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The Price of Loyalty: Bundled Discounts and Quasi-Exclusive Discount Structures

The Price of Loyalty: Bundled Discounts and Quasi-Exclusive Discount Structures. Willard K. Tom. ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting Washington, DC April, 2003 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. Raising Rivals’ Costs Basics. Exclusive Dealing to Raise Rivals’ Costs. Excluded Competitor.

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The Price of Loyalty: Bundled Discounts and Quasi-Exclusive Discount Structures

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  1. The Price of Loyalty: Bundled Discounts and Quasi-Exclusive Discount Structures Willard K. Tom ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting Washington, DC April, 2003 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

  2. Raising Rivals’ Costs Basics

  3. Exclusive Dealingto Raise Rivals’ Costs Excluded Competitor Dominant Firm Distributor A Distributor B Distributor C Customers

  4. Tying to Raise Rivals’ Costs Excluded Competitor Seller Bundle Good 2 Good 1 Good 2 Buyer

  5. Some Exclusive Dealing Stories Require Distribution Entry Barriers Excluded competitor Dominant Firm Entry Barriers Block Use of New Distributors Distributor A Distributor B Distributor C customers

  6. Barriers Not Absolute/Raise Cost of Distribution Excluded competitor Dominant Firm More Expensive Distributor D Distributor A Distributor B Distributor C customers

  7. Types of Cost-Raising that Might Confer Power Over Price • Raise Cost of Distribution • Deprive Rival of Economies of Scale • Damage Rival’s Brand (goods with network characteristics) • Prevent Ubiquitous Distribution Needed for Advertising, Promotion, or Complements

  8. Tying Stories May NotRequire Distribution Entry Barriers Excluded Competitor Seller Bundle Good 2 Good 1 Good 2 Buyer

  9. Exclusive Dealing and Tying Through Pricing Structures

  10. Loyalty Discounts to Raise Rivals’ Costs • First six units: $115 • After seven units: $108, starting from first unit

  11. Loyalty Discounts to Raise Rivals’ Costs, cont’d $115 $108 $66 6 7 8

  12. Bundled Discounts: LePage’s v. 3M A B C D E F A Buyer

  13. What En Banc Decision Settles • Plaintiff in bundled discount case need not show that monopolist priced below cost. • Plaintiff need not show that the excluded competitor was equally efficient.

  14. What En Banc DecisionDoesn’t Settle • If it is lawful to beat LePage’s price by very low but above-cost pricing, why should economically equivalent conduct be unlawful? • Robinson-Patman 2(c), (d), (e)?

  15. What En Banc DecisionDoesn’t Settle, cont’d • Presumably this is at most a presumption. How does one rebut? • What if defendant had showed that the price even with all of the discounts allocated to one product was above cost? • Consumers better off allowing conduct: • Monopolist more efficient. • Barriers to re-entry or new entry low. • Should intention not to kill product be relevant?

  16. What En Banc DecisionDoesn’t Settle, cont’d • What constitutes a procompetitive justification? • Transaction cost efficiencies in bundling rather than having a separate discount program for 20,000 products? • Is lowering own cost a justification for raising a rival’s?

  17. JURY

  18. The Price of Loyalty: Bundled Discounts and Quasi-Exclusive Discount Structures Willard K. Tom ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting Washington, DC April, 2003 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

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