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GEORGE BUSH AND THE WAR ON TERROR

GEORGE BUSH AND THE WAR ON TERROR. READING. Smith, Talons , ch. 10 DFC, chs. 1, 3 . ENDING THE DECADE OF UNCERTAINTY (1990-2001). Change of administration Change of party Change of context: 9/11. PHASE 1: INITIAL ORIENTATIONS High level of presidential interest

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GEORGE BUSH AND THE WAR ON TERROR

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  1. GEORGE BUSH AND THE WAR ON TERROR

  2. READING • Smith, Talons, ch. 10 • DFC, chs. 1, 3

  3. ENDING THE DECADE OF UNCERTAINTY (1990-2001) • Change of administration • Change of party • Change of context: 9/11

  4. PHASE 1: INITIAL ORIENTATIONS High level of presidential interest Relationship with Mexico (and Vicente Fox) Near-agreement on immigration reform Support for FTAA Composition of administrative team Isolation of Cuba

  5. PHASE 2: 9/11 AND THE AMERICAS • Change in regional priorities • Unilateralist impulses • End of wholesale immigration reform • Stamp-collecting • PHASE 3: DUAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS • FTAs with Chile, CAFTA, Peru, Colombia (?) • Steel tariffs and farm bill • Dualism: “Intermestic”politics plus the war on terror

  6. UNLEASHING WAR:CHRONOLOGY • September 11, 2001: attacks on U.S. • September 20, 2001: Bush speech • October 7, 2001: bombardments in Afghanistan • March 2003: invasion of Iraq

  7. WAR ON TERROR:THE RULES OF THE GAME • Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. • Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. • There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. • Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. • Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

  8. U.S. LOSS OF “SOFT POWER”

  9. U.S. PRESTIGE IN LATIN AMERICA

  10. CHANGING VIEWS OF U.S. IN LATIN AMERICA • Distaste for Abu Ghraib, Haditha, “collateral damage” and loss of life • Solidarity with innocent civilians, hidden admiration for Osama bin Laden • Rejection of American society, not just U.S. foreign policy • Resentment of Bush unilateral approach • Distrust of democratic crusade

  11. DUAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS: • CRISIS MANAGEMENT (SIC) • Argentina (December 2001) • Venezuela (April 2002) • Bolivia (October 2003) • Haiti (February-March 2004)

  12. THE PATTERN • Insufficient attention • Blame incumbents for their problems, especially • if unpopular within Bush circles • No preventive action • Deny involvement • Recognize successor • Result: What about democracy?

  13. MARCH 2007 • Week-long presidential trip • Friendly locations: Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico • Goals: reassert American hegemony, proclaim concern for “social justice,” counter influence of opponents • Sidebar: ethanol agreement with Brazil • General view: “too little, too late”

  14. GWB and Latin America: Historical and Comparative Perspective _________Latin America as Priority___________ ______ Low _______ _______ High _____ Operational Mode for U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic imposition intervention (Bush 2001-09) (Reagan 1981-89) _______ _________________ __________________ Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral low-level high-level diplomacy engagement (Clinton 1993-2000) (Kennedy 1961-63) ____________________________________________________________

  15. WHAT COULD LATIN AMERICA DO?

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