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Water conflicten in een globale context Onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! Pieter van der Zaag

Water conflicten in een globale context Onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! Pieter van der Zaag 13 November 2010. Water conflict. between the haves and the have-nots - 0.9 billion without clean water; 2.6 billion without basic sanitation

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Water conflicten in een globale context Onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! Pieter van der Zaag

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  1. Water conflicten in een globale context Onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! Pieter van der Zaag 13 November 2010

  2. Water conflict • between the haves and the have-nots- 0.9 billion without clean water; 2.6 billion without basic sanitation • between water users within the same sector - e.g. irrigators • between different sectors- agriculturalists vs. pastoralists - urban water supply vs. irrigators - distant energy consumers vs. riparian communities • between hydrological units - inter-basin water transfers • between different social/political entities - the transboundary dimension • at the global scale - e.g. the current land & water grab in Africa

  3. photo: Eric Baran Water conflict Cochabamba - Bolivia Scheldt estuary - Netherlands/Belgium Mekong Omo river basin (Ethiopia) and Lake Turkana (Kenya) Manantali dam - Senegal river

  4. Overview • The water asymmetry • Water allocation – local and national practices • Water allocation in transboundary river basins • Towards “water rationality” • benefit sharing • payment for environmental services • issue linking • Water conflict or cooperation? • Concluding remarks

  5. 1. The water asymmetry up down

  6. 2. Water allocation – local and national practices • Different historical regimes: • Local (“customary”) water sharing arrangements; principles of fairness, equity, respect for the environment, respecting hydraulic property • Imposed (colonial) national water laws (e.g. riparian system, prior appropriation) • Subsequently: comprehensive water sectors reforms

  7. 2. Water allocation – local and national practices • Emerging consensus: • Access to water is widely considered a human right • Environment is a legitimate water user • Transboundary commitments are recognised • Permits for non-primary (= economic) uses • Equitable (proportional) allocation

  8. 3. Water allocation in transboundary river basins Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (ILA, 1966) UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN, 1997)

  9. 3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5) ‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1) No significant harm(Article 7) ‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1) (borrowed from Helsinki Rules) (new)

  10. 3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5) ‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1) No significant harm(Article 7) ‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1) Consistent with the Rio Declaration (1992): “States have … the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States” (new)

  11. 3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins Watercourses Convention (1997) UN General Assembly vote (May 1997) For: 104 countries Against: 3 countries Abstained: 27 countries Absent: 33 countries

  12. 3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins • Watercourses Convention (1997) • The formulation of the two principles regulating the use of international water resources appears to be: • the best possible compromise between two opposing interests: • the right to development • and • defending existing uses • consistent with the Rio Declaration (1992)

  13. 3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins BUT: The Convention is not (yet) in force!* As of October 2010, the 1997 UN Convention had been ratified, or acceded to, by only 20 countries: Finland, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunesia and Uzbekistan. (NB: Countries in italics did not vote in favour of the UN Convention, yet ratified it.) Source: http://treaties.un.org; look for Status of Treaties, then Chapter XXVII Environment; then entry no. 12 * 35 countries need to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, the Convention before it comes into force.

  14. 4. Towards “water rationality” * Principles of equity and fairness, without causing significant harm imply that water users have to respect the needs of other users. Thus, users will have to (be willing to) forego some potential (and immediate) water benefits. Why would water users voluntarily accept to forego immediate benefits? Is it rational to cooperate?? * Alam, 1998

  15. 4. Towards “water rationality” * up Is it rational to cooperate?? down * Alam, 1998

  16. 4. Towards “water rationality” * • If water users acknowledge that they depend on each other, • not only in terms of water but also otherwise • not only now but also in future • it may be rational for them to cooperate and forego some immediate benefits. • Even for upstream users/countries • Even in cases where power-differences are large • Strategy: • make explicit the existing interdependencies between parties • actively seek to increase mutual dependencies * Alam, 1998

  17. 4. Towards “water rationality” * • If water users acknowledge that they depend on each other, • not only in terms of water but also otherwise • not only now but also in future • it may be rational for them to cooperate and forego some immediate benefits • even for upstream users/countries • even in cases where power-differences are large • Strategy: • make explicit the existing interdependencies between parties • actively seek to increase mutual dependencies • Examples: • Benefit sharing - joint infrastructure development • Payment for Environmental Services • Issue linking - beyond the basin, beyond water * Alam, 1998

  18. 4. Towards “water rationality” 1. Benefit sharing

  19. 4. Towards “water rationality” 1. Benefit sharing Joint infrastructure development!

  20. 4. Towards “water rationality” 1. Benefit sharing Joint infrastructure development!

  21. 4. Towards “water rationality” Kariba dam - Zambezi river 1. Benefit sharing Joint infrastructure development! Khatse dam - Orange river Maguga dam - Incomati river Manantali dam - Senegal river

  22. 4. Towards “water rationality” Kariba dam - Zambezi river 1. Benefit sharing Joint infrastructure development! Khatse dam - Orange river Maguga dam - Incomati river Manantali dam - Senegal river

  23. 4. Towards “water rationality” Kariba dam - Zambezi river 1. Benefit sharing Joint infrastructure development! Khatse dam - Orange river • Technically complex and data intensive • Pre-supposes a consensus over basic water entitlements • Should encompass all costs and all benefitsacross the entire basin • Requires effective institutions to re-distribute the benefits fairly Maguga dam - Incomati river Manantali dam - Senegal river

  24. 4. Towards “water rationality” 1. Benefit sharing Blue Nile basin

  25. Benefits of transboundary coordination - Blue Nile river basin Source: Goor et al., 2010

  26. 4. Towards “water rationality” 1. Benefit sharing Blue Nile basin • More water for Egypt through reduced evaporation losses (+1 - 2.5 x 109 m3/a) • Increased hydropower in Ethiopia (+1650 %) • Increased irrigation in Sudan (+5.5 %) • Less hydropower from Aswan for Egypt (-9%) • Total basin-wide benefits: ~ 1 - 3 x 109 US$/a Source: Goor et al., 2010

  27. 4. Towards “water rationality” 2. Payment for Environmental Services downstream (blue)water users subsidise upstream (green) water users to promote soil and water conservation measures in order to decrease flood flows and soil erosion

  28. 4. Towards “water rationality” 2. Payment for Environmental Services downstream (blue)water users subsidise upstream (green) water users to promote soil and water conservation measures in order to decrease flood flows and soil erosion Tana river - Kenya Source: ISRIC, 2008

  29. 4. Towards “water rationality” 2. Payment for EnvironmentalServices Requires: - well defined rights to land and water - voluntary transaction - well defined environmental service(unambiguous dose-response relationships) - service providers - service buyers - transparent verification mechanism

  30. 4. Towards “water rationality” 3. Issue linking Scheldt Meuse

  31. 4. Towards “water rationality” 3. Issue linking 1585 - 1800: Dutch close Scheldt for access to the Port of Antwerp 1839: Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of Antwerp (under pressure of London en Paris) 1967 - 1975: Cross-basin issue linkages and the Belgian-Dutch water conventions 1975 - 1985: A total deadlock 1985 - 1992: Laborious negotiations and a breakthrough 1992 - 1995: New linkages and the conclusion of the water conventions 1995 - present: WFD & Negotiations on further deepening of the Western Scheldt Scheldt Meuse Source: Meijerink, 2008

  32. 4. Towards “water rationality” 3. Issue linking - complex - requires a broad approach (space, time, sectors) - may cause delays - but may be the only way of reaching stable and enduring agreements Scheldt Meuse

  33. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? Web of Knowledge database (isiwebofknowledge.com) Source: Gupta and Van der Zaag, 2008

  34. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008

  35. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? • Water may be a cause of conflict • Water may also be a cause for cooperation Source: Wolf et al., 2003

  36. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008

  37. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008

  38. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? • Water may be a cause of conflict • Water may also be a cause for cooperation • Pressure on water is increasing sharply and rapidly: • economic growth and diets (e.g. meat) • biofuels require water • other impacts of global and climatic changes • land grab is also a water grab

  39. 5. Water conflict or cooperation? • Water may be a cause of conflict • Water may also be a cause for cooperation • What can we, as scientists, professionals and educators, do? • We can, and should, promote awareness of the cooperation potential of water

  40. Water may be a cause of conflict • Water may also be a cause for cooperation “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed” Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution, November 1945

  41. 6. Concluding remarks Peaceful cooperation between riparians is possible! This requires an appreciation of: • the entire river system; • our own aspirations with respect to the river; • how we are tied to, and depend on, neighbouring riparians; • the aspirations and perspectives of neighbouring users; • the benefits of cooperation, data sharing and joint infrastructure development; • training at river basin scale to build a new generation of water professionals who adopt a basin perspective.

  42. References Dombrowsky, I., 2010. The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts. Water International 35(2): 132-149. Goor, Q., C. Halleux, Y. Mohamed and A. Tilmant, 2010. Optimal operation of a multipurpose multireservoir system in the Eastern Nile River Basin. Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss. 7: 4331–4369 Grey, D., and C.W. Sadoff, 2007. Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development. Water Policy 9: 545–571 Gupta, J., and P. van der Zaag, 2009. The politics of water science: On unresolved water problems and biased research agendas. Global Environmental Politics 9(2): 14-24. Meijerink, S., 2008. Explaining continuity and change in international policies: issue linkage, venue change, and learning on policies for the river Scheldt estuary 1967-2005. Environment and Planning A 40: 848-866 Sadoff, C.W., and D. Grey, 2002. Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers. Water Policy 4: 389-403. Van der Zaag, P., 2007. Asymmetry and equity in water resources management; critical governance issues for Southern Africa. Water Resources Management 21 (12): 1993-2004 Wolf, A.T., 1999, Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Natural Resources Forum 23: 3-30 Zeitoun, M., and N. Mirumachi, 2008. Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation. International Environmental Agreements 8: 297–316

  43. Thank you! Useful websites: http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/index.shtml http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/ http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/ www.unesco-ihe.org

  44. Scheldt 1585: Fall of Antwerp against the Spanish 1648: Peace of Münster 1839: Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of Antwerp (under pressure by London en Paris) 1967: Belgium proposes the construction of Baalhoek and Bath canals, allowing greater and faster access to Port of Antwerp 1968: NL link Baalhoek and Bath canals to: water quantity and water quality of the Meuse water quality of the Scheldt 1974: Regionalisation of the Belgian water policy 1975: Package deal: the three draft Belgian-Dutch water conventions on the five issues 1975: Wallonia opposes draft conventions: it would pay while Flandres would benefit 1977: Belgium proposes to discuss deepening of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt 1983: NL links deepening of the Scheldt to the water quality and quantity issues of the Meuse 1985: Belgian and Dutch ministers agree to start simultaneous negotiations on: water quantity and water quality of the Meuse, construction of Baalhoek canal, and deepening of the Western Scheldt (Bath canal and the Meuse reservoirs are removed from the negotiations) 1992: Talks on linking the negotiations to the modernisation of Albert canal; Flanders disagrees. NL considers compensating Wallonia 1992: UN-ECE convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water courses and Intl. Lakes 1992: Belgian regions receive treaty-making competency 1992: Dutch decide to de-link Scheldt- and Meuse issues Source: Meijerink, 2008

  45. Scheldt 1992: Establishment of a multilateral negotiation commission on water quality conventions on Scheldt and Meuse 1992: Establishment of a bilateral Flemish-NL negotiation commission on deepening of the of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt and the distribution of the Meuse water (Flandres diverts Meuse water to Antwerp via Albert Canal) 1993: Both commissions reach agreements on draft conventions 1993: Flandres proposes to link deepening to the negotiations on the alignment of the HSL train 1995: After almost 30 years, all conventions are signed, including an agreement on the HSL 1997?: Flandres requests NL to a further deepening of the navigation channel of the Western Scheldt NL links the further deepening to outstanding HSL issues Environmentalists demand an EIA for the deepening 2000: European Water Framework Directive leads to a new Scheldt Convention in 2002 replacing the 1995 Convention, covering the entire basin (including tributaries) 2001?: Environmentalists consider ontpolderen an adequate compensation measure for loss of ecological values caused by the further deepening of the navigation channel. 2002?: Innovation: “morphological dredging” limits the negative ecological impact of dredging 2003?:Ontpolderen is made part of the agreement to deepen the navigation channel 2005: Agreement over four new Scheldt Conventions 2006: Flemish government approves Scheldt Conventions 2007: Ratification by the Flemish parliament; approval by NL parliament (Tweede Kamer) 2008: Ratification by the NLparliament (Eerste Kamer) 2008: NL MP proposes to drop the requirement of Ontpolderen from the agreement 2009: NL Administrative Court forces the Dutch government to abide by the earlier agreement 2010: ???? Source: Meijerink, 2008

  46. Mekong River Commission Summit, 5 April 2010 5. Water conflict or cooperation? • Water may be a cause of conflict • Water may also be a cause for cooperation Mekong River

  47. 4. Towards “water rationality” 3. Issue linking Pangani river - Tanzania Source: Mul et al., 2010 Source: Komakech et al., submitted

  48. 4. Towards “water rationality” 3. Issue linking Source: Mul et al., 2010 Source: Komakech et al., submitted

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