Why Oh Y ? HS2 -- grand projet , great delusion or national network ?

1. Why Oh Y ?HS2 -- grand projet, great delusion or national network ? Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK Cambridge University Railway Club 17 February 2012

2. How have we got here ? • growth in rail traffic -- distinct change in trends, with multiple causation -- corporate assumptions of trends continuing -- limited interest in alternative scenarios -- ‘green’ message imperfectly understood hence momentum for increased capacity • politics -- Conservative commitment lieu Heathrow runway -- enthusiasm of Labour Transport Secretary -- longstanding LibDem support for public transport

3. how have we got here ? continued • engineering opportunity seized by -- people frustrated by more modest projects -- the construction industry • economic opportunity seized by -- believers in infrastructure as economic driver -- northern cities desperate for regeneration • other factors -- keeping up with other countries -- railway enthusiasts dreaming of an HSR in Britain -- a polarised debate [more later]

5. My position • long career dedicated to quality passenger services (first to quantify link between speed and demand) -- therefore a surprising sceptic about HSR • reasons: -- this University taught me objective appraisal -- doubts grew as I studied documents, specifically - the ‘network’ concept - the technical optimism • the environmental arguments • the mega-project phenomenon

7. A flawed process • Government need for grand projet • HS2 Ltd too close to Department for Transport • HS2 did not emerge from a national strategy • planning presupposed standards + geography • concern for property rights > secrecy • consultation confused strategy, route-planning and local considerations – largely ignored anyway • polarisation : ‘true believers’ versus ‘nimbys’ • little independent debate: silence of the industry / treason of the consultants

8. So, what are the issues ? • need for a national network strategy • demand forecasts • scale, timescale, costs, economic benefits • routes (Chilterns, M corridors, Heathrow, HS1) • technical specification and operating capacity • location-specific environmental issues not addressed (ecological, socio-cultural, personal loss only legitimate if overwhelming justification for a project : establish that first without compromised assessment procedure)

9. A national network strategy • what is railway for ? -- context : continuous growth … ecological limits -- public service or travel supermarket ** -- marginal social cost pricing (all modes), or subsidy -- mode of first choice for all appropriate journeys ? • principles : -- national standards of service, eg. frequency, speed -- comprehensive connectivity (including other modes) -- fares system matched to objectives (not so now !) • nb. responsibility for delivery is secondary matter

10. “Whatever your destination this autumn, you can bag a bargain, giving you more money to spend on nights out or your Christmas shopping. But hurry, this offer ends on Sunday and the numbers of tickets are limited, …”

11. a national network strategycontinued • huge improvements but still uneven quality • no systematic plan to address weaknesses -- eg. London / non-London variation, mixed-purpose services, missing links, ends of suburban lines, historic anomalies, off-rail places -- not helped by poor data • model demand with various scenarios, mode splits • then envision an ideal network (compare Swiss) • possible outcomes : a case for extensive HSR / limited HSR / new non-HSR sections / projects directed at specific timetable improvements

12. toward an excellent system of public transport timetabling, operations planning modal-split targets national standards of service-quality and connectivity modelling route-specific demand data, scenarios infrastructure plan organisations, budgets

13. Demand forecasts • questionable presumption of continuing growth • changes in composition of traffic, public expectations • surprising acceptance of ‘predict and provide’ • no analysis of potential gains elsewhere on network (lower mode-shares > greater social benefit ?) • reluctance to question value by journey-purpose • myth of business people doing vital deals • doubts about Virgin’s business model • crowding distorted by fares policy • should we be encouraging long-distance commuting ?

14. Scale, timescale, costs, benefits • bold vision – or hubris ? • Birmingham … London not until 2026, full ‘Y’ not until 2032 : a long time to wait in an uncertain world • risk of cost-escalation or changed circumstances leaving unfinished project, lost opportunities • high cost of British civil engineering compounded by large projects (Euston), tunnelling • economic benefits subject of fierce debate (weak evidence on regional regeneration, absence of strong regional government, arcane value-of-time figures) • may widen, not narrow, North / South division • as planned will favour select cities, not whole regions

15. The routeing arguments • HS2 ‘perfect railway’ : straight, 400 km/h, few stops • the ‘Y’ is London-centric, serves few cities • not a network, places omitted (Stoke, Coventry) • ambiguity on city-centre or ‘parkway’ stations • Chiltern route (note pull of Heathrow) most environmentally and politically damaging • routes along Motorway corridors : less damaging –and would the engineering be that difficult ? • muddled thinking about Heathrow • even more muddled thinking about HS1 link

16. Specification + operating capacity • maximum speed driven by technical ambition -- undervalues energy and carbon costs -- prejudices route choices -- marginalises all but largest cities • assumption of European gauge -- required by EU law (challengeable ?), BUT -- adds engineering cost -- predicates 2 train-types (‘captive’, ‘classic compatible’) -- complicates station design -- may introduce operational inflexibility

17. specification + operating capacitycontinued • HS2 Ltd believes 18 trains / hour feasible, based on advanced control technology (= >20, with margin) • compare with present maximum anywhere of 15 • 18 t/h an act of faith too far ? -- effect of intermediate stops, diverge/merge moves -- inevitable perturbations, esp. from classic lines -- matters because expectations exceed even 18 • poor integration with existing network • system designed for 400 m trains, but ‘classic compatibles’ limited to 200 m – unless portion-working introduced (could help capacity)

18. The convergence problem Trains 1 and 3 non-stop, train 2 starts on ‘slow’ line and converges at c. 2.5 km from station.

19. The timetable plan for a £32billion project

20. The implications of constrained capacity Column 1 : HS2 latest plans * HS1 services omitted * Birmingham reduced to 3 * commitment to North East Col. 2 : aspirations Col. 3 : what could be offered without the Heathrow and HS1 links Col. 4 : the potential benefits of portion-working (actual frequencies = 2 x trains) NB. ‘open access’ ignored !

21. What are the alternative strategies ? • a flexible, incremental approach • for example, for the West Coast Main Line : -- Pendolino lengthening, more Standard seats -- better operating discipline in peaks -- reform of ticket-pricing policy -- selective infrastructure schemes • but do in context of a national public transport plan • new alignments may be justified (not necessarily in WCML corridor) but make socio-economic case first and weigh environmental factors honestly

22. What now ? • Government has decided to build • despite the spin the project is not certain • complex Hybrid Bill procedure • opponents will fight bloody battle through Judicial Review and then Parliament • will distract the rail industry’s attention • dangers of mega-projects with own momentum • compare APT and HST • case for a pause, a national debate, a fresh start ? • I would rather that than a negative ‘stop’ campaign

23. Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK 01904 611187 ptn@btconnect.com