/idealism dichotomy (IR): Violence/non-violence

  12. The issue: What is causing what?“Si vis pacem, cole justitiam” • The League of Nations, 1919: • the League (….) has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice • ILO – 1919: Sécheron, Lake Geneva • 1969: Nobel Peace Price in reward for its work for improving peace among classes and pursuing justice for workers • The foundation stone

  13. The alternative – Si vis justum, cole pacem Traps of violence – poverty is trapped by violence; Peace first, then development Assumes that violence: • linked to weak institutions • clientlist politics • governance structures that give scope for ‘calculated violence of neglect “the deliberate failure of government and state officials to carry out their duties in order to benefit from the ensuing disorder and distress”

  14. The notion of structural violence • Johan Galtung, PRIO: Structural violence (1969) • Structural violence is “violence”/oppression “built into” social structures, institutions, ideologies and histories” • the nature of social structures, cultural traditions, customs, the way institutions function represent denial of rights and obstacles to people’s needs • Hence, direct and indirect forms of violence – undermines development

  15. The notion of structural violence Article 2.7 of the Draft Declaration encompasses this assumption: “Mechanisms should be developed and strengthened to eliminate inequality, exclusion and poverty, as they generate structural violence, which is incompatible with peace Development research – refer to some of the same phenomena as traps of poverty (Chronic Poverty Institute/Report) • Chronic poverty is defined aspoverty that people suffer over an extended period of time. • Five poverty traps, or development failures that represent structures and institutional practices that cause poverty

  16. Traps of poverty Five poverty traps • Insecurity incl. crime and insecure environments • Lack of effective citizenship • Disproportionally affects people living in remote areas with vulnerable or scarce living resources • Social discrimination and exclusion • Lack work opportunities, and access to income

  17. Traps of poverty as structural violence Why are poverty traps structural violence? • Resources and knowledge exist to tackle and eradicate chronic poverty How can structural violence be abolished? • Requires reforms of national and international policies, and institutional transformations • Policies and institutions are not unchangeable; they are social constructs and possible to alter Structural violence not primarily legal or physical violence but social constraint on people’s capabilities and functioning

  18. Traps of violence as obstructing development More analytic focus needed on TV • How is insecurity, violence and un-peaceful environments distorting development • Chronic Poverty Report (2008-9), 19 out the 32 countries classified as chronically poor had experienced major violent conflicts since 1970 TV is mainly suggesting greed causes of war • The protracted violence in Congo • Nigeria, Boko Haram • Powerful interests manufacturing violence - warlords, local and political elites, urban criminal gangs in pursuit of wealth and power

  19. Traps of violence: Explanation and causal mechanisms (and theories) • Disorder an instrument if power and control • Governance structures not robust to handle internal chocks • Types of violence (vigilante or gang hostility) are interrelated: election violence - ethnic conflict • Organized violence - repeated cycles; civil wars recurs, election violence • Development is obstructed – nested circles of unresolved violent conflicts

  20. Traps of violence: Explanation and causal mechanisms (and theories) Cox, North and Weingast argue that traps of violence undergird most of the economic poverty traps that much of the literature has focussed on • Violent conflict is endemic and highly common in the developing world, including the richer developing countries • The violence trap correlated with lack of appropriate incentives to avoid conflict • costs of domestic conflict for ruling elites are too low • costs of violent domestic conflict for conflict entrepreneurs need to be ‘raised’, and the ability to access arms held by domestic elites reduced

  21. Traps of violence: Explanation and causal mechanisms (and theories) Brozka and Croll (2005) • “It seems unlikely that the MDGs can be reached unless issues of security and conflict are brought into the diagnosis of the obstacles hindering their attainment” • Violent conflict distorts development by destructing transportation infrastructure (and prevent local markets from operating) • Constrains effective use of funds to the health and education • Civil wars spill over into neighbouring countries

  22. Traps of violence: Explanation and causal mechanisms (and theories) Goodhand (2003) • causal linkages (Violence/development) important because of policy implications • increasingly accepted that violent conflict is a driver of chronic poverty • the reverse relationship - chronic poverty causes conflict – much more contentious • Long-term conflict is a maintainer of chronic poverty • chronically poor are generally less likely to engage in violent conflict Kenya in early 2008 as case? National and local political leaders’“greed” for power, was intertwined with “grievance”-led claims about land grabbing by local farmers on the ground

  23. Traps of violence: Explanation and causal mechanisms (and theories) Civil wars have structural effects on economies and development • Collier – this happens through five mechanisms: • destruction of resources • disruption of social order • diversion of public expenditure • lack of domestic saving for investment • and the shifting of values and assets out of the country • Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda • “peace and good governance as core elements of well-being, not an optional extra”

  24. Explanation and causal mechanisms: Summary Three theories • grievance theory – common in the development (and aid) discourse • greed theory • third position: ‘cost of conflict’ perspective The analytical task • acknowledge that the particular direction the arrow point and the theoretical approach relies on context

  25. Institutional deficiencies Two general insights: • Structural violence as ‘social imperfections’ • are socially constructed • result from the use or misuse of power • the functioning of institutions and legislation that were supposed to correct them • Countries with high levels of violence, and weak institutional legitimacy • lack governance and institutional capacity to resolve serious and violent conflicts

  26. Institutional reforms as remedy - difficult Three key reasons why institutional reforms are difficult (World Bank): • Lack of trust among elites, and people lack trust in state institutions • Agreements easily broken because elites and groups loosing power and benefits are uncertain • Country going through institutional transformation may face security threats that disturbs the process of institutional reform

  27. Institutional reformsResponses to institutional weakness Three basic obstacles need to be managed: • Restore confidence and trust in institutions and social relations • Institutions that contribute to citizens’ security, justice and job creation given resources • Govern external ‘stresses’ (economic and security) need to be governed

  28. Governance responsese.g. power-sharing to end violence/war, and build positive peace Key features: • Include parties to a violent conflict in power-sharing arrangements: Coalitions (SA, Kenya), federal institutions ( Ethiopia, Nepal) and proportional allocation of government positions (SA) • Integrate the “spoilers”, conflict entrepreneurs • End impunity? • Exit opportunities for “spoilers”? • Increase costs of conflict • Ability to delivery of institutional and political reforms and material results Cases: South Africa, Kenya

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