Presentation Transcript

1. AthenaHESS Pre-Incident Planning A key Element in Successful Management of Industrial Emergencies Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE, MBA Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd Singapore
2. Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail "He who fails to plan is planning to fail“ - Winston Churchill "If you fail to prepare then you are preparing to fail“ - Benjamin Franklin
3. Pre-Incident Planning (PIP) - Definition The process of documenting and maintaining critical information and predetermined actions to precipitate concerted mitigation efforts by response parties to successfully contain incidents and minimize consequential losses.
4. Outbreak escalates to Conflagration A recurrence of this incident is playing out NOW ! Preventable Consequence!
5. Largest Refinery of Global Oil Major September 2011 Preventable Consequence!
6. Buncefield UK 2005 Preventable Consequence!
7. Crude Pipeline Explosion - Dalian(2010) Preventable Consequence!
8. Firework Plant Explosion - Yichun City (2010) Preventable Consequence!
9. Largest Refinery of Global Oil Major COSMO Petrochem. Explosion & Fire - Ichihara, Chiba , March 11, 2011 Injures : serious 1, slight 5 Time table of accident - March 11, 14:46 earthquake broke out - 15:35 : inflammable gas leaked near the LPG tank - 15:47 : the tank fire and explosion, all units were shut down - 16:04 : start extinguishing - March 21, 10:10 : extinguished fire(10 days) Preventable Consequence!
10. Largest Refinery of Global Oil Major Ta Polystyrene polymerization unit explosion Hyundai EP Petrochem. Co. Ulsan, KOREA, August 17, 2011 Fatalities : 3, Injures : 2 Runaway reaction resulted from the cooling water failure at polymerization reactor Rupture disc burst and occurred VCE $50 million property or product damage Preventable Consequence!
11. Polyethylene Textile Mfg - August 2011 Ta Gumi, Korea Preventable Consequence!
12. Video – Fire at an Oil Refinery URL: http://www.youtube.com/user/bozkuhi#p/a/u/2/uKQinSGm6cI OR Hyperlink attached video clip
13. If these incidents are indeed Preventable: Consider why these incidents are recurring with disturbing regularity! Which HES Management System element is responsible for these lapses? How? Leadership and Accountability
14. Leadership failure due to: Emergency preparedness program not robust: Lack of sustained will and commitment Limited resource allocation: Priority for operational demands. Sporadic nature of incidents: Short organizational memory. Failure to recognize incident potentials & consequences Ineffectual risk assessment & management. Underestimation of IM complexities Lack of management insight Paucity of easy-to-use tools Failure to challenge & motivate creativity
15. The Necessity of Pre-Incident Planning An industrial emergency invariably requires the coordinated effort of multi-disciplinary teamssuch as Operations, Engineering, Emergency Responders and Management. Whist each team may be carrying out different tasks; their collective effort requires cohesion and must conform to a single overall strategy. Furthermore, resources available within an organization to handle an emergency are limited and have to be applied in unison. Pre-Incident Plans (PIP) are a vital tool to harness the finite resources of an organization to mount concerted and coordinated action to contain an industrial emergency.
16. Emergency Preparedness Framework BowTie/HAZOP
17. Pre-Incident Plan (PIP) Development Process Identify and review of potential scenarios BowTie® / HAZOP reports Past incidents and trends Site inspection and assessment of Plant layout and spacing Verification of implementation of BowTie/HAZOP recommendations Exposure/escalation potentials Emergency access adequacy Fire Protection system adequacy and configuration Rationalize & prioritize identified scenarios Develop of mitigation strategy and tactics for IAPs Determine standard template for PIPs Deploy resources & responsibilities for PIP development
18. Essential Elements of PIP Target Equipment / Facility Potential Scenarios Alternative Mitigation Means Thermal Radiation & Vapour Plume Simulations Fixed Fire & Other Protection Systems Extinguishing Media Requirements/Logistics Incident Action Plans
19. Generic Scenarios – Example
20. Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1
21. Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1 (Cont…2)
22. Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1 (Cont…3)
23. Pre-Incident Plan Specimen (Refining)
24. Cover Page ABC Refining Company Limited Pre Incident Plan Crude FeedPump Mechanical Seal Failure Applicable to: Pump # 1101 Pump # 1102 Pump # 1103 Pump # 1104 Pump # 1105
25. Part 1: Target Equipment / Facility Equipment, Facility Technical data Environmental Data
26. Part 2: Potential Scenario Potential Scenario & Challenges Special Hazards & Precautions Alternative Mitigation Means
27. Part 3:Alternative Mitigation Means Additional Isolation Means Alternative Access
28. Part 4: Thermal Radiation Simulation - 37.5 kW/m2 - 12.5 kW/m2 - 4.0 kW/m2
29. Part 5: Vapour Plume Simulation Concentration Cloud Height Distance Downwind
30. Part 6: Fixed Fire Protection System
31. Part 7: Extinguishing Media Demand
32. Part 8: Initial Standard Response Deployment
33. Part 9A: IAP – Immediate Ignition (Liquid) Incident Action Plan A. Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire (Immediate ignition) 1. Raise alarm 2. Stop pump involved (G101/ G101-A/ G101-B) 2. Evacuate non-essential personnel from Unit and conduct headcount 3. Isolate crude feed line (by shutting valve at battery limit – Road #) 4. Stop crude pump at source (CTT) 5. Cool adjacent exposures 6. Confirm Fire Pump(s) in operation and line pressure 7. Deploy Fire Tenders (predetermined locations, refer FB-SOP #) 8. Initiate Foam Attack 9. Shut water monitors (FWM) 10. Establish foam concentrate replenishment 11. Standby Foam hand-lines for mopping up operation 12. Confirm extinguishment, maintain vigilance against re-ignition.
34. Part 9B: IAP – Delayed Ignition (Vapour) B. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE); Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire 1. Raise alarm 2. Evacuate personnel from Unit and conduct headcount 3. Stop pump (G101) 4. Commence Shut-down of unit and eliminate all sources of ignition 5. Isolate crude feed line (by shutting valve at battery limit – Road #) 6. Stop crude pump at source (CTT) 7. Activate Fixed Water Monitors 8. Monitor wind direction 9. Initiate gas monitoring to establish hot-zone boundary 10. Keep personnel outside the ‘hot zone’ 11. Confirm Fire Pump(s) in operation and line pressure 12. Direct Fire Tenders to deploy in safe areas (refer FB-SOP #) 13. Deploy Fire Tenders per FB-SOP #( ) 14. Commence Brigade operation to situation (Vapour Dispersal or Foaming) per SOP In the event vapour cloud ignites: Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UCVE) will occur with the characteristic “fire ball” resulting from the volumetric expansion combusting vapours, followed by Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire
35. Pre-Incident Plan Specimen (Gas Plant)
36. ABC Gas Company Limited Pre Incident Plan Product Bullet Drain Valve Seizure in Open Position Applicable to: LPG Bullet # 9 LPG Bullet # 10 LPG Bullet # 11 LPG Bullet # 12 LPG Bullet # 13 LPG Bullet # 14
37. Part 1: Target Equipment / Facility (LPG)
38. Part 2: Potential Scenario
39. Part 2B: Special Hazards & Precautions In the event vapour cloud ignites, an Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) will occur with the characteristic “fire ball” resulting from the volumetric expansion of combusting vapours. If an explosive situation is credible, priority shall be to evacuate all non-emergency personnel to the designated evacuation assembly area(s). Emergency Response Team members should be moved to a safe area upwind of the incident. In the event of thermal radiation from UVCE affecting the neighbouring bullets, raised internal pressure may cause PSVs to release LPG vapour jets which may get ignited. Extinguishment of the resultant jet fires could be achieved by the Cooling of the bullets. Fixed water spray systems, supplemented by water monitors. Unfreezing of the seized valves may be achieved by applying water streams on the affected valve(s). Gas fires should not be extinguished other than by isolating the source, unless isolation can be achieved immediately upon extinguishment.
40. IAP – Liquid Jet Fire (Immediate ignition) Liquid Pressure / Jet Fire (Immediate ignition) 1. Raise alarm (Sounding of Plant siren; Civil Defence notification) 2. Initiate Total Plant Shutdown by activating ESD 3. Stop all vehicular movement within Plant 4. Evacuate non-emergency personnel to designated assembly area. 5. Activate of Water Spray System of involved bullet 6. Activate of Water Spray System of adjacent bullet 7. Deploy portable 'water-curtain' monitor between drain line discharge & root-valve a. Provide water spray cover from handline for deployment 8. Apply water stream from handline on root-valve to 'unfreeze' valve seizure 9. Close root-valve to starve jet fire issuing from drain valve Note. In the unlikely event that the root-valve cannot be fully closed, attempt should be made to safely close the tail end drain valve. 10. Maintain cooling until normal operating conditions are attained.
41. IAP – Vapour Cloud (Delayed Ignition) B. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Release threatening Explosion (UVCE) followed by Liquid Pressure / Jet Fire (Delayed ignition after release) 1. Raise alarm (Sounding of Plant siren; Civil Defence notification) 2. Initiate Total Plant Shutdown by activating ESD 3. Evacuate non-emergency personnel from Plant 4. Eliminate all sources of ignition (including vehicular traffic) 7. Operate Fixed Water Monitor (where available): a. Dissipate vapour cloud b. Divert vapors away from bullet 8. Supplement monitor operation with wheeled monitors 8. Monitor wind direction 9. Initiate gas monitoring to establish hot-zone boundary 10. Keep personnel outside the ‘hot zone’ 11. Apply water stream from handline on root-valve to 'unfreeze' valve seizure 12. Close root-valve to starve jet fire issuing from drain valve Note. In the unlikely event that the root-valve cannot be fully closed: Attempt should be made to safely close the tail end drain valve. 13. Maintain cooling until normal operating conditions are attained. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UCVE) will occur with the characteristic “fire ball” resulting from the volumetric expansion combusting vapours, followed by Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire
42. Leveraging BowTieXP® Software A Current Initiative in the Netherlands
43. Leveraging BowTieXP Software Advanced Barrier Management Plan – Do – Check – Act
44. Leveraging BowTieXP® Software Athena HESS lending its Concept & Experience.
45. Possible Message to Management: PIP = Profit Insurance Plan athenahess@singnet.com.sg Thank you!