RFID SECURITY

1. RFID SECURITY

2. How Does RFID Work? 02.3DFEX4.78AF51 EasyToll card #816 Radio signal (contactless) Range: from 3-5 inches to 3 yards Tags (transponders) Attached to objects, call out their (unique) name and/or static data on a special radio frequency Reader (transceiver) Reads data off the tags without direct contact Database Matches tag IDs to physical objects

3. Asymmetric channels Range of Reader (Forward Channel) ~100 m READER TAG EAVESDROPPER ~5 m Tag’s Range (Backward Channel)

4. Applications • Tracking/Identification • Library Books • Children • Pets • Auto Parts • Inventory management in a Supply Chain • Contactless Smart Cards

5. Retailers Wholesalers Manufacturers Supply web (retail customers not shown) Suppliers goods, invoices Purchase orders, payments A Generic Supply Chain

6. Key Decisions • When to order • How much to order • As order quantity increases, holding cost increases • As order quantity decreases, stockout cost increases • From whom to order

7. The Problem - Motivation • Basic problem with RFID tags • Can be remotely scanned • Respond to query by any reader • This leads to security and privacy risk • Resource constraints • Limited power and computing resources • Hence classical cryptographic mechanisms not feasible • The RFID security challenge • How to obtain maximum security with almost no resources?

8. The Problems of Privacy and Security • RFID privacy concerns the problem of misbehaving readers harvesting information from well-behaving tags. Risks : • Leakage of personal information (prescriptions, brand/size of clothes etc.). • Location privacy: Tracking the physical location of individuals by their RFID tags. • RFID authentication concerns the problem of well behaving readers receiving information from misbehaving tags, particularly counterfeit ones. Risks: • Forgery • Sabotage

9. Cost and capability • The strength and flavor of proposed security solutions will depend on the allowed tag cost for different applications • 50+ cent tags. Low-end tags will be 10 cent, 5 cent and 2 cent in about 5 years

10. Challenge • Tens of research ideas have been proposed in the past two years • Propose improvements over the existing privacy enhancing protocols for the extremely resource constrained RFID systems

11. Security Attacks • Spoofing • Imitating the behavior of a genuine tag • Denial of Service • Man in the middle attack • Modify the response of the tag to the reader or vice versa • Replay Attack • Eavesdrop message from the tag (reader) & re-transmit the message to the legitimate reader (tag). • Traffic Analysis • Monitoring of comm. between reader & tag allows adversary to perform traffic analysis & generate statistical data.

12. Security and Privacy Requirements • Anonymity • Tag output should not give idea about ID • Untraceability • Tag output should be varying • Indistinguishibility • Tag output should be truly random, i.e. variation should not be predictable • Forward Security • Adversary should not be able to associate the current output with past output • Mutual Authentication • Tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag authentication

13. Backend Requirements • Efficiency and scalability • Order of computation/precomputation required as a function of number of tags • Flexibility • Changes required with addition/removal of tags

14. “Who are you?” metaID key “My real ID is…” Hash Lock [Rivest, Weis, Sharma, Engels] Goal: Authenticate reader to the RFID tag Reader RFID tag Compute hash(key) and compare with stored metaID Stores metaID=hash(key) Stores key; hash(key) for any tag Unique key for each tag

15. Hash Lock Analysis PROS • Relatively cheap to implement : Tag has to store hash function implementation and metaID • Security based on weak collision-resistance of hash function • Scalable due to low key look-up overhead CONS • Constant tag output – enables traceability • Motivates Randomization • Too many messages/rounds • Requires reader to know all keys

16. “Who are you?” R, hash(R,IDk) “You must be IDk” Randomized Hash Lock [Weis et al.] Goal: Authenticate reader to the RFID tag Reader RFID tag Generate random R Compute hash(R,IDi) for every known IDi and compare Stores its own IDk Stores all IDs: ID1, … ,IDn

17. Randomized Hash Lock Analysis PROS • Randomized response prevents tracking • Tag needs to store hash implementation and pseudo-random number generator CONS • Inefficient brute force key look-up • No Forward security • Motivates updating tag ID on each read • Security Flaw - Adversary can impersonate tag by learning a valid tag response.

18. OSK Scheme [Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita] Goal: Enable reader to identify the RFID tag, change tag identifier on each read Database Reader Tag Query Ai=G(Si) Ai=G(Si) Compute Hash Chain Si+1=H(Si) Tag ID

19. OSK Analysis PROS • Different random like values on every read operation prevents tracking • Forward Security ensured due to one way hash property • Tag needs to store only 2 hash implementations, hence low cost • Minimal number of transmissions CONS • Not scalable for large scale applications due to brute force search • Motivates reducing computation time at reader/backend • Susceptible to DoS attacks • May lead to problem due to hash collisions.

20. Summary • RFIDs have many useful applications related to tracking and identification • But there are some important issues of security and privacy • Small number of gates for S/P makes the design of such protocols challenging • Tens of schemes proposed for security/privacy but subtle drawbacks with many of them. Much more work needed in this area