H5N1

1. H5N1 An update

2. Issues Spread of the virus and the role of wild birds Wild birds and human health Bird conservation: direct impacts Bird conservation: indirect impacts What BirdLife has been doing Next steps

3. Distribution of AI in poultry (blue) and wild bird outbreaks (in red). Red lines indicate known movements of poultry, taking virus from China to Vietnam, Korea and Japan, together with Lanzhou to Lhasa (Tibet) (Interesting that even in 2004 major poultry outbreaks known in Lanzhou and in NW China (Xinjiang). Red dots show where wild birds found dead – mainly scavengers (magpies, crows) that died close to infected poultry More information on details of wild bird outbreaks and links to scientific publications on these outbreaks are available on the BirdLife website under Downloads – Wildbird H5N1 Outbreaks Ellis, T. M., Bousfield, R. B., Bissett, L. A., Dyrting, K. C., Luk, G. S. M., Tsim, S. T., Sturm-ramirez, K., Webster, R. G., Guan, Y., & Peiris, J. S. M. (2004) Investigation of outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in waterfowl and wild birds in Hong Kong in late 2002. Avian Pathology , 33, 492-505. Nguyen, D. C., Uyeki, T. M., Jadhao, S., Maines, T., Shaw, M., Matsuoka, Y., Smith, C., Rowe, T., Lu, X., Hall, H., Xiyan, X., Balish, A., Klimov, A., Tumpey, T. M., Swayne, D. E., Huynh, L. P. T., Nghiem, H. K., Nguyen, H. H. T., Hoang, L. T., & Cox, N. J. (2005) Isolation and characterization of avian influenza viruses, including highly pathogenic H5N1, from poultry in live bird markets in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2001. Journal of Virology , 79, 4201-4212. Terakado, N. (2004) Routes of infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Japan. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infection Route Elucidation Team, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Tokyo.Distribution of AI in poultry (blue) and wild bird outbreaks (in red). Red lines indicate known movements of poultry, taking virus from China to Vietnam, Korea and Japan, together with Lanzhou to Lhasa (Tibet) (Interesting that even in 2004 major poultry outbreaks known in Lanzhou and in NW China (Xinjiang). Red dots show where wild birds found dead – mainly scavengers (magpies, crows) that died close to infected poultry More information on details of wild bird outbreaks and links to scientific publications on these outbreaks are available on the BirdLife website under Downloads – Wildbird H5N1 Outbreaks Ellis, T. M., Bousfield, R. B., Bissett, L. A., Dyrting, K. C., Luk, G. S. M., Tsim, S. T., Sturm-ramirez, K., Webster, R. G., Guan, Y., & Peiris, J. S. M. (2004) Investigation of outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in waterfowl and wild birds in Hong Kong in late 2002. Avian Pathology , 33, 492-505. Nguyen, D. C., Uyeki, T. M., Jadhao, S., Maines, T., Shaw, M., Matsuoka, Y., Smith, C., Rowe, T., Lu, X., Hall, H., Xiyan, X., Balish, A., Klimov, A., Tumpey, T. M., Swayne, D. E., Huynh, L. P. T., Nghiem, H. K., Nguyen, H. H. T., Hoang, L. T., & Cox, N. J. (2005) Isolation and characterization of avian influenza viruses, including highly pathogenic H5N1, from poultry in live bird markets in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2001. Journal of Virology , 79, 4201-4212. Terakado, N. (2004) Routes of infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Japan. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infection Route Elucidation Team, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Tokyo.

4. The spread west across southern Siberia was very quick and at a time when waterfowl are moulting, could not fly and do not yet migrate south (not west) for the autumn/winter. Spread followed major rail (shown as dotted line) and road routes. One rail route passes through Lanzhou, known as a major poultry processing centre, and which is close to lake Qinghai.The spread west across southern Siberia was very quick and at a time when waterfowl are moulting, could not fly and do not yet migrate south (not west) for the autumn/winter. Spread followed major rail (shown as dotted line) and road routes. One rail route passes through Lanzhou, known as a major poultry processing centre, and which is close to lake Qinghai.

5. The poultry outbreaks in Ukraine, Turkey and Romania have been persistent, lasting into 2006. Most outbreaks in mute swans of small numbers from larger flocks. Larger flocks died on west Caspian: 186 in Kalmykia and 558 in Astrakhan (Volga Delta), both out of much larger flocks. Unlike previous outbreaks, these outbreaks did follow the timing and location of some wild bird migration routes. The poultry outbreaks in Ukraine, Turkey and Romania have been persistent, lasting into 2006. Most outbreaks in mute swans of small numbers from larger flocks. Larger flocks died on west Caspian: 186 in Kalmykia and 558 in Astrakhan (Volga Delta), both out of much larger flocks. Unlike previous outbreaks, these outbreaks did follow the timing and location of some wild bird migration routes.

6. The European outbreaks began with outbreaks in southern Italy and Greece. These outbreaks may have been caused by westward dispersal movements of infected birds away from unusually cold weather in the Black Sea area. The source of the H5N1 outbreaks in western Europe and the Baltic Sea is still poorly understood. It is unlikely that birds would move north in February during cold weather from the Mediterranean towards the Baltic Sea over large mountain ranges in Europe (Alps). If birds dispersed from the Black sea north west, then birds reaching Sweden (ducks) would have had to travel c. 1500 km during the incubation phase of avian influenza (3 – 7 days). Alternatively birds may have picked up avian influenza somewhere en route that had been infected by wild bird or poultry, or picked it up at the site where they died. There is some evidence for the latter on Ruegen Island, Germany, where a ringed Whooper Swan was found dead; it had been ringed in Latvia (believed infection free) and seen alive and well on Ruegen 17 days before being found dead. This bird therefore seems to have contracted the infection on Reugen, probably implying that the virus had been taken there by other wild birds (so far no evidence from poultry on the island). Similarly, poultry outbreak in France appears related to earlier outbreak in a duck on nearby lake. A timeline of the outbreaks from January 2006 onwards is available at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/pdfs/hn51_outbreak_weeks.pdf A map of European outbreaks are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/food/animal/diseases/adns/index_en.htm A map of German outbreaks are available at: http://www.fli.bund.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/News/av_Influ/LB_Influenza.pdf The European outbreaks began with outbreaks in southern Italy and Greece. These outbreaks may have been caused by westward dispersal movements of infected birds away from unusually cold weather in the Black Sea area. The source of the H5N1 outbreaks in western Europe and the Baltic Sea is still poorly understood. It is unlikely that birds would move north in February during cold weather from the Mediterranean towards the Baltic Sea over large mountain ranges in Europe (Alps). If birds dispersed from the Black sea north west, then birds reaching Sweden (ducks) would have had to travel c. 1500 km during the incubation phase of avian influenza (3 – 7 days). Alternatively birds may have picked up avian influenza somewhere en route that had been infected by wild bird or poultry, or picked it up at the site where they died. There is some evidence for the latter on Ruegen Island, Germany, where a ringed Whooper Swan was found dead; it had been ringed in Latvia (believed infection free) and seen alive and well on Ruegen 17 days before being found dead. This bird therefore seems to have contracted the infection on Reugen, probably implying that the virus had been taken there by other wild birds (so far no evidence from poultry on the island). Similarly, poultry outbreak in France appears related to earlier outbreak in a duck on nearby lake. A timeline of the outbreaks from January 2006 onwards is available at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/pdfs/hn51_outbreak_weeks.pdf A map of European outbreaks are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/food/animal/diseases/adns/index_en.htm A map of German outbreaks are available at: http://www.fli.bund.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/News/av_Influ/LB_Influenza.pdf

7. Outbreaks in Egypt occurred along the Nile Valley where we might have expected migrant waterfowl from Siberia to winter. But the outbreaks occurred in February, long after migrant arrival. In Egypt infection are unlikely to have been missed due to ongoing surveillance of poultry, people and wild birds by US Naval Medical Research Unit based on Cairo. A map of outbreaks in Egypt is available at: http://declanbutler.info/blog/?p=36Outbreaks in Egypt occurred along the Nile Valley where we might have expected migrant waterfowl from Siberia to winter. But the outbreaks occurred in February, long after migrant arrival. In Egypt infection are unlikely to have been missed due to ongoing surveillance of poultry, people and wild birds by US Naval Medical Research Unit based on Cairo. A map of outbreaks in Egypt is available at: http://declanbutler.info/blog/?p=36

8. Role of wild birds Europe incidents: wild birds can carry virus for long distances, can transmit to poultry …but this seems to be exceptional Overall patterns of outbreaks fit poorly with migration timing and direction No spread along migration routes in last Northern fall and (yet) spring Spread to and in W Siberia clearly linked to transport routes Outbreaks in wild birds short-lived, self-contained …but Thai duck study: free-range ducks contracting H5N1 in paddy-fields Study on avian influenza in Thai ducks available at online open access journal Emerging Infectious Disease http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/ Gilbert, M., Chaitaweesub, P., Parakamawongsa, T., Premashthira, S., Tiensin, T., Kalpravidh, W., Wagner, H., & Slingenbergh, J. (2006) Free-grazing ducks and highly pathogenic avian influenza, Thailand. Emerging Infectious Disease , 12, 227-234. Songserm, T., Jam-on, R., Sae-Heng, N., Meemak, N., Hulse-Post, D. J., Sturm-ramirez, K., & Webster, R. G. (2006) Domestic ducks and H5N1 influenza epidemic, Thailand. Emerging Infectious Diseases , 12, 576-581. Study on avian influenza in Thai ducks available at online open access journal Emerging Infectious Disease http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/ Gilbert, M., Chaitaweesub, P., Parakamawongsa, T., Premashthira, S., Tiensin, T., Kalpravidh, W., Wagner, H., & Slingenbergh, J. (2006) Free-grazing ducks and highly pathogenic avian influenza, Thailand. Emerging Infectious Disease , 12, 227-234. Songserm, T., Jam-on, R., Sae-Heng, N., Meemak, N., Hulse-Post, D. J., Sturm-ramirez, K., & Webster, R. G. (2006) Domestic ducks and H5N1 influenza epidemic, Thailand. Emerging Infectious Diseases , 12, 576-581.

9. Issue: ‘Asymptomatic’ wild birds? Widely assumed, but not confirmed Evidence from lab experiments: captive Mallards can carry some H5N1 strains without getting ill Disputed evidence from Siberia (9 birds) and Poyang lake (6 ducks) BUT Many, many thousands of migrating wild birds tested, tiny rate of H5N1 infection No outbreaks along migratory routes – Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia, East Africa, etc. H5N1 now endemic in Chinese Tree Sparrows, but different strain Study on 6 ducks at Poyang Lake: Chen, H., Li, K. S., Wang, J., Fan, X. H., Rayner, J. M., Vijaykrishna, D., Zhang, J. X., Zhang, L. J., Guo, C. T., Cheung, C. L., Xu, K. M., Duan, L., Huang, K., Qin, K., Leung, Y. H. C., Wu, W. L., Lu, H. R., Chen, Y., Xia, N. S., Naipospos, T. S. P., Yuen, K. Y., Hassan, S. S., Bahri, S., Nguyen, T. D., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M., & Guan, Y. (2006) Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications for pandemic control . Proceedings of the National Academy of Science , 103 , 2845-2850. Chinese tree sparrow study: Kou, Z., Lei, F. M., Yu, J., Fan, Z. J., Yin, Z. H., Jia, C. X., Xiong, K. J., Sun, Y. H., Zhang, X. W., Wu, X. M., Gao, X. B., Lil, T. X. 2005. New Genotype of Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses Isolated from Tree Sparrows in Chin. Journal of Virology 79 , 15460-15466.Study on 6 ducks at Poyang Lake: Chen, H., Li, K. S., Wang, J., Fan, X. H., Rayner, J. M., Vijaykrishna, D., Zhang, J. X., Zhang, L. J., Guo, C. T., Cheung, C. L., Xu, K. M., Duan, L., Huang, K., Qin, K., Leung, Y. H. C., Wu, W. L., Lu, H. R., Chen, Y., Xia, N. S., Naipospos, T. S. P., Yuen, K. Y., Hassan, S. S., Bahri, S., Nguyen, T. D., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M., & Guan, Y. (2006) Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications for pandemic control . Proceedings of the National Academy of Science , 103 , 2845-2850. Chinese tree sparrow study: Kou, Z., Lei, F. M., Yu, J., Fan, Z. J., Yin, Z. H., Jia, C. X., Xiong, K. J., Sun, Y. H., Zhang, X. W., Wu, X. M., Gao, X. B., Lil, T. X. 2005. New Genotype of Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses Isolated from Tree Sparrows in Chin. Journal of Virology 79 , 15460-15466.

10. Issue: H5N1 virology Numerous genetic strains circulating in SE Asia, apparently maintained by poultry movements Westwards: three lineages of ‘Z’ genotype: Scotland, Rügen, Denmark, Sweden, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Qinghai: almost exclusively wild birds Greece, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria: poultry and wild birds Turkey: poultry only Two different genotypes in Nigeria! Wide variation in wild bird susceptibility: species, age, previous AI exposure. Pigeons infected but not shedding virus Amount of virus bird exposed to also key In water, virus survives longest at low temperature, low salinity and moderate alkalinity Simplistic assumptions about wild bird spread based on genetics have little basis Strains of H5N1: Li, K. S., Guan, Y., Wang, J., Smith, G. J. D., Xu, K. M., Duan, L., Rahardjo, A. P., Puthavathana, P., Buranathai, C., Nguyen, T. D., Estoepangestie, A. T. S., Chaisingh, A., Auewarakul, P., Long, H. T., Hanh, N. T. H., Webby, J., Poon, L. L. M., Chen, H., Shortridge, K. F., Yuen, K. Y., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M. 2004. Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1 influenza virus in eastern Asia. Nature 430, 209-213. Survival time of virus: Stallknecht, D. E., Kearney, M. T., Shane, S. M., Zwank, P. J. 1990. Effects of pH, temperature, and salinity on persistence of avian influenza. Avian Diseases 34, 412-418.Strains of H5N1: Li, K. S., Guan, Y., Wang, J., Smith, G. J. D., Xu, K. M., Duan, L., Rahardjo, A. P., Puthavathana, P., Buranathai, C., Nguyen, T. D., Estoepangestie, A. T. S., Chaisingh, A., Auewarakul, P., Long, H. T., Hanh, N. T. H., Webby, J., Poon, L. L. M., Chen, H., Shortridge, K. F., Yuen, K. Y., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M. 2004. Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1 influenza virus in eastern Asia. Nature 430, 209-213. Survival time of virus: Stallknecht, D. E., Kearney, M. T., Shane, S. M., Zwank, P. J. 1990. Effects of pH, temperature, and salinity on persistence of avian influenza. Avian Diseases 34, 412-418.

11. Information on H5N1 incidents in wild birds still very inadequate The ‘wild duck’ syndrome Basic data often lacking Methodologies questionable Inadequate involvement of ecologists and ornithologists Advice on data surveillance available on BirdLife website at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/surveillance.htmlAdvice on data surveillance available on BirdLife website at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/surveillance.html

12. Direct risk to people Approaching 200 human cases, c. 50% mortality, c. 10 countries All from poultry, not wild birds Unconfirmed case in Turkey from contaminated gloves Confirmed case in Azerbaijan from plucking swan H5N1 (still) very inefficient at infecting people With sensible hygiene, direct risks from wild birds are extremely small For more information on human impacts http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/ Basic precautions and advice for birdwatchers available at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/birders_faq.htmlFor more information on human impacts http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/ Basic precautions and advice for birdwatchers available at: http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/birders_faq.html

13. H5N1 has affected at least 42 species of wild birds so far

14. H5N1 outbreaks in wild birds have generally been self-limiting and affected small numbers of individuals For wild bird outbreaks infection rates are generally low and transmission of H5N1 appeared to be inefficient, even in wild birds that share waterbodies with infected birds. Within Europe, aside from the outbreak in Ruegen Island where c. 200 waterfowl died, small groups of birds (3-10 birds) have died. Even for the Ruegen Island outbreak, the mortality rate for wintering birds in 2006 was not significantly higher than previous years and only 3 % of the dead birds actually tested positive for H5N1. These low infection rates are in stark contrast to the high H5N1 mortality in poultry operations. Weekly updated maps of H5N1 outbreaks are available on Nature report Declan Butler’s website: http://declanbutler.info/blog/?p=16For wild bird outbreaks infection rates are generally low and transmission of H5N1 appeared to be inefficient, even in wild birds that share waterbodies with infected birds. Within Europe, aside from the outbreak in Ruegen Island where c. 200 waterfowl died, small groups of birds (3-10 birds) have died. Even for the Ruegen Island outbreak, the mortality rate for wintering birds in 2006 was not significantly higher than previous years and only 3 % of the dead birds actually tested positive for H5N1. These low infection rates are in stark contrast to the high H5N1 mortality in poultry operations. Weekly updated maps of H5N1 outbreaks are available on Nature report Declan Butler’s website: http://declanbutler.info/blog/?p=16

15. c. 6,000 wild birds died at Qinghai Lake, China in April-July 2005, 90% of which were Bar-Headed Geese… The only outbreak that had affected a significant number of wild birds was in Qinghai Lake between May to June 2005. The estimates for the number of birds that died at Qinghai lake vary from 1500 to 6000 birds. Although not many of the dead birds were tested, many showed the same physical characteristics of H5N1 infected birds. More information on the Qinghai outbreak at: Chen, H., Smith, G. J. D., Zhang, S. Y., Qin, K., Wang, J., Li, K. S., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M., & Guan, Y. (2005) H5N1 virus outbreak in migratory waterfowl. Nature , 436, 191-192. Liu, J., Xiao, H., Lei, F., Zhu, Q., Qin, K., Zhang, X. W., Zhaing, X. I., Dhao, D., Wang, G., Feng, Y., Ma, J., Liu, W., Wang, J., & Gao, F. (2005) Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus infection in migratory birds. Science , 309, 1206The only outbreak that had affected a significant number of wild birds was in Qinghai Lake between May to June 2005. The estimates for the number of birds that died at Qinghai lake vary from 1500 to 6000 birds. Although not many of the dead birds were tested, many showed the same physical characteristics of H5N1 infected birds. More information on the Qinghai outbreak at: Chen, H., Smith, G. J. D., Zhang, S. Y., Qin, K., Wang, J., Li, K. S., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M., & Guan, Y. (2005) H5N1 virus outbreak in migratory waterfowl. Nature , 436, 191-192. Liu, J., Xiao, H., Lei, F., Zhu, Q., Qin, K., Zhang, X. W., Zhaing, X. I., Dhao, D., Wang, G., Feng, Y., Ma, J., Liu, W., Wang, J., & Gao, F. (2005) Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus infection in migratory birds. Science , 309, 1206

16. At least one globally threatened species affected Red-breasted Goose positive for H5N1 on Skyros Island, Greece, in Feb 2006 90% of the world population of 88,000 confined to five roosts in Romania and Bulgaria — both affected countries Red breasted goose confirmed Feb 24 2006. In northern part of Skyros Island in Greece. Close to Evros delta where many swans died (of the cold).Red breasted goose confirmed Feb 24 2006. In northern part of Skyros Island in Greece. Close to Evros delta where many swans died (of the cold).

17. H5N1 in perspective Large-scale mortality events in wild birds occur due to many other reasons than avian influenza. Birds die of ingesting toxins, starvation, botulism or other bacterial diseases. It is important to keep H5N1 in perspective. At present, H5N1 is largely a poultry disease and there are much greater pressing threats such as habitat loss, introduced predators, or climate change that are having a much greater impact on wild birds.Large-scale mortality events in wild birds occur due to many other reasons than avian influenza. Birds die of ingesting toxins, starvation, botulism or other bacterial diseases. It is important to keep H5N1 in perspective. At present, H5N1 is largely a poultry disease and there are much greater pressing threats such as habitat loss, introduced predators, or climate change that are having a much greater impact on wild birds.

19. Indirect impacts:potentially much more severe The greater threat to wild birds may not be due to direct mortality from H5N1 but rather due to inappropriate government or public responses to avian influenza. Avian influenza hysteria has lead to some governments and members of the public calls for nest destruction, flushing birds away from habitats as well as culling. Flushing or culling birds can have much greater impacts on bird populations, and could also cause infected birds to disperse and spread H5N1 over a larger area.The greater threat to wild birds may not be due to direct mortality from H5N1 but rather due to inappropriate government or public responses to avian influenza. Avian influenza hysteria has lead to some governments and members of the public calls for nest destruction, flushing birds away from habitats as well as culling. Flushing or culling birds can have much greater impacts on bird populations, and could also cause infected birds to disperse and spread H5N1 over a larger area.

20. Negative public perceptions Despite limited threats to human health, avian influenza has sparked hysteria in the public and media. Media reports frequently drastically overestimated both the potential health, poultry and even the biodiversity impacts of H5N1. Despite limited threats to human health, avian influenza has sparked hysteria in the public and media. Media reports frequently drastically overestimated both the potential health, poultry and even the biodiversity impacts of H5N1.

21. Confusion between H5N1 and human pandemic Distorted assessment of risk Fear and panic induced by media

23. Authorities add to hysteria ‘Representative plenipotentiary of the President of Russian Federation in Siberian Federal District, A. Kvashnin, proclaimed that nesting of wild birds must not be permitted on wetlands near human settlements “by all means possible”… Federal Chief Inspector A. Zavyalov officially reported that similar plans would be carried out in Altay region, and that “not a single duck must be allowed to land here”.’ ‘Russia's chief doctor called for mass elimination of crows in Russian cities, warning yesterday that these birds are potential carriers of bird ‘flu. “Crows are feathered wolves who feed on carrion, including birds that have died of flu. They should be exterminated mercilessly,” Mr Onishchenko said. ‘Vietnam's commercial hub Ho Chi Minh City has begun poisoning pigeons and other wild birds as it moves to prevent avian flu from spreading, an official said on Friday. “We will make sure that no birds are left in the city…” Huynh Huu Loi, Director of Ho Chi Minh City's Animal Health Department, told Reuters.’

24. Individual actions Persecution of wild birds Nest destruction Access to nest sites closed off Dumping of exotic birds Dumping of cats and other pets Less feeding of wild birds Fewer visits to nature reserves

25. A few examples… Germany: First White Stork nest removed — public ask for permits to remove House Martin nests Greece: Hunters help in surveillance efforts, end up hunting birds in protected area Indonesia: Wild doves shot in village because of bird flu fears Poland: Attempts to kill swans for H5N1 testing Romania: Torture and killing of wild birds stranded by freezing weather: “Around 15 young men, aged between 20 and 25, were catching the birds, throwing them in the air, using birds which were still living as soccer balls, and tearing off their heads” UK: Headmaster applies for permit to shoot gulls around school

26. Other side effects: hunting Hunting banned in some countries (e.g. Belgium, Kenya, Lebanon, Russia, Slovakia) Promoted in others (e.g. Greece) Concerns over H5N1 surveillance as ‘excuse’ for increased hunting intensity

27. Other side effects: wild bird trade EU ban continues: pressure to make permanent Conservation implications uncertain

28. BirdLife’s contribution? Relevant wild bird data e.g. migratory movements, key sites (IBAs), key species Science-based advice on biosecurity issues Counter hysteria and unbalanced reporting Provide information on the real (versus imaginary) risks posed by avian influenza Monitoring avian ‘flu in wild birds through the BirdLife network: Track numbers and behaviour Report suspicious deaths Take and submit samples for analysis Build better links between ornithologists and vets/virologists — help to answer many outstanding questions

29. The Secretariat team Effort expanded — thanks to RSPB support Communications: Ade Long, Richard Thomas, Nick Langley Science and policy: Leon Bennun, Maï Yasué Independent technical advice: Chris Feare Tracking US developments: Gary Allport Keeping on top of EU issues: Clairie Papazoglou Working closely with other regions and key Partners

30. What the team is doing… Weekly avian ‘flu update meeting Weekly update of position statement Tracking and documenting outbreaks (database in development) and scientific findings Guidance for Partners (and others) Birdwatchers and general public Surveillance (methods and data needs) Report on fish-farming issue (Chris Feare) H5N1 virology (for non-virologists) (Chris Feare) Numerous press releases, material for journalists, interviews, institutional advocacy work, etc. New download section on website Support for individual Partners and regional secretariats

31. …and more Scientific papers (in prep.) on methodological issues Question methods and assertions of some virological work Participation and advocacy at key meetings EU Ornis Committee (Brussels) Sixth International Symposium on Avian Influenza (Cambridge) CBD Avian ‘Flu web-forum and technical meeting (Curitiba) CMS/UNEP Seminar on Avian Influenza, the Environment and Wild Birds (Nairobi – chaired by Peter) Building linkages, especially with WCS and FAO … and maintaining AIWATCH

32. Some next steps Take action on Russia – look into staff support for RBCU Pursue continued funding for co-ordination work and for Partner activities Re-engage with CMS Task Force as cross-institutional forum Contribute to FAO/OIE meeting in May Try to get voice at donors’ pledging conference (Beijing follow-up) in June Work with WCS on Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) Follow up WCS USAID funding (central and national) Integration with Global Livestock Early Warning System (GLEWS) Better communication with Wetlands International Work on collaboration with FAO Updates at regional Partnership meetings Review how avian ‘flu work fits in BirdLife programme longer-term (moving from crisis management to strategic response)