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The Human Factor – Finessing the White Bears Alan Merry Professor and HOD Anaesthesiology University of Auckland. Disclosure. Alan Merry has financial interests in Safer Sleep LLC Is on the Boards of Safer Sleep LLC NZ Health Quality and Safety Commission Lifebox
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The Human Factor – Finessing the White Bears Alan Merry Professor and HOD Anaesthesiology University of Auckland
Disclosure • Alan Merry has financial interests in • Safer Sleep LLC • Is on the Boards of • Safer Sleep LLC • NZ Health Quality and Safety Commission • Lifebox • ANZCA (ie as a Councillor) • and has received support for research from • ANZCA • WHO • HRC NZ • AFT Pharmaceuticals • Roche Baxter • and others
Today… • A story of an error in anaesthesia • Systems, human error and why things go wrong, extending the Reason model with some new ideas • Some recent guidelines and possible solutions • Acknowledge Atul Gawande, Angela Enright, Iain Wilson, Rob McDougal, Peter Kempthorne and others
Medication Errors in Anaesthesia • About 1 in every 1000 administrations (≈135 anaesthetics) • 10 000 drug errors reported in the UK in 2006 25 deaths and 28 cases of severe harm Webster Merry et al Anaesth Intens Care 2001 NPSA “Promoting safer use of injectable medicines” 2007
Adverse Event Rates from Medical Record Reviews Runciman Merry Walton 2006
Approaches to Cognitive Psychology • Experimental cognitive psychology • experiments on healthy individuals • Cognitive neuropsychology • studying impairment in brain damage • Computational cognitive science • modelling • Cognitive neuroscience • imaging
Latent factors and Swiss cheese Reason BMJ 2000
Errors • Experts make errors • Not carelessness • Deterrence useless • Medical practice is challenging
Errors - Definition • When you are trying to do the right thing but you actually do the wrong thing • Focus on process not outcome
Violations • Element of choice • May be carelessness • Deterrence may be effective
Violations • Element of choice • May be carelessness • Deterrence may be effective • Not always reprehensible • Systems double-bind
Classification of Error • Action failure • Skill-based (slips and lapses) • Technical (dural tap) • Decision or planning failure • Rule-based • Knowledge-based
Classification of Error • Action failure • Skill-based (slips and lapses) • Technical (dural tap) • Decision or planning failure • Rule-based • Knowledge-based Errors of reasoning
Chaos Theory:Deterministic vs Random Systems Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil set off a Tornado in Texas? Lorenz E American Association for the Advancement of Science 1972 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Edward_lorenz.jpg
Problems • Simple ( baking a cake) • Complicated (going to the moon) • Complex (raising a child) Zimmerman and Glouberman Cited in GawandeThe Checklist Manifesto 2010
How We Think Automatic System Reflective System Controlled Effortful Deductive Slow Self-aware Rule-following • Uncontrolled • Effortless • Associative • Fast • Unconscious • Skilled Thaler and SunsteinNudge 2008
Time for a New Paradigm: STPC • Standardization(drugs, concentrations, equipment) • Technology(drug identification and delivery, automated information systems) • Pharmacy(satellite pharmacy, premixed solutions and prefilled syringes whenever possible) • Culture(recognition and reporting of drug errors to reduce recurrences)
Mass 1 mg/ml Ratio 1 in 1000 Wheeler D et al Annals of Internal Medicine 2008
“Both systems scored significantly lower than standard equipment for overall performance of spinal and epidural procedures, although the performance of non-Luer devices was mostly rated ‘adequate’ or better” “Both non-Luer connectors could cross-connect with one or more Luer connectors”
The Amsterdam Urinals Choice Architecture “It turns out that, if you give men a target, they can’t help but aim at it” http://nudges.wordpress.com/the-amsterdam-urinals/
“… the rate of postoperative complications and death were reduced by more than one-third” Haynes et al NEJM 360 491-9 2009
108 VA facilities: 182 409 sampled procedures 2006-8 • Briefings debriefings and checklists • 74 vs 13: mortality RR • 0.82 (0.76-0.91) vs 0.93 (0.80-1.08) • (18% vs 7%) Neily J et al JAMA 2010
De Vries et al NEJM 2010 Total complications 27.3 – 16.7 per 100 patients In hospital mortality 1.5% - 0.8% De Vries et al NEJM 2010
Strategies for Improving Surgical Quality —Checklists and Beyond “…checklists seem to have crossed the threshold from good idea to standard of care” BirkmeyerNEJM 2010
Some Estimates of Anaesthesia Mortality • Australia 1 in 56000 • Zimbabwe 1 in 3000 • Malawi 1 in 500 • Togo 1 in 150 Gibbs and Rodoreda Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 2005 McKenzie South African Medical Journal 1996 Heywood et al Annals of Royal College of Surgeons of England 1989 Hansen et al Tropical Doctor 2000 Ouro-Bang'na et al Tropical Doctor 2005
Togo: Avoidable Anaesthetic Mortality • 74% of anaesthetic deaths due to respiratory causes: • Aspiration • Undetected oesophageal intubation • Postoperative hypoxia • Overdose • Difficult intubation • All cases could have been identified by pulse oximetry Ouro-Bang’naMaman AF Tropical Doctor 2005 35: 220-22 Ouro-Bang'na et al Tropical Doctor 2005 (Slide modified from Walker I 2008)
77 700 ORs worldwide and 31.5 million operations per year without oximetry Funk et al Lancet 2010
77 700 ORs worldwide and 31.5 million operations per year without oximetry We have yet to identify a country that has minimal monitoring standards for anaesthesia in which pulse oximetry is not mandatory Funk et al Lancet 2010
“HIGHLY RECOMMENDED: applicable throughout any elective procedure, from patient evaluation until recovery (however, immediate life-saving measures always take precedence in an emergency)”
Global Pulse Oximetry Project Normal cost around $750
Global Pulse Oximetry Project $250 delivered $25
Education • A huge challenge • Linked to local agreements and philosophy of sustainable change • One size will not fit all needs • Should address physiology and decision making
Training and practice • Appropriate equipment, facilities and support • Intelligent design • Process tools (including checklists and well designed simple algorithms) • Experience, experience, experience