International climate negotiations: new issues for African countries

1. International climate negotiations: new issues for African countries Regional Development Briefing No.4 Ouagadougou, 1–2 November 2010 Celia Gautier, Mission leader, Public Policy and International Relations, GRET gautier@gret.org

2. Plan Introduction: Climate change and vulnerability in Africa State of play of negotiations before Cancun (COP16) • Cancun, year 1 after Copenhagen • From Copenhagen to Cancun • Cancun: getting negotiations back on track The major negotiation issues for Africa • Emission reductions in the North and reduction actions in the South • REDD+ • Finance (fast start and long term) • Adaptation • The inclusion of agriculture in the countries of the South • Transfer of technologies • Capacity reinforcement

3. Introduction

4. The effects of climate change in Africa One of the most vulnerable continents • Yet responsible for only 4% of world greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs) => climate justice • Major destructive effects (Giec 2007, Boko et al. 2007, Collier et al. 2008, Müller 2009, UNCCD et al. 2009) • Greater frequency of extreme climate events, increased variability • Lower agricultural yield • Increased risk of food insecurity • Increase in the number of people in danger of water stress (reduced availability of water resources) • Increased risk of exposure to malaria • Rising sea levels => coastal erosion, severe impact on mangroves and fishing resources and increased risk of flooding • Deforestation, degradation of woodlands • Agriculture in Africa: coping with the challenges of climate change and food security

5. Source: Pnud 2005

6. International negotiations before the Cancun conference

7. Cancun: Year 1 after Copenhagen Copenhagen agreement • Political declaration, not legally binding, outside of the United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate (UNFAC) • Bottom-up approach: Gap between the recommendations of science (from -25% to -40% by 2020) and the reduction announcements of the developed countries: +3°C instead of +2°C • Promises of finance by the developed countries: • 30 billion $US for fast start finance over 2010–2012, particularly for the most vulnerable countries. • Then 100 billion $US by 2020 • Signed by the African countries, despite promises of finance lower than the demands of the African Group in Copenhagen

8. From Copenhagen (COP15) to Cancun (COP16) Heavy going negotiations, with some incremental progress at the Tianjin session (early October) • … but refusing to come to a worldwide, fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement in Cancun. Legal format of future agreement still uncertain: • Majority of countries: a binding world-wide agreement in the framework of the Convention (AWG-LCA) • But also a second commitment period in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Guarantee for Highly Indebted Countries. EU now prepared to consider a 2nd commitment period of the Protocol (without the USA) if worldwide agreement continues to be the end goal • Issue: to emerge from the impasse on the legal format of the future agreement

9. Cancun: putting the negotiations back on track Expectations for Cancun considerably reduced in comparison with Copenhagen: • restoring trust between the countries, sending a positive signal Adopting a “balanced package” of decisions • The essential components of a “balanced package” • Decisions by the COP on emissions reduction, adaptation, funding, technology, and capacity upgrading • A declaration on the end goal of a legally-binding agreement • A working plan to achieve that objective • A decision by COP/MOP to underline the pursuit of the Kyoto Protocol on a second commitment period But how is balance to be achieved? • The countries must discuss their vision of the “package” and the ways in which it balances the various issues.

10. African position in Cancun In Copenhagen: a common position for Africa In Cancun, it should not seek to distinguish itself from the Copenhagen position (president of the CAU) • … with a lower aim: to achieve the sector-focused objectives in Cancun before the final stage of COP17 in South Africa which should herald an agreement.

11. The priority negotiation issues for the African countries

12. Emissions reduction Reduction of emissions in the developed countries: 75 countries committed to cut their GHG emissions by 2020 • Promises not enough to stay below the 2°C bar • Unsatisfactory signal sent to the developing countries • The developing countries also need an assurance that these promises will be kept through national policies and plans (e.g. the case of the United States) • Africa Group: the approach adopted by the Convention should raise the ambitions of the countries listed in Attachment I which do not form part of the Kyoto protocol NAMAs: • MRV of the actions funded by the countries of the North • MRV of funding

13. REDD+ In Africa Deforestation: 12–17% of emissions Copenhagen Accord • REDD+ important: providing motivation for action and mobilising resources • France and the UK: 20% of up-front funding for REDD+ • More intensive discussions before signing the accord • Some points need clarification (safeguards) Issues • MRV • Strengthening capacities • Decision possible at COP16 but its substance depends on progress being made in other areas (funding) A decision at COP if decisions are taken on other measures Parallel initiatives and discussions: • E.g.: The REDD+, UN-REDD, FCPF partnership

14. Fast start funding (1) Essential for: • re-establishing a climate of trust after the Copenhagen debacle • laying the foundations for the financial climate architecture post-2012. Debate: recognition of the value of the Copenhagen Accord by the HICs  payment of finance by the developed countries • Is a decision from the COP on fast starts in Cancun necessary so that everybody recognises them and payments are actually made? Additionality in relation to the aims of Public Development Aid • In reality: very little extra new money, much APD recycling • Climate change is giving rise to new needs! Development is likely to be +40% more expensive (Fankhauser & Schmidt-Traub, 2010) • EU, differing definitions of additionality!

15. Fast start funding (2) Priority use in the poorest and most vulnerable countries (e.g. Copenhagen Accord) • PANA: existing finance (181 million $) insufficient to cover implementation (2 billion $) • However, use seems greatest in the emerging and mid-level income countries • A very small proportion currently returned to Africa A balance between emissions reduction / adaptation • Copenhagen Accord: “balanced” allocation • In reality, the developed countries are more inclined to fund emissions reduction (70% for the EU) than adaptation In the most at-risk countries: • Give public funding precedence over private funding • Give gifts precedence over loans: • Very few countries have declared the loans/gifts split • Loans are seldom used to support adaptation and capacity strengthening actions

16. Fast start funding (3) Funding governance: ensure a balance between donor countries and receiver countries • E.g.: Fund for the Adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol • Allocation of funds to national bodies rather than international agencies • Direct, full and effective participation of the communities responsible for the governance of the funds Crucial need for transparency (e.g. EU Council) • regarding sources, distribution channels, disbursements, geographical distribution, the gifts/loans proportions, activities funded • Authorise the COP (the Climate Conventions decision-making body) to define common criteria on the use and accounting of fast start funding and prepare annual contribution analysis reports?

17. Long-term funding • Africa will need finance over a longer period of time than other regions • Copenhagen Accord: creation of a “Green Fund” containing $100 billion by 2020 • Signed by the African countries as a minimum, but not to prejudice the actual sum they require • Africa Group and LDC Group: • 1.5% of the GDP of the developed countries by 2020, i.e. around $ 600 billion per year (2008 GDP) • Total needs as net North-South transfers (UNFCCC): $425 billion per year by 2030 • In Cancun: probable decision by the COP to create the Fund, while the terms and conditions governing its implementation will still require definition.

18. Adaptation (1) Adaptation of agriculture in Africa essential, both in terms of urgent actions and in-depth transformations in the longer term • Falling productivity, falling income, rising instability => increased vulnerability, risk of increased food and nutritional insecurity • Role of family farms => They must be able to develop while remaining aware of the permanent need for adaptation • Estimated cost of agricultural adaptation in the developing countries: $2.5–2.6 billion per year between 2010 and 2050 (World Bank) Exhaustive text in Copenhagen Africa Group and other countries call for the establishment of a committee on adaptation • Provision of technical support for the implementation of adaptation actions

19. Adaptation (2) Funding issues: • Fund the PANAs (urgent actions) • Funding to be multi-year, stable and reliable in the longer term • Gifts for the most part, not loans • Public money in the main, not via the carbon market Coordinate existing efforts and multiply them • Initiatives before and after the Copenhagen debacle, often on a “project” basis • Don’t expect negotiation, but be proactive • Need for a coordinating role for the UNFCCC • Regarding the institutional tool: consensus on the need to reinforce and set up national institutions on adaptation • Monitor funding and actions implemented, or just funding to identity the lacunae?

20. Including developing country agriculture (1) A major issue in terms of adaptation • 96% of African agriculture is rain-dependent Also an issue in terms of reduction • 13.5% of global GHG emissions in 2004 (Giec)  potentiel to reduce this to 5 to 6 gigatonnes of CO2eq by 2030 But excludes negotiations until mid-2009 • A new approach, uncertainties • Incorporated into the discussions in the framework of the Convention in November 2009 • Significant progress in Copenhagen, no decision by the COP Negotiation issue: • Include agriculture in the countries of the South in a worldwide agreement on climate to facilitate a change in agrarian systems to a “climate smart” agriculture which takes account of agricultural system diversity.

21. Including developing country agriculture(2) • As with other matters, a COP decision depends on the global “package” • If agriculture is included, “climate” funding must take account of the specific features of agriculture in the developing countries • Carbon market: risks. Rather: find out more about the possibility of reduction, reinforce, develop and publicise techniques available to family farming via public funding.

22. Technology transfer In Copenhagen: • Intensive negotiations, close to a decision to set up a mechanism for technology (with an executive committee and a Technology Centre) • Copenhagen Accord: importance of technology recognised and creation of a Mechanism, with no further detail on implementation Decision in Cancun by the COP to set up a technology mechanism? • Possible, but it depends on other matters (funding, for example) Matters pending: • Links between a technology mechanism – finance mechanism (since negotiated separately) • Intellectual property rights • How to tackle non-financial aspects (adequate governance)? How to tackle the capacity reinforcement issues? • Emissions reduction technology / adaptation technologies

23. Capacity reinforcement Essential for the most at-risk countries and crucial to free up negotiations Requests lodged by certain countries (LDCs, Africa Group) to create a framework devoted to capacity reinforcement with special funding. Discussions in Tianjin: • Institutional tool (new institutions?) • Performance indicators: not yet developed, project approach preferred Re: the Declaration by the Forum for the Development of Africa (Addis-Ababa 10–15 October 2010) Probable mention of capacity reinforcement at Cancun (in an entirely separate decision?)

24. Conclusion Questions about the effectiveness of the multilateral system. • We already know that the UNO negotiations are bound to be very slow Parallel initiatives which take precedence • E.g.: Partnership between REDD+ (Participation of participants, safeguards, transparent, rights of indigenous peoples) And which are added to the Convention But the multilateral framework remains essential to give a voice to those who have no other channel of expression

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