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Regulatory Vulnerability and Institutional Resolution of Environmental Degradation Resulting in Poverty in China Dr. Dej

Regulatory Vulnerability and Institutional Resolution of Environmental Degradation Resulting in Poverty in China Dr. Dejin Gu Assistant Professor of Law Sun Yat-sen University November 10-15,2008.Mexico City. Table of Content. 1 Introduction 2 Centralization of Environmental Legislation

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Regulatory Vulnerability and Institutional Resolution of Environmental Degradation Resulting in Poverty in China Dr. Dej

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  1. Regulatory Vulnerability and Institutional Resolution of Environmental Degradation Resulting in Poverty in China Dr. Dejin Gu Assistant Professor of Law Sun Yat-sen University November 10-15,2008.Mexico City

  2. Table of Content 1 Introduction 2 Centralization of Environmental Legislation 3 Decentralization of Environmental Implementation and Enforcement 4 Conclusion

  3. 1 Introduction 1.1 During the 1990s, the Chinese economy grew at the rate of 9.5 percent per year 1.2 several dozens of environmental laws and regulations have enacted in China since 1979, when Environmental Protection Law (Trial) was promulgated 1.3 Mounting environmental crisis: citizens’ health, and poverty because of unaffordable medical care and degradation of crucial environment, which undermines the performance of economy.

  4. 1.4 vulnerable institution of implementation and enforcement is undermining the effectiveness of environmental legislation 1.5 unharmonious relationship: central government vs. provincial and local governments responsible for implementation and enforcement 1.6 unmatchable centralization of legislation vs. decentralization of implementation and enforcement

  5. 2 Centralization of Environmental Legislation 2.1 Legislative Authority NPC and its Standing Committee A. Environmental Protection Law (Trial) 1979; B. Environmental Protection Law 1989; C. Law on Appraising of Environment Impacts 2002; D. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 1984 (Amended in 1996 and 2008); E. Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 1987 (Amended in 1995 and 2000);

  6. F. Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes 1995 (Amended in 2004); G. Law on Prevention and Control of Pollution From Environmental Noise 1996; H. Law on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution 2003 I. Marine Environment Protection Law 1982 (Amended in 1999).

  7. 2.2 Quasi-Legislative Authority of State Council Enacting Regulations to implement environmental legislation enact by NPC and its Standing Committee 2.3 Minister of Environmental Protection (MEP) Enacting Administrative Rules to implement legislation, administrative regulations, and decisions or orders of the State Council

  8. 2.4 Legislative and Quasi-Legislative Authority of Provincial and Local Governments To implement legislation or administrative regulation, or meeting the requirement of local concerns for which no legislation or regulation enacted Chat I Structure of legislature and its authority (Next Slide)

  9. 2.5 Institutional Limitation of Centralized Environmental Legislation A. The purpose of local legislation is limited to implementing national environmental legislations, which prevents local governments from designing creative regulatory schemes. B. The local governments always do not exercise their legislative authority actively because of economic priority. C. The limited number of local legislations only show the symbolic willingness of local governments to implement the national environmental legislations which not always result in actual implementing action.

  10. 3 Decentralization of Environmental Implementation and Enforcement MEP State Council EPB Provincial and Autonomous Region Municipality Directed Under the State Council Prefecture-level Municipality EPB EPB District County- Level City County District County

  11. 3.1 Authorities allocated Implementation and of enforcement A. MEP conducts unified supervision of environmental protection, and enforces legislation throughout the country. B. Provincial, municipal and county (or district) EPBs have the same administrative authority within their respective territories. C. Because of only about 2300 staffs working for MEP (compared to 17,000 U.S. EPA), the enforcement mainly depends on the provincial and local EPBs.

  12. 3.2 Incapacity of Meeting Legislative Goal A. Provincial and local governments favor economic growth over environmental quality and health of residents. B. Local revenue also depends on the polluting industries. C. Provincial and local EPBs are controlled by respective governments in terms of budget and personnel management.

  13. 4 Conclusion 4.1 Strengthening Supervision of MEP 4.2 Verticalization of Local EPBs 4.3 Enhancing the Role of Court 4.4 Reforming Policies Restraining NGOs Chat III Proposed Framework of Environmental Governance (Next Slide)

  14. Government Court Public (NGO) Industry

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