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Developments in Financial Supervision in Institutional Terms: Alignment to the Hungarian Needs. Group of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern Europe, Annual Conference Dubrovnik, May 26-28, 2004. There is no optimal and exclusive structure of supervision
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Developments in Financial Supervision in Institutional Terms:Alignment to the Hungarian Needs Group of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern Europe, Annual Conference Dubrovnik, May 26-28, 2004
There is no optimal and exclusive structure of supervision A single structure is not an aim itself, rather a tool to achieve effective consolidated supervision While harmonizing supervision, sectoral specificities should be observed Legal, cultural, and historical environment of the country should not be disregarded In case of a merger, clear strategy and good managerial skills are important to handle the transition Introductory Thesis
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority • Hungarian Financial Suprvisory Authority – single financial supervisor • Established in April 2000 • Responsible for the overall financial sector • In operation for 4 years • Financed exclusively by the sector
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 2 • Supervisory decisions are final, they can be appealed with the court only • Supervisory resolutions are mandatory for individual institutions, including fines • Non- binding supervisory guidelines • No regulatory power, legally binding regulations cannot be issued by the HFSA
Features of the Sector in Hungary in the late 1990’s • Open financial markets • Substantial foreign participation • 70% foreign capital in banking sector(95% today) • 90% in the insurance sector • Less then 18% public sector participation(1%) • Universal banking, since 1999 • Dominance of financial groups (cca. 80%) • Expansion of cross-sectoral products
Historical Background in Hungary • No long lasting supervisory history, starting the late 1980’s • Central Bank has never had a banking supervisory function • 3 predecessor institutions since 1990’s: • Banking and Capital Market Supervision - through the early merger of (1996): • Banking Supervision • Securities and Exchange Supervision • Insurance Supervision • Pension Fund Supervision
Features of Supervision before 1999 • Fragmented supervisory structures • Diverging level of operative independence • Different approach and regulatory background to off-site and on-site examinations • Poor and slow supervisory co-operation among institutions • Low impact on regulation – MoF responsibility • In general: low international profile – low level of co-operation • Supervision remained on solo basis untill the end of the 1990’s
OBJECTIVE: TO PROMOTE EFFICIENT CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION Conditions thereof: • good and rapid information exchange, • good co-operation among supervisors, • approximating supervisory approach, • appropriate legal background • improved operative independence
Aims of supervisory integration • Channelling all available information into one supervisory body • Grouping all supervisory knowledge at one place • Making benefit of synergies • Consolidated supervision of groups • Following evolving market structure • Expected economies of scale
Aims of supervisory integration(2) • Strengthening the operative independence of all three former supervisory structures • More in line with relevant international standards and tendencies • Prepare the supervision for the EU role • To avoid market captures
Setting up the Single Supervisor • Policy decision: in September 1999 • Government decision in October 1999 • Relevant law adopted in December 1999 • Interim management of the transition • Establishment of the merged supervisory authority in April 2000
International road map • Permanent International Monitoring - Compliance with international standards • IMF-World Bank FSAP: pilot project (2000 and 2002) • Basle Core Principles: self-assessment exercise • IAIS: self-assessment exercise • IOSCO: self-assessment exercise • OECD:Regulatory Reform Project (2000) Country Review,Structural Chapter (2001) • EU: Peer Review (2001 and 2003)
Issues • Financial groups, consolidated supervision • Improving effective supervision • Harmonizing supervisory approach • Improve regulatory responsivness • Upgrading supervision vs.industry groups – to avoid industry capture • Better cost efficiency • Independent regulatory agency – new type of entity • EU perspectives
Practical Challenges • Managerial skills for transition • Identification of the new institution • Mission statement • Elaborated widely within the institution • Positioning within the public institutions • Communication to market participants about renewed supervisory policy • In-house training of staff
Practical Challenges 2 • Financing the supervisory institution – from the market • Retaining experienced staff • Salary levels – close to market levels • Dilemma: • Strict prudential rules versus • International competitivness • Co-operation with the Central Bank - systemic stability
Practical Challenges 3 • Redefinition of supervisory policy • Transposition of int’l supervisory standards • Full revision of all supervisory tools (harmonisation) • Manuals, guidelines, data provison, regulations, sanctions etc. • Revision of sectoral regulatory framework • Building international network • Unification of IT systems • Finding a single headquarter • Raising public awarness – consumers’ interests
Experience • Better overview of the industry • Better overview of regulatory deficiencies and inconsistencies • Better positioned to initiate legislative modifications • Better level of consolidated supervision • More interaction between sectoral experts • Better understanding of cross sectoral market attitude and risks • Over time: in function of results improving investment climate
Conclusions If supervisory integration is decided: • Well prepared decision is needed • Once decision is made, quick implementation • Appropriate time needed, not an overnight • Determined, devoted and skillful managment of transition • Timing is key – a relatively stable period • Sequencing of steps
Conclusions 2 • Clear, upgraded, convincing objectives • For the staff • For the market • For the public, for the politicians • Public communication and awareness raising • Leads to expectations: better consumer protection • No perfect, predefined development track • Need of flexibility, reevaluation during the process • Learning by doing • Cross fertilization of divergent supervisory experience
Conclusions 3 • IT system integration – good opportunity to reassess overall data quality and data need • International experience sharing • Bilateral • „Clearing house” • Effective implementetion builds up credibility internally and internationally • Contributes to good investment climate
Possible Conflicts • Eventual overlooking of sectoral aspects • Overdominance of banking, needs counterbalance • Lack of regulatory power • Continueos professional debates with the MoF • Rigid, time consuming, inefficient regulatory responses • Streamlining data provision • Focusing data provision • Appropriate response to consumer expactations
New legal developments • The new Act XXII of 2004 on the protection of the interests of the depositors and investors entered into force in May 2004. • The new legislation rearranges the management structure of the HFSA • Establishment of the Board of the HFSA and a separate executive management
Recent Institutional Changes Board of the HFSA: • New five member Board takes decisions on the HFSA’s strategy, policies and on yearly inspection program • Non binding supervisory guidelines are issued by the Board • Issues, withdraws licences of institutions • Approves supervisory methodology of HFSA • Board meets at least every month
Recent Institutional Changes 2 • The Chairman is elected by Parliament, Members of the Board appointed by the President of the Republic for a 6 year term. • Chairman of the Board submits reports on the activities of the HFSA to the Finance Minister every quarter • The Minister makes assessment on the HFSA’s activities • The Minister controls whether the HFSA operates in line with its mandate and is entitled to require the Board to remedy eventual defficiencies in the HFSA’s operations
Recent Institutional Changes 3 • The Internal Operational Rules of the HFSA are proposed by the Board and approved by the Minister • The professional staff of the HFSA is managed by the Director General and by his/her deputies • The DG and the deputies are appointed by the Prime Minister for fixed six year term • The operation of the HFSA, conducting inspections, deciding on supervisory measures are the prerogatives of the DG