The Emerging Global Security Environment

1. The Emerging Global Security Environment Lutes, Bunn, andFlanagan, StrategicChallenges, InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies, 2008.

2. Forecasting the Future • Predictionsbased on linearextrapolations of currenttrendsarepronetoerrorbecausecatalyticeventsmayintervenetothrowthesetrendsdrasticallyoffcourse. • However, thefuture is not completelyunknown. Looking at trendswhileconsideringpotentialinterveningevents is a worthwhileexercise. • Acceleratingandmomentouschangesareexpectedtooccur in theinternationalsystem in thenexttwodecades.

3. Thestrategicenvironment of thenextdecade • There are large-scale trends in the current system but there is strong potential for catalytic events that would suppress or accelerate one or more of these trends. • The next decade will be marked by continued, possibly heightened instability. • The United States will be unequalled in military power, but not unchallenged.

4. Large-scaletrends in the global securityenvironment • Increasingglobalization (withbothbeneficialanddisruptivesideeffects) • Thecontinuedrise of ChinaandIndia • Thequickeningpace of technologicalinnovation • Theacceleratingproliferation of massdisruption/destructiontechnologies • Thegrowingpower/andcapacity of nonstateactorsrelativetonation-states • Thepersistence of corrosiveregional, ethnicandreligiousconflicts • Increasingresourcescarcityandenvironmentdegradation

5. Major trends that affect security • Geostrategic trends • Military-technical trends • Regional trends • Disruptive events

6. 1. Geostrategic trends • Globalization, defined as a dynamicprocess of rapidlygrowing, ifuneven, cross-borderflows of goods, services, money, people, technology, ideas, cultures, values, crime, andweaponsthroughouttheworld, willcontinueto be a dominant influence on theevolvingsecurityorderbydeepeninginterdependenceandempoweringcertainactorswhilealienatingandmarginalizingothers. • Globalization is not bringinggeopoliticsorideologicalstrugglesto an end. Rather, globalization’sinfluencesinteractwithtraditionalregionalandethnicrivalriesandareexacerbatingmanytransnationalthreats.

7. Geostrategic trends • Globalization is an overarching “mega-trend” alteringtheworldeconomic, cultural, andsecuritylandscape, but betweennowandtheend of thenextdecade, volatilitywillincrease as shifts in traditionalpowerstructuresoccur. An expandingandincreasinglyintegrated global economycombinedwith a continuedtechnologicalrevolution, particularly in theareas of informationandbiotechnology, willkicktheforces of globalizationintohighgearoverthenextdecade. This trend bothenables, and is enabledby, theflows of energy, money, people, security, technology, andinformationwithoutregardtointernationalborders. Completelynewsocial, political, andbusinessmodelswillemerge. Thespeedandbreadth of changewilldeterminethepotentialfordisruption, as opposedto an orderly transfer of powerfromtheoldtothenew.

8. Geostrategic trends The “dark side” of globalization, including terrorism and organized crime, will continue to exacerbate regional tensions and transnational threats. Regional power structures are likely to change continuously, as regional conflicts, civil wars, and transnational actors reshape existing norms. Local conflicts and wars wil be commonplace and will always carry the risk of escalation into broader conflicts. As societies either transform or resist change, additional challenges will arise in the form of ethnic and religious extremism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and problems of governance. These challenges will be particularly acute in the geographic “arc of instability” or the “gap” countries that are not well integrated into the world economy.

9. Geostrategic trends Whilethe global economy is growing at an average of about 3 percent a year, thegapbetweentherichestandpoorestcountries is widening. The modern industrialpowerspossess 70 percent of theworld’swealth but haveonly 28 percent of theworld’spopulation. Theirpercapitawealth is fourto seven timesgreater, on average, thanthevastnumber of far poorercountriesthathousenearlythree-quarters of theworld’speople. Most of thegapcountries in sub-SaharanAfrica, theMiddle East, and South Asiaarealsoburdenedwiththetwodemographicfactorsmostcloselyassociatedwiththelikelihood of an outbreak of civilconflict: a highproportion of youngadults (aged 15 to 29 years) and a rapid rate of urban populationgrowth. Additionally, thepotentialforescalationtocatastrophicviolencewillcontinuetorise, as theinternationalcommunityremainsunabletodealeffectivelywiththeincreasingproliferation of weapons of massdestructionandpotentialnewcapabilitieswithcapacityforcatastrophiceffect.

10. Geostrategic trends 2. The United Stateswillcontinuetodominatetheworldstage, but itsgeopoliticalpowermaybegintoerodeoverthenextdecade. ChinaandIndiawillcontinuetheirslow, unevenrise. As theleadingpromoter of democraticpoliticalchangearoundtheworldand as themostimportant engine of economic, cultural, andinformationalglobalization, U.S. actionsandthewayothersreacttothemwill be theleadinginfluence on thelevelsandtypes of instability. As themostcapable global actor, the U.S. militarywill be thedefaultoptionforcopingwithrisinginstability as othertoolsarelikelyto be inadequateorinsufficientlydeveloped. As the United Statesseekstoadvanceits global economicandsecurityinterestsandpromotedemocracy, civilsociety, andtherule of law in thisenvironment, it will be challengedbyinstabilityarisingfromstrains on governance, economicdislocation, andpoliticalconvulsions. Itwillalso be challengedbyradicalideologies – particularlythejihadistvision of riddingtheMuslimworld of Western influence, corruptregimes, andrestoringthecaliphate – anddissentingviews of global order – such as thenotion of “sovereigndemocracy” embracedbyRussia, Chinaandothermembers of theShanghaiCooperationOrganizationwhoseevigorous U.S. promotion of democracyandhumanrights as representingunwarrantedinterference in theinternalaffairs of sovereignstates.

11. Geostrategic trends 3. International partnerships will be increasingly complex and difficult to manage. As a result, coalition building will need to be tailored for each distinct strategic challenge or contingency. Regionally based institutions will be particularly challenged to meet the complex transnational threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Additionally, many allies of the U.S. will be unable to keep pace with U.S. military transformation efforts. Alliances will be very case-dependent. An ally or group of allies that cooperates very closely with the United States in one region might take a neutral (or even opposing) position in another.

12. 2. Military-technical trends The reliance of the United States on advanced technology, precision warfare, and information dominance will be asymmetrically challenged by various regional powers and in substate conflict with the potential for escalation to catastrophic violence.

13. Military-technical trends 1. Substate warfare: As the capacity of nonstate actors to employ power improves, substate warfare will be the most dominant form of conflict through 2020. The flow of weapons technology and knowledge is increasingly out of the control of the international community and individual states. The global jihadist insurgency will continue its struggle over the legitimacy of the existing world order. This transnational insurgency marks the transition of warfare to a “fourth generation” in which the political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War II – and as a result of globalization – offer asymmetric advantages to an unconventional enemy.

14. Military-technical trends Continued instability in the Middle East and Africa will exacerbate the conditions that cause insurgencies, civil war, and ethnic strife. In the meantime, other lower level forms of warfare will distract governments globally. The “five wars of globalization” include fights against the illegal international trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money.

15. Military-technical trends State-on-state warfare: In an increasingly interconnected world, a major regional crisis could reverberate well beyond the affected region or the immediate causes of the conflict. Miscalculation and escalation in one or more regional crises or desperation on the part of rogue state regimes may spark conflict that plunges several military powers, including the United States, into war. Lingering tensions between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and on the Korean Peninsula will continue, and flare-ups into actual fighting, with opportunities for serious escalation, will be a possibility. Additionally, aggressive or destabilizing actions by states such as Iran, North Korea, or Syria could result in unwanted escalation and even,in extreme cases, the use of WMD.

16. Military-technical trends 2. Threats to the U.S. homeland, infrastructure, and deployed forces will continue to grow and diversify, and countering weapons of mass destruction or mass effect will prove increasingly difficult. Strong terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, combined with the ongoing dissemination of know-how for their production and inadequate security over some countries’ existing weapons, increases the risk of a major terrorist attack involving WMD. Of greatest concern is that terrorists might acquire biological agents or a nuclear device, either of which could cause mass casualties. Bioterrorism appears particularly suited to the smaller, better informed groups.

17. Military-technical trends The probability of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists will increase significantly over the next decade as the global nonproliferation regime begins to break down. In response to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, additional states may embark on a nuclear course. Preventive action will become riskier as the possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons by Iran, North Korea, and Syria, and the possible acquisition of such weapons by others (to include nonstate actors), increases the potential costs of any military action by the United States against them or their allies. Overt use of WMD by state actors can likely be deterred, but the risk of transfer of WMD materials to terrorists, either wittingly or unwittingly, increases dramatically as more states gain access to the requisite technologies.

18. Military-technical trends 3. Information is a vital domain in current and future warfare. Technology trends point to potential disruptive advances in cyber operations, and space or directed-energy weapons could seriosly endanger U.S. security. A range of potential adversaries – from “super-empowered individuals” (hackers), to terrorists, to state actors – can be expected to attempt cyber attacks to disrupt critical information networks and, even more likely, to cause physical damage to information systems. Adversaries will also take advantage of the easy flow of information and global media to promote their ideology.

19. Regional Trends Over the next decade, the rising powers of China and India, and perhaps others such as Brazil and Indonesia, may begin to alter traditional power balances in their respective regions. Competition for allegiances will be more open and less fixed than in the recent past. The ranks of fragile, failing, or failed states may grow as a result of economic collapse, resource competition, repressive rule, and failed social infrastructure. Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and many other states in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia will be stressed by growing internal pressures.

20. Regional Trends: Europe Europe will enjoy relative stability, although some lingering tensions – for example, in the Balkans – could erupt into conflict. Worries over future EU expansion (beyond the current 27 members), differences over the EU’s institutional arrangements, as well as social problems and economic stagnation exacerbated by aging, declining populations in most EU countries, will occupy much of Europe’s attention and dilute its policy consensus on defense and foreign policy. Europe will be a less capable and sometimes reticent partner for the United States in managing global challenges. The potential expansion of the EU, especially to include Turkey, will cause fissures among key EU states and, potentially, between certain EU governments and their publics.

21. Regional Trends:Europe Both U.S. And European relations with Turkey remain strained and are at a strategic crossroads. As the Turks have watched the EU raise the bar on integration, NATO equivocate on security commitments during the Iraq war, and both the Kurdistan Workers Party regroup and a Kurdish proto-state be formed in U.S.-occupied northern Iraq, they have begun to hedge their bets and ponder a “Eurasian option”. Turkey’s growing energy dependence on Russia is also creating a corrosive new dynamic. Growing Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism could move Turkish politics away from its pro-Western leanings. Turkey could remain a critical partner in advancing a number of common Euroatlantic interests in Southwest Asia and the greater Middle East, but this will require restoring mutual trust and creating a new framework for relations.

22. Regional Trends:Europe The most significant security threat is the specter of catastrophic terrorism in a major urban area in Europe. The ripple effects could include economic destabilization, ethnic tensions directed against growing Muslim communities in Europe, inward orientation to focus on domestic security matters, and concern about possible U.S. reactions.

23. Regional Trends: Europe Enduring security issues in Europe include the persistence of such transnational problems as increased trafficking in arms, drugs, and humans along its southeast corridors. Unresolved tensions with respect to Kosovo’s final status, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova/Transnistria, and Armenia-Azerbaijan could spark conflict. There are also persistent concerns about Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier and tendency to use energy as an instrument of political intimidation. New and longstanding tensions between Russia and its neighbors – Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and even Belarus, as well as the Baltic states – could have wider implications for European security.

24. Regional Trends: Middle East In the Middle East, expanding Islamist extremism, challenges to governance, and long-held grievances will continue to fuel instability. Three significant and interrelated drivers will continue to play out in the region: ongoing Islamist extremist violence; Israeli-Palestinian tensions; and U.S. policies. Also, Syria could be teetering on the brink of instability that could result in civil war, takeover by Islamist extremists, or outright collapse, all with enormous consequences for stability in the region. Additional instability may also result as populations chafe under unrepresentative regimes. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (with its 25 percent Sunni population governing 75 percent of the population that is Shi’a) are candidates for turmoil.

25. Regional Trends: Middle East The Palestinian Authority’s inability to control extremist violence and the polarization of the leadership struggle between Hamas and Fatah have precluded diplomatic progress on a settlement. Even an interim two-state solution based on the Oslo Accords seems unlikely in the next few years, and a final settlement will clearly be a generational effort. Failure by the United States, coalition partners, and neighboring states to achieve stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan would likely increase various forms of extremism and terrorism throughout the region. Pakistan would be particularly threatened, as would the energy-rich countries of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Prospects for significant political change within Iran are low in the near term, and even a more moderate government would not change the course of nuclear status. The U.S. can either freeze the nuclear program or live with it while reinforcing U.S. commitments to allies and friends in the region.

26. Regional Trends: Asia China will remain the most significant driver of change in Asia for the foreseeable future. The challenges China poses in the near-to-mid term are more political, economic, and cultural than military. The rise of China will likely pull more countries toward its influence than push countries away. War over the Taiwan Strait that would involve U.S. İntervention would dramatically change the regional dynamics for years to come. The North Korean situation is the most unpredictable in the region. Without successful implementation of the Six-Party framework, North Korea will retain its status as a nuclear power with uncertain reactions in the region. In the long term, Japan could embark on its own program.

27. Reginal Trends: Asia In other areas of the region, a bipolar dynamic may gradually emerge, with a U.S./Japan-centered axis on one hand, and a China-centered one on the other. In Southeast Asia, Chinese presence and influence will grow, but opportunities for U.S. involvement will remain as nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand look for help with problems such as terrorism, insurgency, piracy, pandemic flu, and other natural or manmade disasters. The rise of India will be the governing dynamic in South Asia over the next 20 years, and India may emerge as an even stronger counterweight to China in Asia. Rising India will put additional pressures on an already precarious Pakistan, as even a minor crisis between the two continues to run the risk of escalation and nuclear miscalculation.

28. Regional Trends: Asia Russia and Cental Asia will struggle with the challenge of political modernization and will have to cope with weakening of state institutions, limited sovereignty, poor governance, and even the risk of state failure. Russian foreign policy will be increasingly preoccupied by the problem of managing its relationship with the rising China. China, and to a lesser degree India, will expand their influence in Central Asia, but no nation is likely to fill the vacuum of power left by Russia’s loss of power and influence in the region.

29. Regional Trends: Asia In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and especially Uzbekistan, leadership transition could trigger regime failure and instability, opening doors to clan, tribal, and regional rivalries that may transcend state borders and lead to turmoil and violence in large portions of Central Asia. Significant and protracted instability could become the defining characteristic of Central Asia, including failed and failing states, or states with limited sovereignty; radical Islamic movements; organized crime; and trafficking in weapons, WMD materials, and narcotics.

30. Regional Trends: Asia U.S. pursuit of democratization and wide-ranging reforms will be viewed as a threat to national and regional stability. This view will be shared not only by the former Soviet states of Central Asia, but also by their biggest partners and neighbors – China, Russia, Iran, and even U.S. allies and partners Turkey, Pakistan, and India. The United States will have to find a way to cooperate with and assist Russia, while in effect competing with it for influence in Central Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the South Caucasus.

31. Regional Trends: Africa Africawill remain outside the mainstream of economic globalization and will continue to struggle with significant problems that have prevented its development in the past. HIV/AIDS is the most serious challenge facing Africa today and will grow in its devastation during this time – hampering economic growth and limiting manpower. Continued terrorist activity in parts of Africa is a virtual certainty. The existence of several failed or weakened states with significant Muslim populations and the growth of Islamist extremism in Nigeria and parts of western, central, and northeastern Africa, could aid the continent’s emergence as a new regional battleground in the war on terrorism.

32. Regional Trends: Africa As demonstrated by the crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, civil strife with potential for mass violence will continue to plague a number of African countries. In addition to ongoing and known conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, flashpoints triggering pressures for new or expanded international interventions could well arise elsewhere in Africa.

33. Regional Trends: Latin America The strained relationship between the United States and Latin America expands opportunities for greater influence by China, Japan, India and several European countries. The most explosive potential crisis in the region is the implosion of Cuba in the wake of Fidel Castro’s death. Such a scenario could trigger intervention by the United States and other governments in the region. The result could be civil war and a massive humanitarian crisis.

34. Disruptive Events The geostrategic, military-technical, and regional trends considered thus far provide context for the security environment of the coming decade. However, these trends can be drastically altered by discontinuous events with significant strategic consequences: witness, for example, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent reactions of the United States and international community.

35. Disruptive Events Some of these events can be considered strategic shocks or wildcards: events that are very unlikely and cannot be fully anticipated, such as cascading natural disasters, worldwide economic collapse, or the sudden rise of a charismatic leader. For other types of events, trend lines point to the possibility of their occurrence; however, whether and how they will unfold are unknowns. Examples of these types of events are familiar scenarios such as war on the Korean Peninsula or a WMD event on the U.S. homeland. Whether “known unknowns” or “unknown unknowns”, these uncertainties harbor strategic consequences that can shape the security environment beyond recognition of the current trends.

36. Disruptive Events In mitigating risks, it is less important to predict the specific event than it is to characterize the strategic effects that might arise from similar events. The following considers the strategic effects resulting from possible disruptive events over the next decade.

37. Disruptive Events 1.Some types of WMD attacks – for example, a large-scale contagious biological attack – could disrupt the flow of trade and people, causing systemic effects so important as to alter the forces of globalization. A catastrophic WMD event or a sustained terrorism campaign inflicting substantial losses at home or abroad could fundamentally alter international and domestic security “rules”. If fear became a dominant driver, it could interrupt the process of globalization by significantly increasing the security costs associated with international commerce, encouraging restrictive border control policies, and adversely affecting trade patterns and financial markets. As the most capable provider of security, the U.S. Military would see an increasingly active role globally.

38. Disruptive Events 2. Regional crises that lead to wider instability, conflict, or failed states may severely tax U.S. ability to respond to broader challenges. Well-known scenarios include escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, over the Taiwan Strait, and between India and Pakistan. The potential for a WMD exchange looms large in these conflicts. Peaceful resolution of these regional tensions would also have lasting strategic consequences that may shift the trend lines significantly. For example, a unified Korean Peninsula with nuclear weapons would likely spark new tensions with Japan and possibly China and trigger a regional arms race.

39. Disruptive Events 3. Wider proliferation of WMD introduces another plausible set of scenarios with strategic consequences: US intervention in WMD states such as Iran, North Korea, or Syria. If left unchecked, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea will be fully realized and Syria might use the threat of its chemical and biological capabilities to support aggressive activities in the region. The reaction and policies of the United States will have more of a global effect.

40. Disruptive Events 4. Energy insecurity, resource scarcity, and natural disasters could create instability and uncertainty. Global primary energy demand is projected to increase by just over one-half between 2006 and 2030. Over 70 percent of the increase in demand comes from developing countries, with China accounting for 30 percent of that growth. Resource scarcity will be an increasing source of humanitarian crises and instability.

41. Disruptive Events 5. Asymmetric challenges: Even the greatest U.S. military advantages may also be an Achilles’ heel. The U.S. ability to effectively use the information domain provides a unique opportunity for its adversaries. Most vulnerable is the civilian information infrastructure. Less likely would be direct attacks on the military information infrastructure, but since the military is so reliant on commercial systems for day-to-day operations, its ability to carry out its missions would be severely impacted. Space systems are increasingly vulnerable to attack as well, as graphically demonstrated by China’s January 2007 antisatellite weapon test.

42. Conclusion Over the coming decade, the international community will struggle to manage the accelerating pace of change and turmoil stemming from globalization. Widening economic inequality and the global jihadist insurgency with its anti-Western ideology will remain particularly vexing challenges to a stable world order for the foreseeable future. Countering weapons of mass destruction or mass effect will prove increasingly difficult, and the probability of such weapons coming into the hands of terrorists will increase significantly. Climate change and resource scarcity will be growing causes of humanitarian crises and instability.