MH-5: The Civil War- Ending Limited War

1. MH-5: The Civil War- Ending Limited War

2. North achieved several notable victories by June 1862: Border States secure in North’s camp Lower Mississippi & New Orleans captured West & Middle Tennesseeheld Strategically important Corinth captured without a shot Then fortunes (friction) of war changed: South countered w/aggressive & unexpected offensives Threat became centered closer to Washington Southern forces in West also struck back McClellan’s“Grand” Peninsula strategy faltered The Civil War- Ending Limited WarStrategic Overview 1862:

3. Strategic Reassessment & Change • As Result: brief war appears more & more unlikely • North begins to reassess its Limited War Strategy • Growing doubts prompt several changes… • One change is in organization & unit structure: • Both sides adopt corps system for control of troops • More independent fighting wingsof 3 or more divisions • Begin to fight more in classic Napoleonic style of Europe

4. Battle Map Overview- Civil War 1861-62

5. Battle Map Overview- Eastern Theater 1861-62:

6. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses: • George B. McClellanrebuilt Army of Potomac • Great organizer w/charisma but extremely cautious • Dearly loved by troops as a caring commander • Leaves Lincolnwith impression of action • Delay in reality; also his ego strains relationship • Joe Johnston: competent & resourceful • But also cautious and prone to readily retreat when in doubt • Force dispositions (actual & perceived): • McClellan: 100K effectives vs. • Joe Johnston’s 40K • Pinkerton’s Intel convinced “Little Mac” that the South had 150K men • Overestimates of enemy strength reinforced cautious commanderview

7. Peninsula Campaign- Strategy & Tactics • Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives • Mac: end war by “A Single Grand Campaign” • Build up Union forces & conduct end run around Johnston • Strike South’s “center of gravity” and end war • Plans & preparation: • Johnston’s “150K” troops occupy Centerville • Following South’s victory at Bull Run • Mac initially wanted to deploy troops to Urbana • Then march 50 miles to Richmond and lay siege • Johnston’s redeployment & its impact: • Mac’s Plan modified because of Johnson’s recent & unexpected move from Centerville to central Virginia • New plan required as a result: deploy to Fort Monroe • (75 miles further from where?)

8. Peninsula Campaign-Deployment: • Mac 1st conducts shake down march to Centerville • Becomes obvious to all that Intel picture dead wrong • “Quaker cannons” & other indications=> no 150K possible • Mac looses credibility with Lincoln & the Public • Relations between two become more strained & Mac is demoted • Union deployment to Fort Monroe: • Hugh maritime lift required to deploy Union forces • Major amphibious operation: 113 steamers & 276 small craft • Transport 121,500 troops, 14K horses & mules • 1224 wagons & 200 cannon for siege operation • (Mac’s preferred tactic) • Contact limited: caution and classic siege warfare

9. Engagements: Yorktownto Seven Pines: • Battle of Yorktown- Mapoverview: • McClellan's inland advance stalled 4 April 1862 • MG Magrudersuccessfully delays Mac’s operational progress • Rebel defensive line of forts across Peninsula to James river

10. Battle of Yorktown- Decision to Abandon • MeanwhileLincoln becomes concerned the capitol is vulnerable • Holds back McDowell's I corps • Reduces Mac’s Peninsula Campaign’sOrder of Battle(OB) • Impact on the cautious McClellan? • Johnston: sees Yorktown as inevitable loss • (Mac’s heavy siege cannon will defeat his forces trying to hold) • Notifies Davis of his intent to abandon Yorktown (Vigorously protests)

11. Battle of Yorktown- South’s resistance stiffens • Significant strategic costs of this move: • Opens York & James rivers to Federal Navy • Union Navy gunboats now able to position for operational & fire support for Army • Also South forced to abandon Norfolk & its Naval Yard • Scuttle CSS Virginia • Davis even considers abandoning Richmond • Lee argues strongly against Capitol’s abandonment • Convinces Davis to hold on • Then South’s resistance stiffens • Rebels able to turn back Federal Navyat James river • AsMcClellanfinally closes in on Richmond… • Decides to conduct formal siege • Brings up heavy siege cannon & settles in for classic siege • Required to use railroad spur to transport his siege guns

12. Mac Splits his Army • So Mac locates main supply base at White HouseLanding • Base of supply is situated on Pamunkey river (R. Lee’s house) • Forced to split his forces North & South of Chickahominy river • Two Thirds to the North & One Third to the South of the river • Rationale: Use position to flank Rebel left, protect RR spur for siege, & receive McDowell’s I corpswhen/if released • Tactical impactof this move?* • Tactical opportunity afforded (and to whom)?*

13. Battle ofSeven Pines(Fair Oaks) • When McClellan splits his forces, Johnston seized the opportunity: • Tactics: tries to concentrate Rebel army on Union’s southern wing(defeat in detail) • Problem: poorly planned & executed: • Plan too vague and overly complex • Poor staff & generalship during execution • Union flank saved by MG Sumnerinitiative • Sends BG Sedgwick across partially submerged Grapevine bridge over flooded Chickahominy • Campaign's Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • No major change with one key exception: • Johnstonwounded & Leetakes command

14. Shenandoah Valley- Prelude • Lee is convinced passive defensenot viable against four major Union threats currently confronted: • 1. McClellan’s large force’s direct threat to Richmond • 2. Banks’ army in central valley is also potential threat • 3. Fremontnot far in West Virginia • 4. McDowellcould reinforce Mac from Northern Virginia • Lee’s Strategy: Active Defense (at very high risk) • Plan: Ewell to join Jackson in ShenandoahValley • Lee’s TacticalObjective: fully concentrate on Banks & defeat in detail • Assumption: McClellan’s caution will buy Lee time to act • Jackson recommends & Lee accepts plan’s modification: • Jackson will combine w/Johnson’s 2800 first to hit Fremont • Then combine with EwellandJohnson and attack Banks

15. Jackson & Shenandoah Valley Campaign • Jackson will reek havoc against the North in ShenandoahValley • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses: • Jackson: decisive & aggressive commander and brilliant tactician • Banks & Fremont: Political, plodding & both considered unreliable • Force dispositions (Map): • Jackson: 4500 (initially), to be augmented to 10,000+ • Later combines w/Ewell’s 7K • Banks: 38K; Fremont: 10K

16. Shenandoah Valley- Strategy & Tactics • Strategic & Operational Objectives: • South’s strategic Aim: tie up Uniontroops in Valley • Keep them from reinforcing McClellan against Richmond • Tactics: Jackson to use surprise to defeat greater numbers in detail • Cut off Banks’s supply & LOC • Lincoln & his Army become convinced Jackson has more troops (or is about to be reinforced) • Therefore poses a direct potential threat to Union Capitol

17. Shenandoah Valley- Execution • Engagements & Execution Overview: • Jackson strikes unexpectedly using terrain as choke points to defeat Banks & Fremontin detail • Jackson attacks & capturesBanks’LOCat Fort Royal • Banks then retreats all the way to Potomac w/Jackson in pursuit • Lincoln ordersFreemont & McDowell(40K) to trap Jackson in pincer movement & prevent his escape • Jackson eludes pursuers by a hair • Engages pieces of both forces later • Then soundly defeats them in detail • Port Republic illustrates his tactical brilliance

18. Shenandoah Valley- Results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Jackson’stactical victories have major strategic impact • Able to pull it off with only 17K total troopsagainst 60K • 60,000 Federal troops retained in Northern Virginia • Troops otherwise available to McClellanfor Richmond drive • Major impact on McClellan’sconfidence • (Always wants more troops before he attacks) • Convinced he is outnumbered & now has even less • Becomes stalled & Richmond is able to hold • Now Robert E. Lee will turn the tables on the Army of the Potomac

19. Failure of North’s Limited Strategy • Lee’s response to McClellan’s threat to Richmond: • Find a weak spot in McClellan’s line and attack • Lee recalls of Jackson from Valley to Richmond’s defense • Lee’s tactical priorities: • Initiative & speed • Concentration on enemy’s weakness (defeat in detail) • Surprise & Intel (Know your enemy) • Troop morale (Note: Troop numbers are not high on his list) • Lee sends JEB Stuarton reconnaissance: • Stuart’s “ride around the Union Army” discovers what? • McClellan’s right flank (RF) is “in the air” (?) • Lee’s operational aim & strategy : • Operational Aim:force McClellan back down Peninsula • Operational. Strategy: Focus & concentrate on Union’s exposed RF • Break it; hit his rear & cut off his supply LOC (at White House)

20. Seven Days Battle Series • Lee versus McClellan • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses: • Lee:bold & unpredictable • McClellan: cautious & predictable • Force dispositions (Map): • North: 5 corps 5 miles east of Richmond & one (Porter’s V) north of Chickahominy • South: 9 Divisions (2 out of position- Jackson’s) = 80K • 20K remain at Richmond defenses • Both Armies about even

21. Seven Days- Strategy & Tactics • Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives: • North: initially capture Richmond by siege • Changed to defensive withdrawal down Peninsula • Occurs soon after Lee’s attack on F. J. Porter • Shift supply base from White Houseto Harrison Landing • South: Force Union army back down Peninsula • Then trap & destroy McClellan’s Army in detail • Cut off Union supplies and LOC • Lee’s Concept of Operations: • Jackson redeploys from Valley in time to turn Porter’s right flank • Remaining forces to key offJackson’s assault- and attack Union’s front • Lee’sOperational Plan based on key assumption: • McClellan will go on what once attacked

22. Seven Days- Mechanicsville • Execution overview: • Jackson fails to reach assigned position & attack on time • Misses key assignment – impact? • AP Hill attacks w/o Jackson’s lead & without informing Lee • Lee thinks Jackson has arrived & all the rest follow • Conduct frontal assault into strong defensive position without the benefit of Jackson’s attack on the Union right flank • Porter’s cannon & rifle fire chew up Rebel attackers • Rebels unable to penetrate Porter’s lines • Porterlearns of Jackson’s approach to his right flank • Withdraws to even stronger position at Gaines Mill

23. Seven Days- Gaines Mill • Execution overview- Gaines Mill • Replay of yesterday’s futile Rebel frontal attacks • Jackson is late again but finally attacks Porter’s RF • Porterable to retreat south over Chickahominyat dusk & rejoin rest of Army • As expected- McClellan goes on defense • Forced to abandon White Houseland supply base • Shifts supply base to Harrison Landingto south west on James river

24. Seven Days- Lost Opportunities • Execution overview- Lee tries toaggressively pursue Mac- (Map) • Savage Station: another costly assault • Frayser’s Farm: last chance botched • Malvern Hill: extremely costly repulse • “It was not war it was murder.” - D. H. Hill • Assessment: Lee’s plans: • Poorly executed with several missed opportunities due to: • Bad generalship& poor staff work • Lee’s staff too small & inadequate • Lost opportunity to destroy McClellan’s army: • Poor Intel & leadership preclude decisive & favorable result • Simplistic tactics& Union arty produce unaffordable high Rebel casualties

25. Seven Days- Results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Tacticallymixed for Lee: • High casualties (24%)- (South also cannot strategically afford) • Costly mistakes & simplistic tactics (failed key tactical objective) • Malvern Hill(futilefrontal assaults on strongUnion defenses) • Union cannonpre-sighted caught Rebel attackers in cross fire • Nevertheless (NTL)=> Operational & Strategic victory • Ejected Army of Potomacfrom Peninsula & saved Richmond • Richmond’s loss would have opened up entire Southeast • 3 Key questions: • 1. Why was Jackson late and ineffective? • 2. Why does Lee fail to destroy McClellan’s Army? • 3. What does Lee’s tactical actions & aggressive persistence portend for future engagements in similar situations?

26. Confederate Counterstrokes & North’s reversal of fortunes • Lincolnreorganizes & reassigns his generals: • Hallackappointed General & Chief • Impact in Western Theater? • Granttakes over command of Western Theater • McClellanordered to withdraw & his troops reassigned • Appeared to be frozen in defense- slow to redeploy his troops • Who isordered to command new Army of Virginia? • Major General John Pope • General Popetasked with 3 key objectives: • 1. Protect ?__________________ • 2. Control Shenandoah Valley • 3. Draw Lee out of ?____________________ • Objective: Relieve pressure on McClellan • What does Lee decide to do about Pope?

27. Second Manassas- Strategy & Tactics • Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives • Lee wants to prevent Popefromsupporting McClellan • Ultimately shift strategic focus of operations to North’s territory • Plan: Lee decides to divide his Army • Send Jackson to cut off Pope’s supply at Manassas & LOCto Washington • Thereby pose threat to Washington w/o a general engagement • Pope is blind to Lee’s strategy & tactics • Sees only tactical opportunity to “bag” Jackson

28. Second Manassas (2nd Bull Run) • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses • Jackson: aggressive, resolute, & tactically brilliant • Pope:pompous, rigid, & tactically incompetent • Force dispositions & deployment (Map): • Lee: 2 wings (corps): • Jackson with 23K • Longstreet with 5 Div. (32K) • Pope:7 corps with 63K

29. Second Manassas- Execution • Engagements & Battle Execution • Jackson executes Lee’s plan as directed (57 mile march in 2 days) • Cuts off Pope’s rail LOC& destroys supplies he’s unable to move or use • Meanwhile Poperemains fixated on trapping Jackson • Sees his opportunity at Manassas junction • Jackson withdraws NW after plundering Union supplies • Forms defensive line along unfinished railroad cut • Popefinally locates Jackson’s position & attacks into front • Jackson able to hold (just barely) • Popeoblivious to Lee & Longstreet & 32K forming on his left flank

30. Second Manassas- Longstreet Attacks • Longstreet finally attacks Union left (Porter’s V corps) • Union left crumbles & troops forced to withdraw • Unionmakes fighting retreat • Finally stand firm at Bull Run • Pope decides to withdraw NE back toward Washington • Union troops acquit themselves well during battle • Made several valiant attempts to reform & hold (Map)=> • Blame lies solely with Pope’s incompetent leadership

31. Second Manassas- Results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Major tactical & operational victory for South • Humiliating defeat for North • Popesuffered 14.5K casualties to Lee’s 9.5K • Lincoln& most Northerners harden attitude toward South • Conclude harsher methods to be required (Emancipation Proclamation) • Also strategic victory for South: • South encouraged by victory (European recognition & support) • Pope’s Army ejected from Virginia • Remainder of McClellan’s forces redeploy back to Washington • Lincolnreappoints McClellanas commander (Why?) • Who else available who has commanded an Army (also popular w/men) • Lee now sees opportunity to head North into Maryland

32. Battle ofAntietam(Sharpsburg)- Dispositions • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses: • Lee versusMcClellan (again)- No change • Even with “lost order #191” • Intel windfall for McClellan • Does he take advantage of it? • Force dispositions (Map): • Lee: 50K effectives (40K engaged) • Deployed as 3 separate groups • McClellan: 75K effectives (46K engaged)

33. Battle ofAntietam- Strategy & Tactics • Confederate Diplomatic & Political Objectives: • Encourage Maryland to secede • Gain recognition from Britain • Influence U.S. midterm elections to support Copperhead Dems • Strategic, Operational & Tactical Objectives: • South: End War with major battle victory in North’s territory • 1. Shift combat operations to North’s territory • 2. Threaten Washington & cut key rail bridges to interdict Union LOCs • 3. Take advantage of North’s untouched food source & logistic supplies • 4. Forage in North and give Virginia farmers a break • North:react to Lee’s movements and protect Washington & Baltimore • Keep Union Armybetween Lee’s Army and Washington

34. Antietam-Campaign Plan & Deployment • Lee’s Plans & preparation: • Secure LOC to Valley at Harpers Ferry • Must divide Army to accomplish (Jackson) • Plan’s assumptions & their risks: • McClellanwill continue to be cautious & slow to redeploy • Risk: something unexpected happens • Operational & tactical Deployment: • Lee’s Division of his forces (Map)=> • “Friction” & McClellan’s lost opportunity: • Lee’s lost Battle Plan- Special Order 191 • Caution versus speed: McClellan starts out OK then reverts to old plodding self • Slows to crawl & gives Lee time to re-concentrate his forces just in time

35. Battle ofAntietam- Execution • Battle of South Mountain: • Buys Lee time to concentrate his divided forces • Fallback to Sharpsburg: • Urgent re-concentration of Lee’s Army • Battle line drawn with Potomacto his rear (risk!) • McClellan’s slow & fragmented attacks • Piecemeal & uncoordinated sequential strikes at Lee • Starting at Lee’s LF=> • Then movestoCenter=> RF

36. Battle ofAntietam– Tactical Interior Lines • Lee’s efficient management of scarce resources & interior lines • McClellan’s piecemeal attacks allow Lee to exploit his interior lines • Lee able to plug holes by shifting his defense to where it’s badly needed • But Burnside finally crosses “his” bridge on Lee’s right flank • Pushes thin Rebel line all the way back to Sharpsburg’s outskirts • Lee is finally out of options • “And then up comes A.P. Hill” • Conducts forced march from Harper’s Ferry • Attacks union left flank and stops their further advance

37. Battle ofAntietam-Results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Tactically a draw- heavy casualties on both sides • “Bloodiest battle of war”=> • Union: 12.4K vs. Rebel: 13.7K • Lee forced to withdraw back to Virginia • North therefore held field and could claim “victory” • Operationally & strategically a setback for South • None of Lee’soperational or strategic objectives gained • Political & Diplomatic impact: • Lincolnable to use “victory” to issue preliminary what? ?____________________________ • British & French forced to rethink recognition of Confederacy • (Last real chance for recognition of South lost)

38. Battle of Fredericksburg - Prelude • Lincoln relieves McClellan as he continues to dawdle in place • (last and final time) • Appoints Burnsidewho doesn’t want job • Cmders’ strengths & weaknesses • Burnside:a mediocre corps commander • (Simply out of his depth & knows it) • Slow, plodding, tactically inferior & inflexible • Force dispositions: • Leewithdraws across Potomac to Fredericksburg on south bank of Rappahannock • Establishes strong defensive position with 72.5K effectives • Burnside: marches “On to Richmond” with 114K (Campaign) • Forms skirmish line north side of Rappahannock opposite Lee

39. Battle of Fredericksburg- Strategy & Tactics • Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives; • Burnside: “On to Richmond!” (via the flanks) • Union strategy: slip passed Lee’s right flank • Cross Rappahannock at Fredericksburgbefore Lee opposed it • Lee: block Union advance to Richmond • Build strong defense position & invite attack • Plans & preparation: • Burnside orders pontoon bridges to cross river • Bridges arrival delayed 2 weeks until December • Lee able to concentrate his forces in strong defense • Maryes Heights exceptionally strong- arty sighted on all approaches

40. Battle ofFredericksburg-Execution & Disaster • Engagement (11-13 Dec 1862): • Burnsidesends Federals across river • Rebel snipers inflict casualties but Union soldiers press on • Union establish themselves in Fredericksburg town center • Lee patientlyawaits Fed. attack • Burnside orders 10+frontal assaultsin all- • All fail with horrendous losses • Bloodiest over an open field against impregnable defense on a hill behind a stone wall • Gibbon’s advance is typical (in yellow) • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Resounding tactical victory for Lee • Causalities: Union- 12.6Kversus Rebel- 5300

41. Assessment: Stalemate & Contributing Factors • Geography: • Virginia: numerous rivers & creeks (spring rains) • Difficult to maneuver & deploy forces rapidly (time) • Western Theater: greater distances: • Stretch out Lines of Communication & supply; • Overland LOCs (rr) especially vulnerable to attack: • Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg • Example: Van Dornat Holly Springs& Bedford Forrestto NE • Different fighting capacities & trade-offs: • North: Mpw, Logistic/supply, $$$ & industrial power • South: Well led & motivated troops, aggressive tactics

42. Assessment –Toward Total War • Contrasting perspectives: • Federal view: South’s determined resistance surprising • McClellan’s theory: small Southern elite were main culprits • Grant: Surprise assault at Shilohproved otherwise: • Especially after Union victories at Forts Henry & Donelson • Peninsula Campaign convinced the rest of North – long war • Total Warnow appeared unavoidable • Grand Strategy required major revision for Total War: • Southern society must now be changed by force; • Northmust overthrow South’s entire way of life; • Total War requires new & harsher tactics: • Seize & destroy property, crops, & all material support; • Destroy industry & towns & RR, & treat civilians as enemy

43. Back-up Slides

44. Western Theater • Meanwhile – other operations initially conducted in the West had little significant strategic impact on the war • Grant’sfirst overland campaign to capture Vicksburg had to be abandoned when his LOCs are attacked by Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to the NE • Leaving Sherman unsupported & ultimately repulsed at Chickasaw Bluffs • Bragg’s raids into Kentucky & Tennessee end with limited tactical success & little strategic relevance • Culminating in little more than a tactical draw against Rosecransat the Battle ofStones River (Murfreesboro)

45. Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro) • Execution: 31 Dec 1862 • Bragg anticipates Rosecrans and beats him to the punch • Attacks Union’s right flank at dawn exploiting tactical surprise • Surprised Union troops on right collapsed into closed “jackknife” like defensive stance • 2 Jan 1863: Bragg then attacks Union left across Stones River • Union holds & its arty decimates Rebel attack • Bragg is forced to withdraw 30 miles SE to Tullahoma

46. Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg • Long LOC (via rail) vulnerable to cavalry raids • Van Dorn’s attack atHolly Springs • Bedford Forrest to NE • Grant forced to abandon campaign when LOC cut off • Subsists off land => key Lessons Learned (LL) • Sherman left unsupported at Chickasaw Bluffs: • Soundly repulsed by Vicksburg’s defenders • It’s back to “drawing board”